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Date
11/10/2014
Author
Hidden
Source
New Times
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Translated material

What does Putin want?

Expert survey: before the annexation of Crimea, Putin was a member of the Eight and one of the most influential world leaders. After-Russia turned out to be excluded from the G-8, was under serious sanctions, and is on the verge of finance and economic crisis. Putin underestimated the possible reaction of the West to events in Ukraine or, on the contrary, deliberately chose confrontation?

KIF DARDEN, professor of American University:

Putin, of course, underestimated the reaction of the West. He did not expect sanctions at all, and even more so did not expect Europe that Europe would join them. It seems to me that he also did not understand how much the Western economy and how these opportunities were used against him have. Arno Dubyen, director of the Franco-Russian Analytical Center of Observo: in fact, the Russian president was mistaken with Germany-the fact that Chancellor Merkel, whose phone was listened to the Americans and on which it was very angry, will nevertheless remain in the positions of the Euro-Atlantic policy, became an unpleasant surprise for Putin. However, it is not a fact that the West would have gone to strict sanctions against Russia if the tragedy with the Malaysian Boeing had not happened. However, EU sanctions will probably be canceled in the summer of 2015. Ukraine as an economic entity is drowning and will continue to sink, but Russia, with all costs, will most likely withstand the chatter. So it is not at all obvious that Putin will eventually be losing.

Fedor Lukyanov, editor -in -chief of Russia in Global Policy:

This is not so much a course to confrontation as a reluctance to do anything to correct the current geopolitical situation. This is a “disconnection” from the West as a reference point, what it was for Moscow for a long time. Russia is no longer going to navigate in its actions to the Western reaction. Putin proceeds from the fact that the United States has committed sufficiently foreign policy actions, the results of which deserve the most stringent criticism. One Middle Eastern policy of Washington, which is otherwise than incoherent and provoking new problems, cannot be called what is worth it. Secondly, President Obama, recently speaking to the UN, from a high rostrum put Russia on a par with the Ebola virus and cephalre from the IG. What reaction can be expected? Thirdly, Putin came to himself that it is pointless to talk with the United States, their approach will not change until the structural structure of the world that arose after the Cold War changes.

Pauline Jones Lungu, Professor of the University of Michigan:

Putin just appreciated everything: he knew that the west reaction would be slow and quite weak. He knew that there would be no military intervention (NATO) in Ukraine. This is what Putin really did not expect is the scale of the negative impact of sanctions on the weakening Russian economy. At the same time, the counter -sanctions from Russia hit primarily on the Russian population and on the trading partners of Russia in the countries of the former USSR.

Strogub Talbott, Director of Brookings Institute:

The answer to this question is not yet clear. If Putin manages to get out of sanctions and force the world to accept the annexation of Crimea and virtual occupation/annexation of the territories of Eastern Ukraine, then he won-at least in the near and medium-term future. A lot depends on the solidarity of the Atlantic community. But in the long run, Putin certainly lost, so the external threats that Russia will have to face is not coming from the West (EU Plus NATO), but from the south (Islamic extremism, which is already breaking the way to the Caucasus) and from the east (China is poor in resources, but a rich country that looks rich in resources, but a little -willed. Siberia). Finally, threats to him come from the inside, from Russia itself: the inability or refusal to modernize the economy, the slow -down demographic “bomb” - the abbreviated Slavic population of Russia, the systemic crisis in healthcare - all this will make itself felt.

Dmitry Train:

The Western policy of sanctions formally sets the goal of changing the policy of Moscow, its rejection of claims to a significant independent role in the world. Since there are little hopes that President Putin will change his course and surrender to the United States, the most consistent figures in the United States realize that to achieve the goal, a change of regime in the Kremlin is needed. The calculations on the elite front were not justified, it remained to hope that the general deterioration of the economic situation in the Russian Federation will lead to mass social discontent, the split of the top and the palace coup (“change of regime”) or revolution (“change of the system”). It must be borne, however, that among Western politicians, including American ones, there are not many strategists. Unlike the USSR, modern Russia is not perceived as the main problem and the main threat to security in the United States or Western Europe. Leading media portray her rather a "hooligan requiring an approximate punishment." Under these conditions, sanctions are more likely an instruments of punishment than elements of a well -thought -out strategy. At the same time, few people think about the fact that the sanctions policy, firstly, helps to rally the bulk of the population of Russia around Putin’s figure (and against the West), and secondly, leads to the formation of the Chinese-Russian alliance in Eurasia and a wider informal anti-Western coalition.

Sergey Medvedev, professor of the Higher School of Economics:

Putin acts in the kids logic of collision, punching on weakness and the deflection of the opponent. He constantly tests and pushes the border of the permissible, but does not cross it. This is a tactical move in the game, but not a strategic gap.