A discerned victory

On the eve of Victory Day, the head of the military-memorial center of the Russian Armed Forces, Major General Alexander Kirilin, announced the new official figures of the Council losses in the Great Patriotic War-8,860,400 dead. The total irretrievable losses of the armed forces, including those missing people who were captured or surrounded, but then returned alive, amounted to , according to the general, 11 million people. However, another report of Kirilin’s statement says that the dead militias and partisans are also included in this number.

If so, then an increase of more than two million people was received almost exclusively at the expense of militias, since the losses of the partisans were not so great and, moreover, at least half of the partisans were the fighters and commanders of the Red Army, who were surrounded or fled from captivity. According to our estimates, the total irretrievable losses of partisans do not exceed 240 thousand people (see: B.V. Sokolov. Occupation: truth and myths. M.: AST-Press, 2003. P. 99 and Sl.). But even if we take this maximum assessment, the total losses of the Armed Forces at the expense of the dead partisans who had not previously served in the Red Army can increase by at least 120 thousand people. And then it turns out that the total irretrievable losses of militias who died even before the transformation of militia divisions into regular people make up more than 2 million people, which exceeds the total number of militias. It should be borne in mind that the militias suffered the main losses in the fall of the 41st in boilers near Kyiv, Vyazma and Bryansk, and by that time the vast majority of militia divisions were transformed into ordinary divisions of the Red Army and their losses were taken into account along with the losses of other divisions. Therefore, the figure of 11 million irrevocable losses, apparently, includes additionally the official number of those who also died from captivity and surroundings, and by no means the loss of partisans and militias.

For those who have long been involved in the calculation of Soviet military losses in the Great Patriotic War, in a statement by General Kirilin is not enough. The value he named almost does not differ from the previous official figure of 8,668,400 dead Red Army soldiers (together with sailors, border guards and fighters of the internal troops), first given in the book “The Secret Screenshot” (m.: Military Publishing House, 1993) and repeated in its reprint under the name “Loss of the Armed Forces” (M.: Olma-Press, 2001). The total figure of irrevocable losses (with surroundings and surviving prisoners) in 11,285,057 people is also given there (though this is without border and internal troops).

As you can see, the last three digits in the seven -digit number (400 people) are sacred and inviolable for our military statistics. Although they cause, to put it mildly, they cause distrust among experts: the losses of the Red Army are, in principle, it is impossible to count even with an accuracy of hundreds of thousands, not like hundreds. The new value was obtained by simple addition to the previous 192,000 - it was so above that they allowed to increase the irretrievable demographic losses of the Red Army to demonstrate the fact that the commission to establish losses continues to work and takes into account criticism.

By the way, in the book "Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century", in addition to 8,668,400 dead, there are more about 500 thousand mobilized in the early days of the war, but allegedly missing even before arrival in their units. Perhaps now 192 thousand of these 500 thousand people were decided to be recognized as dead and at their expense to increase the total number of dead in the Red Army.

Along the way, General Kirilin repuls the opponents. He claims that "some so -called historians" "say and write that from 35 to 45 million Soviet soldiers died in the Great Patriotic War." This is a clear overexposure. The author of this note is often accused of the greatest "bloodthirstiness" in terms of determining Soviet military losses. So, even my figure of dead Soviet soldiers is 26.4-26.9 million people. Obviously, absurd estimates of 35-45 million dead were needed by Kirilin only to discredit critics.

The general claims that the entire male population of the USSR before the war amounted to 90 million people, of which 34.2 million were called up. However, it proceeds from a clearly low assessment of the population of the USSR by the beginning of a war of 194 million people. Meanwhile, in June 1941, the CSU pre -estimated the population of the USSR within the new borders at the beginning of 1941 in 198.7 million people. They managed to make a second assessment before the start of the war only in Moldova and the Khabarovsk Territory. It turned out to be higher than the preliminary by about 4.6% (V.S. Krasurin. On the population of the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War // Military Historical Journal. 1991. # 2. P. 23-26). If we assume that it was approximately the same inconsistent in other regions, and taking into account the natural increase for the first half of 1941, the total population of the USSR by the beginning of the war can be estimated at 209.7 million people, including more than 100 million men.

As for the total number of mobilized in the army, then here the official figures are significantly underestimated at least at the expense of those called directly in the part, the centralized accounting of which was not produced. For example, only the Southern Front and only in September 1943 called directly in the part of 115 thousand people from among the former surroundings and persons who had not previously served in the Red Army (RGASPI, f. 83, op. 1, 29, Ll. 75-77). It is worth noting that in those territories that were not occupied by the Germans in the first weeks of the war, the draftees were more profitable to be called encirclement, otherwise they could be held accountable for the fact that in the 41st they evaded mobilization.

As for the statistical data on which the authors of the books “The Secret Strip Filmed” and “Russia and the USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century” are based (and after them the military-memorial center), their inferiority is visible from one example. According to their information, on July 5, 1943, by the beginning of the battle near Kursk, the troops of the Central Front totaled 738 thousand people and during the defensive phase of the battle suffered losses (sanitary and irrevocable) of 33,897 people from July 5 to July 11. By July 12, when the Soviet offensive began, the composition of the Central Front has changed little. Two rifle brigades left it and one tank brigade was added. The number of a separate rifle brigade in the state ranged from 3,500 to 4200 people, the number of a separate tank brigade was 1300 people. Thus, due to the replacement of troops, the number of troops of the front could decrease by only 6-7 thousand people and by July 12, at least 697 thousand people were supposed to be at least 697 thousand. In reality, it amounted to only 645 300 people. When I publicly indicated to the author of the corresponding section to Captain 1st rank M.V. Filimoshin on such a striking inconsistency, he in response began to shout that he could not be responsible for the numbers that other people brought in the documents several decades ago. When I asked the head of the author’s collective, Colonel General G.F. Krivosheev that he had at the Arithmetic School, he indignantly replied that he had graduated from a school with a gold medal. I'm afraid that General Kirilin is no better with arithmetic.

For example, he claims that the materials of the archival card of the Ministry of Defense containing data for 18 million dead are unsuitable for calculating irrevocable losses, since "they were compiled during the war with unqualified workers and were repeatedly duplicated (several documents were received from military units, hospitals)." It is understood that the current employees of the military memorial center surpass them on their heads in terms of qualification.

Meanwhile, in reality, in the file cabinet of the dead, which, on the basis of the archival cards of the Ministry of Defense and the data of search detachments, is conducted by the Museum of the Great Patriotic War on Poklonnaya Hill, already in 1995 there were about 19 million names, and now there are already about 20 million of them. But even if we take the initial cardboard of the Ministry of Defense, clearly incomplete, 18 million names, it turns out if you believe Kirilin that everyone who died in them in them. He was taken into account twice. It’s hard to believe in this.

It is also hardly worth considering a reliable assessment of losses in military burials, as Kirilin does. He indicates that 9,100 thousand Soviet military personnel rest in military burials. However, many warriors of the Great Patriotic War have not yet been buried. Most Soviet military graves are mass graves, and how many soldiers are in each of them are not known for certain.

Alternative calculation methods give higher and closer to the truth the numbers of irrevocable losses of the Red Army. For example, I had a chance to assess these losses based on the data on the monthly dynamics of losses to wounded for the entire war and monthly data on irrevocable losses for 1942, choosing the month in which almost all irrevocable losses were killed, and not on prisoners. Having added the dead losses and celestial losses, I received the above figure of 26.4-26.9 million dead. By the way, contrary to widespread opinion, the highest losses killed and wounded by the Soviet troops were in 1943-1945, and not in 1941-1942, when there were heavy losses by prisoners. So, the greatest losses wounded, and therefore killed were killed in July and August 1943. In third and fourth place are losses in July and August 1944, and the honorary fifth place is occupied by the loss of April 1945 - the battle time for Berlin.

You can use the data on the irrevocable losses of officers of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht and their ratio with the losses of ordinary people. This method gives an assessment of irrevocable losses of the Red Army in approximately 21 million people, but it seems less reliable. If we proceed from the assessment of the losses of the German armed forces given by B. Müller-Gillerand (4 million people), and the above assessment of 26.4-26.9 million dead Soviet military personnel, the ratio of losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front will be approximately 10: 1. The ratio of irretrievable losses on the Soviet-German front, taking into account the losses of the German allies, as well as those Soviet citizens who died in the ranks of the German armed forces, will probably be close to 7: 1.

All the tricks of our military department to maximize the reduction of the losses of the Red Army in the Great Patriotic War are aimed at making them comparable to the loss of the Wehrmacht and retroactively prove that the Soviet commanders fought not by the number, but by the ability. Unfortunately, this is very far from reality.