What was it really?

The diplomatic scandal between Moscow and Kiev that occurred this week actually marked the start of the Ukrainian presidential election campaign... in Russia. Actually, this is precisely how Kyiv politicians and Moscow journalists characterize Dmitry Medvedev’s harsh statement – ​​as Russia’s participation in the Ukrainian elections. In Kyiv, they recall the anniversary of the operation to “force Georgia to peace” and, not without reason, believe that Ukraine is the next candidate for “forced pacification.” “The aggressive appeal of the Russian President is “aimed at consolidating the Russian nation and reformatting the image of the enemy,” said Igor Gryniv, a member of the Yulia Tymoshenko faction, not forgetting to add that if Tymoshenko were the President of Ukraine, “Russia would not dare to speak in such a tone,” that Yushchenko is a weak president and that “while they are chatting, she is working...”.

The head of the political council of Our Ukraine, Vera Ulyanchenko, responded on behalf of Yushchenko. She refuted at length and, in fact, redirected Yushchenko’s accusations of “unconstructiveness,” citing sociological surveys of the Ukrainian KIIS and the Russian Levada Center, according to which Ukrainians have strengthened their love of peace over the past year, while Russians have become quite the opposite: “The number of Ukrainians who consider Russians to be their friends and good neighbors during the period from March 2008 to March 2009 increased from 88% to 93%. But we cannot help but be disturbed by the constant anti-Ukrainian zombie that is happening in Russia. During the reign of the current Russian president, the number of Russians who consider Ukraine an unfriendly state has grown from 30% to 56%, that is, almost doubling,” Ulyanchenko said.

In other words, from now on the topic of “neo-imperial Russian aggression” has again become almost the main topic of the election rhetoric of the Ukrainian media, and Medvedev’s statement has become a kind of “go-ahead”: the 2009 campaign will be played out according to the same matrix as the 2004 campaign, we will get “two Ukraines”, we will distinguish them along the lines of pro and contra, relations with Russia will become a kind of indicator, etc. The problem here is not even that Russia lost the 2004 campaign, the problem is something else: whoever wins these elections will most likely not bear the name Yushchenko. Why did the Russian leadership need to revive the victorious theme of the previous Yushchenko campaign? Why bring the anti-Moscow card into play again and throw an ace of trump cards to the enemy?

What was it really? An adequate / emotional / asymmetrical (cross out what is unnecessary) reaction to Agreman’s delay, a demonstrative reluctance to deal with Yushchenko and a somewhat premature exclusion of him from the game? Like, there’s no point in making a ceremony now, there won’t be long left anyway... Or is it quite deliberate whipping up of hysteria on both sides of the “divided Ukraine”? The Russian concept of the Ukrainian elections is still based on this simple idea - and “and then you win”? Probably, both – the conscious and the unconscious in politics often work in resonance. What will we get as a result? Will Yanukovych's rating increase after all these events? If yes, then not by much; practically it is already at the maximum - 22%. Will Yushchenko's rating increase? Most likely, although it is unlikely that this will seriously help him. But the rating of Oleg Tyagnibok’s ultra-nationalist “Svoboda” will obviously skyrocket (as much as this is even possible in the case of a simulacrum party). So maybe that was the point?

Kyiv

Photos by RIA Novosti