37th and 41st

The documentary "Stalin against the Red Army" shown on NTV is called upon to answer two main questions: whether the Tukhachevsky conspiracy was and how much the repressions weakened the Red Army before the 41st year.

The first question in the film is not given a definite answer. The statement that there is no documentary evidence that could prove or refute the version of the military conspiracy is clearly erroneous. The materials of the Tukhachevsky case, which became available to researchers in the 90s, indicate that no evidence of the existence of a conspiracy except the testimonies of the under investigation, knocked out by torture, did not exist in nature. And these testimonies, which were written under the dictation of the investigators, were clearly fantastic and the story about the specific preparation of the military coup (pulling out certain units to the capital, their commanders, etc.) did not contain. But they abounded clearly invented details - such as the need to ask permission for a coup with foreign governments. And the authors of the film admit that the testimony of a military conspiracy was obtained by torture. To call a conspiracy the desire of Tukhachevsky and his comrades to shift Voroshilov from the post of People's Commissar of Defense, which they did not hide in the investigation would be a great exaggeration.

The film has a number of controversial and erroneous statements. So, it cannot be said that Stalin did not dangle along the fronts of the Civil War, like Trotsky, and that he failed almost all military affairs as a member of the Revolutionary Military Council. Even his opponents admitted that the successful defense of Tsaritsyn against the Cossack army of General Krasnov in 1918 was largely the result of Stalin's energy.

The hints that Stalin was the organizer of the death of Mikhail Frunze are unlikely to be founded. Firstly, Frunze himself insisted on an operation that became fatal; Secondly, in 1925, Stalin had not yet controlled the situation in the Kremlin to force doctors to murder a high-ranking patient.

When it comes to the dying letter of Yakir Stalin, in which he states that he will die with the name of Stalin on the lips, and on which Stalin left the famous resolution “Bright and prostitute”, then the part of the letter is lowered in the betrayal (“Then the failure of the Nightmare, into the irreparable horror of betrayal” and tries to pray life.

As for the repression in general, the opinion of historian Alexander Pechenkin rightly sounded in the film: "Personal devotion for Stalin was much more important than talents." Stalin chose to leave a “Konarmey” group personally devoted to him in the leadership of the Red Army and exterminate the “infantry” grouping of Tukhachevsky, who had competed with it, which allowed himself to disagree with the leader on a number of military issues. Stalin feared that during the coming victorious, as he thought, the “Red Bonaparte” could grow from Tukhachevsky.

The film is attended by children and grandchildren of repressed military leaders. Their words are understandable that the defeat of the highest command personnel in the 37th year catastrophically weakened the Red Army and became one of the main causes of the tragedy of the 41st year. Indeed, the terror deprived the Red Army of several talented commanders, such as Tukhachevsky, Ublievich, Yakir, who, in the opinion of both historians and military leaders, could adequately manifest themselves in the fields of the Great Patriotic War. At the same time, about the commercial abilities, for example, Blucher and Egorov, historians have great doubts. Repressions also negatively influenced the army in the sense that commanders of all levels began to avoid independent decision, fearing that they would be accused of treason. As for the level of combat training of the Red Army, then, contrary to common opinion, the repression was practically not reflected in it. As the historian Andrei Smirnov showed on the great documentary material in the wonderful book “The Krach of 1941-the repression has nothing to do with it” (M.: Exmo, 2011), the level of combat training of the Red Army in 1935-1936 was as low as in 1940-1941. In the same way, the commanders in the vast majority did not have practical command skills, acted according to the template, did not know how to organize the interaction of troops in battle and properly use the means of communication, taught troops not at all what could be required in the war. And the point here was not in repressions, but in the general cultural backwardness of Russia from the countries and armies of the West, which appeared in the First World War. For two decades, Stalin did not overcome this backwardness, and in the Second World War the Red Army was given to the Wehrmacht on his head, so the victory had to be bought very long.

The statement that sounds in the film that Blucher created a “brilliant army” in the Far East, sinners with great exaggeration. As the latest studies show, OKDVA's combat effectiveness was very low, which manifested itself in battles in Hassan. Just because of the failure on Hassan, Blucher was removed from his post, and then arrested, and once it is said that Blucher interrogated Beria, it is completely incomprehensible why in the film a man who looked like Blucher, he was talking about Blucher who did not interrogate Blucher.

As for Egorov in the film, inaccuracy is allowed. Efima Schadenko is mentioned on him that he, in a drunken case, Marshal was indignant that in connection with the defense of Tsaritsyn and Denikin’s defeat, Stalin and Voroshilov were remembered, and not him. In fact, there were two denunciations (the second belonged to the future general of the army and the head of the rear of the Armed Forces Andrei Khrilev), and the conversation of Schadenko and Khrulev and Egorov took place after a abundant drink in a narrow circle on the occasion of the appointment of Shchadenko, as a deputy of the People's Commissar of Defense, which followed at the end of November 1937.