
According to the measurements of sociologists, the ratings of the first persons, government and governors are falling. Moreover, to the level of a minimum after monetization of benefits. It seems that the principle of "sausage in exchange for freedom" ceases to work. And this is already threatened by failure in the elections of the party in power. The choice is small in power.
The ratings of trust and approval of the tandem fall and show minimums. According to the last survey of the Levada Center, 66 percent of citizens, Putin-69-minus 3 and 4 percentage points compared with February this year, approve of the activities of Medvedev. The ratings fell strongly in January.
So, in relation to the end of last year, Medvedev lost 9 percent of the rating, Putin - 10. The same picture is also observed in a traditional survey of confidence in politicians (they are asked to name several politicians who trusted the interviewee): Putin trusted 49 percent in December, now - 39, Medvedev - 40 percent in December, now - 34 ratings of the government and regional authorities also We fell strongly from December (6 percent).
The ratings are actually a rather subtle matter: any interpretation is associated in a certain sense with fortune-telling on coffee grounds. They reflect something, but what exactly? Other experts say that the fall is a pendulum, after the summer-autumn peak of the popularity of the tandem. In the summer there were fires, there was a feeling that the state could not cope - there was a tangible drop in ratings. Then autumn - September - the resignation of Luzhkov, strong moves and again the growth of ratings, interest - first of all, to the head of state, ” said political scientist Mikhail Remizov. “At the same time, there was an increase in the rating and prime minister, but for another reason - he managed to straighten the situation with fires, played a noticeable public role,” the political scientist said.
Then, in the ranking of the current prime minister, there was also a certain decline after the monetization of benefits, which the elderly did not like much. Pensioners believed that the reform would significantly worsen their financial situation. The decline in the ranking occurred immediately after rallies against the monetization of benefits (from 69 in December 2004 to 65 in January 2005, the rating of United Russia then “sagged” from 41 to 35 percent).
Now the financial situation really worsened, not only by expectations. At the end of 2010, surveys recorded the main dissatisfaction of Russians - 27 percent, summing up the results of the year, noted a decrease in income or simply their low level as a “bad”. This is lower than in the crisis of 2009, but above everything else Putin's decade.
The previous maximums were observed in 2001 and the crisis 2008 - then 24 and 23 percent, respectively, complained about the poor level of income. Another most important problem for Russians is close and own diseases, but there is no direct connection with the fall of the rating of the first persons. Relatively low (although not as much as in 2009) the number of those who celebrated that the year did not bring anything bad - optimists 27 percent, which is below the level of the pre -crisis of 2006 and 2007 by 5 and 7 points, respectively.
In 2008, citizens testified to the Levada Center survey in all spheres of public life expected noticeable improvements: first of all, in terms of the state of the Russian economy (the balance of positive and negative expectations was 43%: 5%). According to Levada, in the field of order and legality the balance was 34%: 5%, in the field of material well -being - 36%: 9%. In 2008, only 5% to 9% of Russians expected deterioration in 2008. Currently, they are already noted from 9% to 43%. At the same time, the maximum deterioration is recorded in the field of the state of economics and corruption (30 percent) and material well -being of the population (43 percent).
According to recent reports of the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM), the number of dissatisfied and even ready to reach protests exceeded nothing of such non -experienced (49 versus 45 percent). As we have already noted (see the nation ), this does not mean the growth of the real street activity of the broad masses.
However, threatens specific political costs. As can be seen from the example of the monetization of benefits, the rating of the party in power is significantly more dependent on popular discontent than the ratings of the first persons. And we soon have elections to the State Duma. In the party, the authorities emit optimism . “The latest data of the“ Levada Center ”show that the fluctuations of the party’s rating have recently were seasonal. It was a winter that always leads to a deterioration in the well -being of people, moreover, it was not everywhere that they managed to immediately cope with the problem of unreasonable growth of housing and communal services tariffs, ”said Andrei Isaev deputy.
True, measurements of parties ratings before the beginning of the Duma campaign are caused by a well -known skepticism among political strategists. But the latest regional elections in a number of regions demonstrated the real, low for the “obese years”, the popularity of the party of power (see close to failure ). And this is already fraught with low elections (up to the loss of the simple majority in the lower house of parliament, although it is extremely difficult to believe in this today) and some reformatting of the public political field. As well as relations on it.
Social -request data, as we might assume,
Now the “sausage” is getting more expensive against the backdrop of income, but “freedom” is not. Yes, in principle, no one needs it if you have to give the “sausage”. But dissatisfaction is growing and gradually pours out into a very specific discontent with power in general and even the first persons in particular. In addition to this, dissatisfied exclamations of regional elites are heard (see the threat of a party line).
In these circumstances, the authorities seem to have two exits of the quick raising of the rating: creating a tangible (not necessarily real) external threat or buying loyalty. Plus: conducting a bright and truly relevant political campaign, and not a dull rate on the helpless theme of housing and communal services. The first option, as the example of Nicolas Sarkozy shows (the operation in Libya began in the evening before the local elections, but the gallists lost the election with a bang), does not always help. Apparently, Kudrin will have to fork out.