
“The head of the Accounts Chamber, Sergei Stepashin, refused to fulfill Reiman’s order to run on Vimpelcom and decided to clap a door” - so you can summarize the reaction of the Moscow elite to Stepashin’s act.
Indeed, the most careful passengers are in a hurry to go ashore from the state “Titanic”: Gref and Phrases are found out in advance at the government’s meetings, who will be to blame, Khristenko, by rumors, asks somewhere away to Brussels (and what should he do in the government after the privatization of Magnitogorsk?), And even Phradkov rumors about his ill-deviation.
And here Illarionov made it clear that this power could no longer be advised, but only one can be rude.
It seems that Stepashin decided to follow the example of Illarionov.
Alas, only the impression.
If power is a drug, then Mr. Stepashin, in contrast to the unbearable heretic of Illarionov, is a much more lordician person.
Since the oligarchs called Mr. Stepashin to the successors of Yeltsin, and then they themselves changed their minds, Mr. Stepashin is in a humiliating position of the person who was invited to the restaurant, gave the menu to read-and then put it out without letting the soup. In this position, the dream of soup remains for life. At least lick the tablecloth.
Sergei Stepashin’s ability to accurately and impartial analysis of information, in my opinion, was best manifested when he was the prime minister at a visit to Wahhabi Chabanmakhs and Karamakhi. Stepashin brought humanitarian aid to Wahhabis and expressed himself in the sense that these Wahhabis are good guys. Wahhabis also liked the visit. It was then that they concluded that if such a boss in Russia can begin.
Who is to blame that such a person did not become the successor of Yeltsin?
Of course, Abramovich.
Can you forgive Abramovich?
It is forbidden.
The result of an irreconcilable attitude towards Abramovich was the well -known romance of the Accounts Chamber about the adventures of Sibneft on Chukotka, which, it seems to me, is an episode with the debt of Chukotka on a “golden” loan - 9.3 billion rubles. The loan, however, was received and stolen into the board of the previous governor Nazarov, who at the time of the creation of the text worked as an auditor of the Accounts Chamber. But who pays attention to such trifles when a large and passionate feeling lives in the chest?
In the existing structure of the authorities, the Accounts Chamber served as an organ that is very necessary for the Kremlin: a preliminary collision body. It was not used for a real blitzkrieg: there, as we see in the Yukos case, ballistic missiles in the form of the prosecutor's office and the tax service were used.
But the Accounts Chamber was a miracle as good for exploration by battle. For a situation where Stepashin could make it clear to the next person involved in the report that he was fulfilling the Kremlin’s will, and the Kremlin, having settled all the questions, could make it clear that Stepashin acted on his own.
Once, in the early 90s, the bodies of the organs were wiring a way of obtaining control over the business: bad bandits in agreement with the authorities ran into a stall-this was called a breakdown-and good organs drove them away.
In a country where wiring has become a method of business management from the winning Cheka, the Accounts Chamber was an ideal punching tool.
A great example of this: a privatization report, which was widely fed, and then completely disappeared from the TV screens. It seems that the defendants are presented secretly in parts.
In this wiring system there is one drawback: it cannot be used too many times. Sooner or later, businessmen cease to perceive the Accounts Chamber as something terrible, which we need to be afraid and what to agree with.
The only means of legitimization of the Accounts Chamber in this case is the confirmation of the powers of its head.
Therefore, Stepashin put the authorities in front of an impeccable chess fork. Or the president will again appoint him the head of the Accounts Chamber, thereby sharply raising the stock index of this institution. In principle, this is an ideal output for the Kremlin, because Stepashin is very to the place. On the one hand, it will not be his own and will not be his own (not only Stepashin remembers that he was married to the successors, but Putin will never forget this). On the other hand, he wants to be his own, and because of this is a big Catholic than the Pope himself.
Or, if the president appoints someone else, Sergey Stepashin will again be in the same position in which he was in 1999. In the completely empty market of opposition political leaders, where demand is hundreds of times higher than the supply, he will be able to advertise himself as a potential Yushchenko.
After all, once a person has already been invited to a restaurant and let me read the menu. Who knows - maybe they will give a second time to eat.