Around Russia

Ukraine is not Belarus?

September 6, 2011 Inna Bulkina



Gas exacerbations between Moscow and Kiev usually take place strictly according to the calendar, and we are already used to the fact that the main “military operations” develop closer to the cold, and the climax occurs exactly by the New Year. But this time the maneuvers began with a noticeable manual: in fact, they coincided with the beginning of the political season and the official opening of the Duma campaign. Observers from Kyiv, not without reason, associate the stiffness of the Kremlin’s position with the next rhetorical need to “blind the enemy” - Yushchenko was better for this role, but Yanukovych will come in the current circumstances.

Nevertheless, Kyiv made the first move: on September 1, the Government of Ukraine handed over a letter to the Russian government with a proposal to negotiate. In fact, it was about a revision of an extremely unprofitable gas contract, signed in 2009, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and then Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. Ukraine raised this issue for a long time, and Moscow clearly made it clear that the strict conditions can be softened, and the incomprehensible price should be reduced, but only if Ukraine joins the Customs Union or in exchange for “merger” (read: acquisition) “Naftogaz” Gazprom. The latter was read as a Belarusian scenario, and Yanukovych answered in the spirit that "Ukraine is not Belarus." As for the Customs Union, Ukraine was satisfied with the compromise format “3+1”, and ideally, the free trade zone with the European Union.

The Russian side immediately replied that “there are no specifics”, that the “dependents”, they say, and again “a penny for fish”. The next move of Kyiv was “specific”: Ukrainian Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov announced the restructuring (in fact: liquidation) “Naftogaz”, which, one way or another, will lead the revision of the agreements after him. Previously, the verdict in the case of Yulia Tymoshenko - the so -called The “Bulgarian version” (Bulgaria after the change of power terminated the unprofitable agreement with Russia: the new government accused the predecessors of “abuse of powers”). Russia at one time has already shown that there would be no “Bulgarian version” that the Stockholm arbitration is a long -playing story and that winter will come earlier than the good news from Stockholm. And an immediate answer followed the move with Naftogaz: every liquidated company has a successor, and Gazprom doesn’t care, as it will be called, if only he paid. Or "merged, absorbed." Miller’s comment sounds unequivocally: “... after the merger with Gazprom “ Naftogaz of Ukraine ”as a business entity will cease to exist, there will be a liquidation period, ... and because of this, all the agreements that exist at the moment will be revised.” In other words, you wanted Bulgaria - you will receive Belarus.

This is Pat. Players, of course, can go to the next round, but today observers on both sides are looking for arguments for a compromise.

The main Russian argument is winter.

Yanukovych Azarov is not so obvious, but here the game is more complicated. Firstly, there is Türkiye in the rear of Ukraine, which frankly slows down the story with the Southern Stream, which means that Russia will not have an alternative to the Ukrainian Pipe in the near future. Secondly, Ukraine traditionally expects to agree with Turkmenia: Yanukovych’s visit to Ashgabat is scheduled for September 12-13.

And finally, there is a “European map”: any exacerbation with Russia leads to “warming” with Europe, in Kyiv this simple two -ways have long been learned. The European plot is somewhat darkened by the trial of Tymoshenko, but there is a flip side: if the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office goes to the end and proves the guilt of its ex-Prime Minister, who signed a bondage agreement, it thereby “substitutes” the second signal-Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. It seems that Europe is really ready to play this game, at least in late August.

The European Parliament International Trade Committee decided not to block the signing of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement because of the trial of Tymoshenko. And in the coming days, it is planned to sign the agreement with Shell on the extraction of Ukrainian shale gas. Experts believe that an additional 10 billion cubic meters, together with 20 billion, the gas already extracted in Ukraine, in principle, remove the “Russian question”.

However, Yanukovych is unlikely to go for an unambiguous exacerbation and make such an obvious choice. The liquidation-restructuring of Naftogaz has one tricky advantage: you cannot privatize a single national company, but in parts it is possible. And let this “cake” already cut and divided between “its own” in the project, at some stage you can also deliver Gazprom a “piece”.

Be that as it may, reports on the last meeting of the two ministers, Konstantin Grishchenko and Sergey Lavrov, make the parties “smoothing the corners”: they are unit from the trial and not without significance recall the Black Sea Fleet (we recall that the last significant “gas disc” was achieved at the Kharkov negotiations in the fleet).

Photos of RIA Novosti