Translated material
Meeting point - Kyiv
A Ukrainian friend of mine, a Russian Orthodox priest, is raising seven children: natural and adopted children together. This is quite difficult, since all adopted children are social orphans - orphans with living parents. So, one of the boys in his care, in addition to his father, also has a biological and legal (according to documents) father.
In some ways, the described family situation is reminiscent of Orthodox life in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC MP - the name is purely journalistic; strictly speaking, there is no such organization) has both genetic (Patriarchate of Constantinople) and legal (more precisely canonical - Moscow Patriarchate) fathers. But the feeling of orphanhood when communicating with the laity and clergy of the UOC does not leave for a second.
The Ukrainian authorities consider the UOC a “foreign church”, Constantinople is flirting with the “Filaretites” and “autocephalians”, and representatives of Moscow are not at all complimentary about Ukrainian national identity. It’s a shame, given that a bishop somewhere in the Ukrainian outback simply cannot communicate with people who grew up after the 80s; they don’t understand Russian. Otherwise they are perceived with distrust as a foreigner.
What about the Ukrainian language of worship? Just try to openly speak out in favor, they will immediately declare you a schismatic. After all, this is how the “Filaretites” serve, who in every possible way support their brand of “national church.” At the same time, none of the priests and bishops of the UOC that I have met are against translations of services. The most balanced and thoughtful position expressed by them, based on the documents of the Local Council of 1917-1918, assumes the parallel coexistence of Church Slavonic and Ukrainian (as well as Russian) languages of worship. And there are even individual examples of parishes serving in Ukrainian in various dioceses of the UOC. But this is still rather an exception; there is no way out in sight.
Answering a question about the future of Ukraine, Fr. Igor, a former university history teacher, sadly said that, most likely, the country would face division. As in 1918, when the UPR (Ukrainian People's Republic with its capital in Kyiv), Western Ukrainian (center - Lvov), Kharkov Bolshevik Republic and Crimea were formed. And the point is not only that there are objective preconditions: the West traditionally gravitates towards Poland, the East towards Russia, and the South towards Turkey. And when I asked my friend if there was a “pure” Ukrainian language - without Polonisms and Russisms - he noted, not without irony, that such a language was probably being created now... with Americanisms.
The trouble is that there is no influential social force that would be interested in bringing the country together, that would offer truly unifying things. Consider only the provisions from a school history textbook that Bolshevism in Ukraine was forcibly introduced by the Russians or attempts to recognize as veterans of the Second World War - by the way, the expression “Great Patriotic War” was completely abandoned - members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who fought on the side of the Nazis, and fighters of the division SS "Galicia". This is on the one hand. On the other hand, there is the cynical use of the UOC by Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions during the election campaign, when priests were obligated, almost for a fee, to receive propaganda leaflets for distribution among parishioners, or the notorious statements of the Moscow mayor about Sevastopol as a Russian city.
Against this background, the actions of the leadership of the UOC seem quite consistent, logical and dictated not only by political considerations, but also by pastoral concern for their acutely politicized and divided flock.
Without insisting on autocephaly, thereby comforting the Russian-speaking part of its parishioners and even initiating the decision of the Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church, set out in the definition “On the unity of the Church” (where, in particular, it is said that “revision of the canonical status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is unhelpful for the modern church life of Ukraine"), in fact, it took the path of independent action. Thus, a message recently published on the official website of the UOC states that the Patriarch of Constantinople is coming to Ukraine to celebrate the 1020th anniversary of the Baptism of Russia at a double invitation - from the church and the state. At the same time, as the text of the message emphasizes, “the church invitation has priority for him; without it, such a visit would be impossible.” The invitation is not personal - all the necessary formalities have been met, but it nevertheless opens the way for Patriarch Bartholomew for a historic visit to Ukraine. The Ecumenical Patriarch will visit Kyiv for the first time.
The unequivocal support of the Patriarchate of Constantinople for the UOC is noteworthy: “representatives of the Church of Constantinople emphasized that Patriarch Bartholomew comes to visit the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and recognizes exclusively His Beatitude Metropolitan Vladimir of Kyiv and all Ukraine as the Primate of the local Orthodox Church. Therefore, Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople will take part in all events provided for in the program of celebrations, including state ones, together with His Beatitude Metropolitan Vladimir. For the same reason, representatives of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, during their stay in Ukraine, repeatedly emphasized that in those events where Patriarch Bartholomew will take part together with Metropolitan Vladimir, the participation of “hierarchs” from schismatic groups should be completely excluded.”
Such support from the Ecumenical Patriarch should, of course, help strengthen the position of the UOC not only in relation to the state and “schismatic groups” (that is, the same “Filaretites” and “autocephalians”), but also to strengthen its independence in relation to the Moscow Patriarchate.
At the same time, the very fact of the concelebration of the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Moscow is of great importance for maintaining pan-Orthodox unity. After all, this happens extremely rarely. The last time, it seems, was on the 2000th anniversary of the Nativity of Christ. The fact that Kyiv became the site of such an event on the initiative of the UOC can be attributed to the achievements of Ukrainian church diplomacy. We cannot agree with those who see the primacy of Patriarch Bartholomew at the joint worship as a humiliation for Patriarch Alexy II. This is the usual procedure in such cases. According to the diptych (list) of heads of local churches, the Ecumenical Patriarch is first among equals.
Thus, Ukraine's centuries-long vulnerable intermediate position - between West and East, North and South - has been brilliantly turned into an advantage. Kyiv is becoming a meeting place for leaders of world Orthodoxy. Perhaps this concern for inter-Orthodox dialogue will reveal one of the distinctive characteristics of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is confidently finding its place in the community of local Orthodox churches. Although now it sounds somewhat paradoxical, but perhaps it is Orthodox Ukraine that plays an important role in overcoming the contradictions between the Second and Third Rome, Greek and Slavic Orthodoxy?
PS When this text was already ready, news came that at the beginning of the celebration, banners with portraits of the Ecumenical Patriarch and the President of Ukraine together were hung around Kyiv. At the same time, according to the same information, the placement of banners with portraits of the Moscow Patriarch is prohibited by the authorities.
How can you comment on this? Mr. V.A. Yushchenko is probably haunted by the laurels of the winner of the church schism of his former Russian colleague. But such an obvious, if not crude, demonstration of one’s church-political preferences, as in the case of banners, is unlikely to contribute to achieving the intended goal. It’s trite, but the church sphere is extremely delicate and such methods are counterproductive. However, the actions of the state authorities do not cancel the ecclesiastical significance of the celebrated event and the fact of the joint participation of the Ecumenical and Moscow Patriarchs in it.