Deja vu

In January 1993, a few days before the resignation of the presidency, Bush Sr. authorized a missile attack on Iraq and thereby ensured the continuity of the course. In June of that year, Clinton ordered the destruction of Iraqi intelligence headquarters. The basis was information about the impending assassination attempt on Bush. In the fall of 1994, another phase of the Iraqi crisis almost turned into a new war. The Clinton administration, however, for a variety of reasons, failed to mobilize the kind of support that Desert Storm received in its day. This forced Washington to change tactics. CIA agents began to spy on Saddam, turning the UN special commission into their roof. As a result, the commission was not just compromised - it ceased to meet its tasks and was dissolved.

By the end of Clinton's second term, the administration's political will had waned altogether. The Iraqi opposition did not receive effective assistance, although this was required by the law passed by Congress. The sanctions regime has worn thin. Last year, Russia became the initiator of the violation of the air embargo with Iraq. Behind the Russian dense wedge, planes of other countries were pulled to Baghdad. At the same time, the mission was always humanitarian. The permission of the UN sanctions committee was requested, but waiting for a response to the request was already considered an unnecessary bureaucratic formality. It got to the point that a Palestinian plane with wounded Hamas militants landed in Baghdad. On the return flight, he set off with a cargo of medicines so needed by Iraqi children.

The current American administration has people in high positions whom Saddam rightly considers his personal enemies. For Dick Cheney and Colin Powell, the Gulf War was a high point, and there is absolutely no reason to believe that their views on the Baghdad regime have changed significantly. As there is no reason why this could happen. On the contrary, there are reasons to harden positions towards Iraq.

At a Pentagon briefing Friday shortly after the missile attack, Gregory Newbold, Chief of Operations of the Joint Staff, explained that General Tommy Franks, commander of the US Central Command, had recommended the attack on the Iraqi air defense system. Since four of the five attacked facilities are located outside the southern no-fly zone, the military needed the approval of the commander in chief. Otherwise, Newbold said, the operation fully fits into the combat mission set by the allied aviation, which ensures the regime of non-flying zones. President Bush, in turn, called the operation "routine" and said Washington would continue to do the same. He may have meant to say that such operations SHOULD become routine. Either way, Saddam received a compelling message about the new administration's intentions.

Characteristically, this time, not only Russia, but also France and Germany, whose foreign ministers were just about to have lunch when they found out about the strike, knew nothing about the US plans. Characteristically, immediately after the strike, State Department officials met with members of the opposition Iraqi National Congress, led by its leader Ahmad Halabi, and promised financial support, in particular for the organization of radio broadcasting to Iraq. The allocated amount is also called - 29 million dollars.

Moscow for the last time recognized as justified a missile attack on Iraq in June 1993. She, of course, would not have been able to do this if Washington had not notified her in advance. But it wasn't just a notification. The United States had reason not only to expect a negative reaction from Russia, but, more importantly, to do everything possible to avoid such a reaction. The Kremlin received an exhaustive CIA dossier on the involvement of Iraqi intelligence services in plotting the assassination of Bush, coupled with a promise to treat the Russian military presence in the "near abroad" with understanding. Subsequently, Moscow decided that bargaining was inappropriate here, and the former confidence gradually faded away. Nevertheless, Russia's reaction should be recognized as very moderate. There can be only one explanation: Moscow felt and calculated the effect of Iraq's absence on the world oil market.

Pictured from Peoples.Ru : Saddam Hussein