Transit-18

It seems that I have drawn out this series so much that the forecast is gradually turning into a commentary. But let the reader not worry. I promised myself to write exactly 21 episodes (as a child I loved to play the corresponding card game). Moreover, the last article has already been written. And I will, of course, return to forecasts. However, mixing “fairy tales and stories” has its advantage: life corrects forecasts. This is exactly what happened with my reasoning around possible compromises between the new president and the security forces.

While discussing current events with colleagues, I discovered one omission. We are talking about another fear that can reconcile the new president with the security forces. This is the fear of losing property. I would venture to guess: the greater the property, the greater the fear. But here, for some, we are talking about billions of dollars and for many, about billions of rubles.

Imagine yourself in the place of some Putin friend in a high administrative rank, who did not waste time occupying the chair given to him, and managed to become one of the “few” or “many”. You are now torn by conflicting considerations. On the one hand, you understand that your chair is your protection and the opportunity to increase your well-being. But at the same time, while occupying it, you are forced to lead a double life: a public one, in which you pretend to be a dignitary concerned with the fate of the state, and a shadow, real one, in which you are engaged in a cool business. It's tiring. And you cannot fully enjoy your wealth. Because, on the other hand, I want to leave and take care of the main thing - my stolen business. But in this case, there is a danger that your property may be taken away by colleagues who come to take your place, using your own proven methods. What a dilemma! Think about it and sympathize with these unfortunate people.

Now let’s compare a number of facts with this. On the one hand, the composition of the new government. I agree with many commentators who claim that this composition is not suitable for solving any pressing problems of the country. It is true that the total power of the displaced security forces has decreased (while maintaining the necessary influence on the situation). But their total influence on the ability to increase the capitalization of their assets and privatize new ones has sharply increased. They have already begun to realize the first opportunity by sharply increasing prices for the products of natural monopolies, and are trying to realize the second. Thus, the main function of the new government is to tidy up and distribute everything that has not yet been capitalized by them. But this means aggravating the severity of the dilemma described above, increasing fear along with the planned growth of capital. On the other side of the scale are Medvedev’s urgent (to the surprise of many) initiatives. Here is a partial list of them.

First . Even before his election, in Krasnoyarsk, Medvedev announced that he intended to abolish the practice of appointing officials to the governing bodies of state corporations (companies with a dominant share of state ownership). I was simply dumbfounded then. After all, the idea is absolutely correct. Several years ago, INDEM devoted a separate study to this problem. But he thereby encroaches on one of the key tools for enriching the current generation of officials at all levels! Isn't it strange?

Second . Constantly discussed topics of restoring legal order, combating legal nihilism, improving the work of courts while ensuring their independence, etc., etc. But let us remember who was the final and decisive authority in numerous cases of taking away someone else’s property. Well, of course! - managed and dependent courts. This means that Medvedev is encroaching on another tool for enriching officials.

Third . Fight against corruption. It is interesting that when discussing the topic of fighting corruption, everyone talks about business corruption and the need to protect business from this evil. Meanwhile, citizens suffer from everyday corruption no less than businesses suffer from business corruption. And the long-term negative consequences of everyday corruption will be more severe (but this is a separate topic). I would like to assert that the authorities do not care about small businesses, that the bureaucratic moans about their plight are a smokescreen. They need to protect other businesses. I think readers can already guess which one. Finally, the enrichment of officials is entirely and without exception corrupt. Why is Medvedev encroaching on the holy of holies!?

Fourth . As part of the fight against corruption, they especially started talking about eliminating raiding. And this is after the public scandal that occurred during the pre-election period, when the powerful Sechin was accused of raiding. But it's not just him. It is no secret that raiding is also a favorite and widely used tool for the illegal enrichment of officials. The new president is bravely encroaching on him.

Now think about it (as they say now), reader. The foundations that are sacred to all bureaucracy are being encroached upon by the weak Medvedev, who has not yet truly taken power into his own hands. Why such courage? And why is the bureaucracy feverishly joining the fight against corruption? It's not just that, as I initially believed, Medvedev offered the bureaucracy a choice: either join in or risk being among the victims. Most likely, the matter is completely different.

History knows many examples when illegally enriched power cliques begin to fight for legal order. The reason is obvious: illegally obtained property needs legitimate protection. I dare to suggest that in this case we are faced with the same phenomenon. Lawyer Medvedev is called upon and mobilized to solve precisely this problem: to establish a legal order that can ensure in the future, when underground billionaires are included in the official list of Forbes magazine, the protection of their property.

My assumption allows us to see a number of consequences. Firstly, it is this mission of the third president and its successful implementation that makes Medvedev’s position invulnerable. No one will encroach on his presidency. Moreover, they will help as much as possible. Secondly, Medvedev has a more important function than being a temporary throne. No, he must work at full capacity, and he is not in danger of his predecessor returning. Thirdly, popular conversations about how the president and prime minister will divide powers, who will control the security forces, who the economy, who the army, and who foreign policy, are completely unimportant. Their powers are divided differently: Putin completes the privatization and division of the country, and Medvedev ensures the future security of the final result through legal means. Fourthly, the length of stay of Putin and most of his closest business associates in the executive power structures is determined by the success of the implementation of the plan described above. They joined the government not in order to remain in power, but in order to increase and keep the property acquired through hard work. Fifthly, the statements of intentions that I listed above are quite sincere, no matter how funny it may seem, and how sincere the intentions of our security officers-businessmen and their legal advisers can be. Only we must correctly understand their goals, and therefore their possible actions. And sixthly, the thaw, about which so much has already been said, will be very one-sided. In particular, it will not be in the political sphere. After all, the operation ahead is very delicate, delicate. No one can interfere with her. But it will be, as they see it, localized in the sphere of business relations and relevant legal areas.

Those who have been lucky enough to read previous articles in this unwieldy series have probably already recognized a familiar plot in my vile fabrications. In the article “Transit-10” we began to discuss the traps that the Putin regime has built for itself, against its own will. There was a trap on the general list called “Free” Wealth.” Then I wrote: “With their practices they demonstrate to everyone: it’s easy to become rich, you just need to first get power.” This is exactly what they are afraid of now: others may take advantage of their experience. Another self-quote: “... the current regime is afraid of color revolutions, afraid of defeat in fair elections, but it itself is cultivating a more real threat to itself: illegitimate violence from its own kind - to gain both power and wealth.” The threat grew, became real and caused the fear with which this article began.

Let me remind readers of the article “Transit-13”. There I fantasized about “what Medvedev will and won’t do” as part of the transition to the “Dictatorship of Development” scenario. In particular, I wrote: “... the positive vector of the efforts of the new presidency will be aimed at restoring the institutions of legal regulation destroyed under Putin and increasing their effectiveness. These efforts are associated with combating corruption insofar as it concerns eliminating the causes that increase corruption. The ineffectiveness of institutions is one of these reasons. First of all, special attention will be paid to the judiciary.” (It’s nice to remember my predictions that came true.) I also remain unconvinced about what the new president will not do.

However, I was mistaken in the assumption that these actions would be carried out as part of the transition to the “Dictatorship of Development” scenario in conditions of severe conflict between cliques. But if my basic assumption is plausible, there is no talk of any development. We're not so naive as to believe the promises of Putin's magnificently hopeless program, are we? Once again: just look at the composition of his government, at the absolutely stupid, ridiculous, random distribution of functions. And we must remember the main thing: property obliges. And a large property obliges you tenfold. Do our new oligarchs care about development?

But where will we go then? Let me make some assumptions.

First: conflicts between Putin’s cliques are tactical in nature. Strategically, the plan to introduce legitimate mechanisms to protect the property of new oligarchs after they leave positions of power requires a certain consolidation, traces of which, it seems to me, we are already seeing. Therefore, along the “consolidation-conflict” axis, a shift towards consolidation should be recorded.

Second: since the scope of the law is planned to be extended only to business relations and the protection of property rights, one should not expect a decrease in the rigidity of the regime. This concerns the trend along the “adaptability-rigidity” axis.

Third: let me remind you that in the article “Transit-14” I wrote: “... an attempt to “charge” the right to normal work in the sphere of business relations will inevitably lead to the expansion of legal relations into other areas, including political ones.” Those. a dosed introduction of the work of law has a high chance of failing towards an uncontrolled (by the authorities) expansion of this zone. This means that the shift along the “playing by the rules - playing with the rules” axis will be quite significant.

Now let’s look at the trends in the political space that correspond to both the previous drift of the Putin regime and the predicted drift of the new presidency. I emphasize that the following figures indicate trends, tendencies, and not states.

Figure 1. Projection onto the plane of the axes “adaptability-rigidity” and “playing by the rules - playing with the rules” of four basic political scenarios and points describing the political regime in Russia in 1991-1996. and in 2001 along with the trends of 2001-2007 and 2007-2008

Now let's look at the second projection.

Figure 2. Projection onto the plane of the “adaptability-rigidity” and “consolidation-conflict” axes of four basic political scenarios and points describing the political regime in Russia in 1991-1996. and in 2001 along with the trends of 2001-2007 and 2007-2008

The given pictures allow us to draw scenario conclusions. Instead of the trend towards the “Security Dictatorship” that I had previously expected, we are witnessing a shift towards “Sluggish Russia”. True, this trajectory passes dangerously close to the “Dictatorship of Development” scenario for the authorities. If we return to my previous forecast, this means that it is only partially realized. We will see, at least at first, only an imitation of the “Dictatorship of Development” scenario with corresponding rhetoric and symbolic movements. What can come of all this, we will discuss in the next two articles. The final article will be devoted to a completely different topic. I'm the one who intrigues you so much.

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The reader has the right to ask: what about the other versions that I discussed in previous articles in the series? The answer may seem trivial: they can all be fair at the same time. Let me explain my point.

When I was young, I was interested in physics. Then it seemed to me that it and mathematics contained the coolest adventures of the spirit. It was there, I believed, that the ultimate truth was attainable. A shock, although not leading to disappointment, was the realization that an electron is both a particle and a wave at the same time; and the atomic nucleus can be thought of as both a translucent glass ball and a drop at the same time. Which metaphor or model is correct depends, for example, on the conditions of interaction of the object with the environment.

In life, especially social life, everything is even more complicated. Its different models can be true in the sense that they are implemented simultaneously - sequentially, in parallel, mixed up. What does this look like plot-wise? I can only guess. Well, for example.

I admit that the version is correct, including the one voiced by me, that the nomination of Medvedev as a successor was an improvisation related to the response to the strengthening of the security forces. I admit, since this happens often, that Putin and his entourage had many different versions regarding his future presidency, including Putin’s possible return to the throne. The bureaucracy's fear of uncertainty and instability caused by the transit of power could give rise to the idea of ​​Putin's premiership. When Medvedev began to play the role of successor, he began to voice as his plans exactly what was familiar to him both as a lawyer and as the former head of the commission that developed the administrative reform program. Then he could realize that the fight against corruption is a considerable symbolic resource that can develop into a power one. His opponents could also begin to realize this. At the same time, bargaining began over personnel changes and the distribution of powers, along with clarification of what to do with the new configuration of power. It was then that the idea that I formulated in this article could have arisen.

By the way, such a picture of life, quite real, in my opinion, entails an important consequence. The fight against corruption remains a multifunctional task for Medvedev: this is also part of the plan outlined in this article; and, as before, a tool for increasing symbolic and administrative capital; and a means of improving controllability. Or maybe even, somewhere deep down, a sincere desire to defeat evil.

Here's a picture, let's say.

To be continued

Author - President of the INDEM Foundation