Neo -feudalism in Russia

On November 24, the head of the analytical department of the Taiga.info site Alexei Mazur made a report at the first meeting of the economic discussion club in Novosibirsk, dedicated to the topic “National Capital in the context of globalization”.

Formally, I have neither economic nor socio-political education and scientific degrees. But, on the one hand, I received a fundamental education as a physicist, and on the other, I have been a bearer of unique experience: for the past twenty years, I continuously took part in political processes in Russia, observing the transformation of both political institutions and people included.

I hope that it is obvious to everyone here that political and economic processes in modern Russia are not only interconnected, but also determine each other. Today in Russia, money is converted into power, and power into money.

On this round table, we are talking about the creation of national capital, or, in the words of President Dmitry Medvedev, about the modernization of the economy. Other speakers have already said about what national capital is, how it is associated with modernization. I would like to focus on one important aspect.

To build any forecasts and give recommendations, we need to understand that for the political and economic system it is built today in Russia, what capabilities and restrictions it possesses. I had a fairly clear and structured vision of the current political and economic system of modern Russia, which I would like to share.

The role of corruption

The topic of my report declares corruption as an obstacle to the creation of national capital in Russia. We all know well, including from the words of the first persons of the state, that corruption is a big problem in Russia. At a completely official level, estimates are given that the volume of “shadow income” of officials is a third of the Russian budget.

But the question remains open - whether corruption is really a fundamental obstacle to the development of Russia. Often you can hear the allegations that corruption in Russia, although great, is not a significant problem. There are even theories that justify corruption - they say, thanks to it, the government makes economically optimal decisions. We also know an example of countries whose economics has quite successfully developed in conditions of high corruption (Italy). Modernization in the USA fell on the peak of gangsterism, the level of corruption in the 30s in the United States was quite high.

To answer the question of how important corruption is in Russia today, it is necessary to understand its nature, how it is caused and how connected with other phenomena in politics and economics.

First a little theory. What is corruption? As in many other cases, one universally recognized concept of corruption does not exist. Until recently, such a legal term did not exist in Russia at all, and jurists interpreted corruption as crimes related to benefit from their official position. However, often completely clear corruption is not a crime, because the law was originally written with “flaws”.

We will not stand on a narrow-legal point of view, since it does not give a complete picture.

Nikolo Machiavelli defined corruption as "the use of public interests for private purposes." This is a very good definition and we will return to its modern interpretation. The UN in its documents stands in a position that is closer to the narrow law, defining corruption as "abuse of state power to obtain benefits for personal purposes." Moreover, the benefit may not necessarily be in the form of a bribe - it can be “kumovism” - non -ism, and protectionism, and the departure from the fine “traffic cop” by demonstrating an official certificate. We will consider the definition used by the UNU corruption in the narrow sense.

We are interested in a broader definition.

Corruption in the broad sense is the use by the agent (official, state body, employee of the company, etc.) granted to him by the principal (state, people, company, etc.) of the authority to achieve the goals not provided for by the mandate.

This is a much wider definition than just “criminal law”.

How easy it is to notice that this definition of corruption falls not only the extraction of benefits from its official position. The vote of the deputy contrary to the election by promises is also corruption in its broad sense. Even if the deputy did not receive a bribe.

Today, the political system of Russia is totally corrupt in the broad sense of the word - all political figures act in the interests of not a mass voter, but organized bureaucratic and financial groups. This fact, as well as a high degree of corruption of the bureaucratic apparatus, determine the nature of the current political and economic system.

Why it happened

In the early 90s, the intention was declared to build a society of modern democracy in Russia. The theory of democracy, confirmed by practice in some countries of the West, as well as in ancient Greece and Rome, suggests that the voter, delegating certain powers to elect state figures, will then control their actions and vote depending on them.

Russian practice showed that for various reasons the mass voter is in the ignorance of the relatively real actions of his chosen ones and votes regardless of them.

The surge in mass activity of the beginning of the 90s did not last longer than one electoral cycle, after which the “game” went according to completely different rules, not provided for by the classical theory of democracy.

Today, the section of political science is developing rapidly, operating with political and economic models. Let us give tribute to fashion and consider one of these "models". Suppose that we have a certain number of “corrupt officials” and “honest” among deputies. Corruptions, having got into power, turn their capabilities into money. "Honest" protect the interests of voters. In the election, corrupt officials spend money on advertising in the media, honest counting on their reputation. What do we get in the end? If a significant part of the voters does not know anything about the activities of the deputies, focusing only on information in the media, if the media publish information only for money, then after the next electoral cycle the share of “honest” is inevitably reduced, and the share of corrupt officials is increasing. If voters and media do not change their behavior model, the outcome is obvious - all elected posts are filled with corrupt officials. Needless to say, according to what scenario the events developed in Russia?

From this moment on, the political system begins to live its life, almost independent of voters.

Corruptions are conducting a struggle for those resources that can be assigned, but at the same time they have a common interest - the voter must remain uninterrupted as possible.

In the context of modern society, it is impossible to conceal information. Therefore, the ignorance of the voter is supported not only and not so much by the control of the most mass media (although a lot has been done in this direction). The authorities are also trying to ensure that the voter as a whole is satisfied. The fear of mass indignation today limits the natural desire of the corruption “lower classes” to revenge everything “to the thread”. Since the overall interest of the corruption layer to keep the people in a state of “complacory ignorance” contradicts private personal aspirations, the Kremlin plays the role of the moderator, holding the “bottoms” from extremes. This feature is a feature of the system that is sometimes called "Putinism."

What kind of system is built?

After the political system “broke” from the mass voter in the early 90s, it began to live according to its own laws. These laws are extremely simple. Inside the system for political and economic resources, various organized groups - FIG, organized crime group, bureaucratic clans are struggle. There is no clear line between them, because in the future we will call all these groups “clans”. Thanks to political technology, money turns into votes, which gives an administrative resource, thanks to corruption, the administrative resource turns into money. Also, the administrative resource can directly contact the votes. Due to the ease of conversion in modern Russia, you can not divide the resource into financial and administrative, speaking about the "resource" in general.

Naturally, the capabilities of the clans to fight the struggle increase along with the resource. If in the “normal” legal system the court decision does not depend on the degree of significance and wealth of the arguing parties, then in Russia they depend. Most raider seizures of enterprises take place with the participation of government officials.

That is, the political and economic “game” that went in Russia in the late 90s-early 2000s can be reduced to a simple scheme: clans are fighting for the resource, the size of the resource increases the capabilities of clans in the struggle (“power” of the clan).

Two years ago, I was engaged in research on how the “system” from many players playing according to such rules can behave. I must say that the results are far from obvious and very curious.

The simplest forecast - the strongest clan will “devour” everyone else. However, the outcome of the game depends not so much on the initial distribution of the resource as on the manner of players' behavior, their ability to form alliances and defend collective interests (for example, from the ability of weak players to unite against a strong one).

The following moment is important: the dependence of the “power” on the “resource” is most often not linear. As a rule, this is explained by the inability to organize an effective bureaucratic structure even inside the clan. The deficit of quality managers applies not only to the state.

Having gained twice as much resource, the clan can only become one and a half times stronger. What does this lead to practice? A strong clan, instead of "burning" weak, puts them in subordination.

The form of such submission can be different, but, of course, it suggests “loyalty” (not to use its “power” against “overlord”, but to use “overlords” against the enemies) and very often - the payment of Dani.

Vassal dependence

The war of all against all for the “resource”, which in turn gives “power” for fighting, leads to the construction of feudalism (under one important condition: if the strength/resource ratio has the optimum with the size of the resource much smaller than the total resource).

The political and economic system of Russia, acting in the conditions of free conversion of money into power and back lived and developed according to the rules of feudalism and came in 2003-2004 to the construction of the “feudal hierarchy”. The system developed mainly under Yeltsin, and under Putin the winning clan, who put all the other clans in the position of vassal dependence, was determined. Moreover, the construction of the “vertical of power” was based precisely on feudal practice, and not at all on the “leadership of the law”.

As an example, I will give a conversation in 2006 between the head of the administration of the President of the Russian Federation Sergey Sobyanin and Alexei Lebed, who at that time headed Khakassia. It was about republican deputies who did not want to recall their representative from the Federation Council, despite the instruction received from Moscow. Details of the conversation were published in the Republican newspaper "Chance", presumably - from the words of Lebed himself: “When meeting with Alexei Lebed, Sergei Sobyanin expressed surprise that the government of the government could not put pressure on local deputies so that they made the right decision. To which Alexei Lebed allegedly stated that this is not included in the circle of his powers. Apparently, Mr. Sobyanin was not pleased with such an answer, because he was further expressed in the sense that if the governor cannot ensure one hundred percent implementation of Moscow’s attitudes in the region, then he cannot work in their team. They say that when, in the end, Sobyanin directly asked Lebed whether he was going to work in their team, Alexei Ivanovich replied that there was no such conditions, because, first of all, he was chosen by the people of Khakassia. We can only guess the reaction of Sobyanin, but the day after this conversation in the Khakassia government, a large -scale check of the Interdepartmental Brigade of the Prosecutor General and the Ministry of Internal Affairs began. ”

This information is important for understanding the principles of constructing and working “Vertical power”. After all, “if the governor cannot ensure a 100 % implementation of Moscow’s attitudes in the region, then he cannot work in their team” is a principle. It was not developed for Alexei Swan alone. It is clear that such conditions were adopted by the vast majority of current governors.

Sociologist Vladimir Shlyapentokh, a native of the USSR, now working in the United States, published the book “Modern Russia as a Feudal Society”, which shows manifestations of feudal relations in various areas of life in Russia. The book gives a fairly complete and convincing picture. I hope that I managed to supplement this picture with an understanding - how exactly the “neo -feudalism” developed in Russia and so it can exist in a society that has, in general, a modernist consciousness.

Economic consequences

The most important consequence is that in Russia there is no established property right, the main efforts of the clans are aimed at protecting “its own” and the seizure of “alien”, and not at development. The development that we observe is largely deceptive is captured and used previously accumulated potential. For example, the rapid development of the aluminum industry turned into a disaster at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station. It turned out that electricity was sold cheaper than necessary, due to equipment wear. The rapid development of construction in Novosibirsk was explained by the seizure of public land for private construction (point development, development of parks, etc.). The main approach of the feudal businessman is to “squeeze” the maximum possible from the captured resource without caring for restoration.

A low planning horizon is the second consequence of “neo -feudalism”. Moreover, the planning horizon changes several times depending on the situation in the country, but even in the best years it rarely exceeded several years. The peculiarity of the Russian economy is such that a significant part of the infrastructure requires the presence of a planning horizon calculated by decades. This is required by both the geography of Russia and the inheritance delivered from the USSR.

The third consequence is monopolism. Formally, most entities of the economy act within the framework of a free market. However, many industries pay tribute to the clans. Consider this model: the clan has the right to “put” or “not let” the company on the market. The fiscal policy of the clan is simple: he tries to raise the “entrance price” until the total amount of receipts stops growing (firms begin to leave the market). Thus, he experimentally gropes the “optimum”. A big mind is not necessary for this.

How do firms react? They increase prices for their goods until the “monopoly price” is achieved, which provides the maximum withdrawal of money from the population.

As a result, we observe a strange picture: there are a lot of firms, and “wraps” are very high for everyone and competition does not work.

The fact that a kilogram of salt costs only ten rubles, although there could be a hundred, says that not everything is so bad in Russia so far.

And the fourth, what we started. Corruption in Russia will be incorrect, while the political and economic system is feudal. At least for the simple reason that its real content is in direct contradiction with the ideologems underlying Russian legislation.

When the local government applies an administrative resource in the elections, or forces the business to “social responsibility” by unlawful methods, when the police disperse the pickets of oppositionists or throws drugs to activists - this is happening within the framework of “feudal obligations”. The Kremlin is not able to resolve such deviations from the law “in the interests of the state” and prohibit them in personal interests.

Is modernization possible?

The feudal system is good to hold power. It is extremely simple, stable, has multiple tools of influence, since it is not limited by law and laws. But effective management in the modern sense of the word in the feudal system is impossible.

Liberals are counting on the modernization of a private initiative and urge to give more freedom to business. However, within the framework of feudalism, the weakening of the grip center will be considered by the “barons” as the right to leave more. Not a dime will go to modernization.

Supporters of the project approach urge to make centralized investments in a particular infrastructure project. But, as we already see the example of Sochi and Vladivostok, clans begin a serious struggle for control over the resources going to the project. And not at all for their more effective use.

The feudal lord perceives the resource provided to him as his patrimony, as a tribute, as a fee for loyalty. The words “modernization”, “infrastructure project”, “growth point” mean nothing to him. He was not born yesterday in this country and knows very well what rules should be played by.

Is there a way out?

Obviously, the feudal political and economic system is in extreme contradiction with the idea of ​​the majority of the people about themselves and about Russia. Moreover, it contradicts the views of most participants in the system.

Most of the lives of most people are not related to this system. What is only the fact that so far there is not even a wide awareness of its character.

Наемные работники, хоть бюджетной, хоть небюджетной сферы не несут бремени не только налогоплательщиков, но и прямой выплаты дани феодальным кланам. Все эти поборы осуществляются косвенно. Зарплата меньше, чем могла бы быть, цены на хлеб, на проезд в транспорте, на коммунальные услуги — выше. Нефть, газ, уголь, лес — проходят мимо обывателя, как и деньги за них, а потому не раздражают.

«Неофеодализм» — это вариант феодализма «софт», он базируется не столько на насилии, сколько на равнодушии обывателя и высокой степени конформизма. Элементы угнетения и грубого принуждения практикуются в основном внутри системы. В случаях массового возмущения обывателей неофеодальная система, как правило, отступает.

Вообще, границы неофеодальной системы довольно подвижны. Путин привел «баронов» к подчинению, но не только не стал менять суть феодальной системы, но и существенно продвинул её границы «вниз». Построение партийной системы в современном виде — это приведение независимых пока политиков (вольной шляхты) к феодальной присяге. Есть выбор, какому клану присягать, но возможностей уклониться от присяги всё меньше и меньше.

Тем не менее, есть и обратный процесс. On the one hand, there is a task (the Kremlin) so that the population is more or less enough. Эта задача становится всё менее выполнимой в рамках неофеодализма, о чем свидетельствуют и посылы Дмитрия Медведева.

As we recall, in the Middle Ages, the end of classical feudalism laid absolutism. Абсолютизм становится возможным тогда, когда повышается качество бюрократического управления и тот самый оптимум сила/ресурс смещается ближе к границе «весь ресурс».

Purely theoretically possible is an option to improve centralized management. Что для этого нужно — это тема отдельного, большого обсуждения.

Другой вариант - пробуждение общества «снизу». Этот вариант кажется не менее фантастическим, чем первый, однако он гораздо более вероятен, чем кажется. Ведь вся феодальная система базируется на полном отсутствии обратной связи между избранниками и избирателями, а сама феодальная система полна противоречий. Вполне возможно, что уровень преодоления порога между феодализмом и демократией совсем невысок.

Какой бы ни был слой «непрозрачности» между властью и народом, однако он становится явно все тоньше и тоньше. Мы недавно в Новосибирске наблюдали, например, «тепловой скандал», в ходе которого депутаты горсовета, вопреки «феодальной присяге» приняли сторону народа (речь идет о ситуации, когда мэрия предложила гражданам заплатить из своего кармана деньги за «перерасход тепла» в прошлом отопительном сезоне, что вызвало неожиданный отпор городских депутатов из фракции «Единая Россия»). Да, это было половинчато, с многочисленными экивоками и увиливанием. Но важен следующий факт: народ еще даже не успел возмутиться, а депутатов подвигла на изменение стиля поведения одна лишь мысль о такой возможности. Впрочем, сказалась и близость предстоящих выборов.

Другой пример — повышение транспортного налога, чье поднятие в два раза и опускание через день мы недавно наблюдали.

Кризис, несомненно, привел к уменьшению общего ресурса, что ужесточает борьбу внутри неофеодальной системы, с одной стороны, и повышает давление на нее «снизу» — с другой.

Полагаю, что задача демонтажа неофеодальной системы в России должна быть поставлена на повестку дня. Без этого все разговоры о модернизации останутся разговорами.