The topic is not disclosed

I hope that with his recent article about Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Vladimir Abarinov interrupted the string of meaningless curses and “screamers” addressed to Prime Minister Putin and judge Danilkin. Indeed, it's time to start "soberly assessing the situation."

And for this you will have to formulate a number of uncomfortable questions. They arise with the same inevitability as in contemporaries of the indicative processes of 1936–38. Then they also rackled their heads why Bukharin and other former leaders of the Bolshevik party were recognized in monstrous crimes. In the case of the indicative process of our time, the question is why neither Khodorkovsky himself, nor his lawyers tried to turn this process into a process over the specific crimes of the Russian government and thereby make an acquittal inevitable. Not a single memorable performance of the defenders, similar to the fact that they sounded in the famous process of Vera Zasulich sounded.

I predict the reproach that the author forgets where the defendants are located. I do not forget - I have no illusions about the Russian prison. Moreover, I admit the existence of threats to the defendants in case they tried to reveal some secrets. Nevertheless, I believe that the defendants in the current process acted in conditions different from the Stalin. Moreover, the Kremlin, confident in its strength, gave the defendants a "public stand for protection", which Khodorkovsky himself recently admitted .

I think few will deny that the defendants and lawyers theoretically had the opportunity to replay the current government. Their speeches on the process opened the road to the Internet. They could publish articles and give interviews. Khodorkovsky’s lawyers were not limited on trips and spoke freely to the foreign audience. In such conditions, the process could really become a turning point in the history of Russian public consciousness if it grew into a process over the general practice of mafia power in the country. However, neither Khodorkovsky himself, nor his lawyers, or even more witnesses who performed in his defense, did not reveal a single secret of the ruling mafia, a high -ranking member of which was the defendant himself before the arrest. The process in the Khamovnichesky court did not become a process over the privatization of the early 1990s, over the collateral auctions, over the prevailing power mechanism of secret, anti-constitutional decision-making.

So far, to the question why the situation developed in this way, one can give only a general answer, but it is extremely important for understanding what is happening. “We hoped that with the advent of President Medvedev the situation in Russia would improve, ” Leonid Nevzlin admitted on his blog on the day of the sentence. “ It seemed on the surface that the KGBIST was replaced by an educated and liberal person, armed with the right words and an accurate understanding of the essence of the problems. He was thrown right and to the left -“ democratic institutions ”,“ modernization ”,“ modernization ”,“ modernization ” "The fight against corruption", "power of the law", instilled hope for positive changes and a new future.

Khodorkovsky himself counted on this. A conversation with the writer Boris Akunin, published in the journal Esquire, forgotten today two years ago, fully demonstrates his hope for Medvedev. In that conversation, he not only approved the actions of the Russian authorities in the international arena, namely the war in the Caucasus, but also stated that he was a supporter of a strong state and that "the state as a whole is a sacred symbol."

In accordance with the attitudes of the accused, his lawyers also acted. An important point for understanding their behavior was the clarification of their colleague Boris Kuznetsov: “Lawyers are connected by positions with the defendants. If Khodorkovsky says:“ I am innocent, and I never find myself guilty, ”then no lawyer, even a hint, ask the court to mitigate the punishment ... this is his choice.”

It turns out that the defense tactics from the very beginning were to focus on the personal confrontation of Putin and Khodorkovsky, on the unbending of the defendant, on his moral superiority, at the political component of the process. In this case, the defense perfectly coped with the task. Such an interpretation was greatly facilitated by the defendant himself for his articles and interviews. As a result, not only in Russia, but also abroad, many agree that "the only reason for the persecution of Khodorkovsky is his beliefs and activities aimed at strengthening democratic and liberal values ​​that are in strict antagonism with the autocracy and corruption of Putin’s power." The logical consequence of the new sentence was the proposals on the nomination of Mikhail Khodorkovsky to the Nobel Prize of the world.

However, if you strive for an objective analysis of existing information, it will be necessary to admit that none of the defendants in the process was able to go beyond the space, the rules in which the Kremlin sets. Not only Judge Danilkin, prosecutors and witnesses, but also the accused and their defenders. Khodorkovsky himself, with all the firmness of the spirit he showed, was morally not free of obligations to the Kremlin. Despite the years spent in conclusion, he did not dare (or did not consider such an opportunity at all) to ask lawyers a fundamentally different strategy and tactics of their protection. It turns out that even during the second process, Khodorkovsky remained faithful to the concepts on which the Russian government acted and continues to act. Moreover, in 2008, he recognized the right of this power to dictate the rules of the game: "Let the power, while it is power, chooses to whom to go with, knowing that we will bring not only our knowledge, but also our ideals."

Otherwise, it would be necessary not only to reveal a lot of secrets, but also to attract as accomplices “a whole bunch of characters who continue to remain in power,” as Mikhail Khazin rightly remarked .

Nevertheless, it is the mafia power, in contrast to the rule of law, that is able to present surprises. Perhaps some of the higher courts will change the deadline. It cannot be ruled out that President Medvedev will dare to have a pardon if the Kremlin decides to continue the game in the competition of two parties - conservative and liberal - in anticipation of the elections. By the way, the completely informed editor of the “independent newspaper” Konstantin Remchukov recently hinted at such a course of events: “When we met Dmitry Medvedev a couple of weeks ago, I asked him a question on Khodorkovsky, by the sentence. And he answered seriously, looking into his eyes, he says: I believe in the verdict of the legal system, which will be issued by the judicial system ... Judge Danilkin is not the end of the justice system in Russia and then he said that he said that he said that he said that he said that he said and then he said that he said that The president has such tools as pardon.

In the meantime, one thing is unconditionally clear: the process in the Khamovnik court, which will go down in history as the Khodorkovsky process, has become an integral part of the Russian puzzle called "Sovereign Democracy." The largest secrets of this puzzle will have to solve future historians, whose disposal will be especially secret documents of the current government - those, of course, which will not be destroyed.