
No one has doubts that the elections were a simulation. Putin’s competitors did not particularly bother, knowing their role in advance. The drama broke out between those who had not had their candidate dissatisfied and Putin, to whom nothing threatened. Putin, in fact, did not make the look that he was fighting with his competitors. For the most part, he did not receive attention, did not even mention. Everything turned out as if this simulacra suddenly acquired the features of something real (but only, of course, not elections). Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the emotional involvement of people and, of course, Putin himself. It seemed that the prime minister suddenly (for the first time in his life) felt that he was forced to join the political area, from which he fenced off for many years. Surprisingly, he made the impression of a person who accepted the call - in no way, however, not personified for him. And when at a victorious rally he said with a tear in his eyes that he won and won “honestly”, I think he believed in it.
Of course, the "honesty" of this victory was not honesty in the generally accepted sense of the word. It was honesty "in relation to meanness", according to Shchedrin, "honesty" in the framework of the simulation (that is, the only one of the available authorities). It was expressed primarily in an unheard of, almost the mobile mobilization of the administrative resource, which acted with full dedication and not counting money, starting from video cameras and ending with the transportation, placement and financing of tens of thousands of people. "Honesty" was also expressed in a decrease in the number of criminal manipulations, in the fact that the rate was made on the unprecedented use of false absenteeisms, which could be voted quite legally. Huge lists of continuous cycle workers were fabricated, even whole non -existent plants were invented. These imaginary workers were brought in hundreds of miles, etc. I'm not talking about organizing huge rallies. All this was “honest” in the sense that the state honestly laid out one hundred percent, and not limited to several state -owned posters, letting all the rest of the money into the cut. Putin really fought without sparing his stomach, and his military rhetoric corresponded to his military spirit.
This behavior, however, is not so easy to explain. The prime minister knew no worse than others that the results of sociological surveys are talking about his inevitable victory - if not in the first, then in the second round. He knew, of course, and that he did not have a single real competitor. Then what is these passions around, what for the sake of these titanic efforts of bureaucrats?
He once said about himself that he was not a politician, but an official. And this, of course, is so. The politician knows how to exist in the zone of changing public moods, opinions, sympathy. His victory is never provided in advance. This is a risk man. The official, like any zealous manager, does everything to minimize the risk. It is easy to make sure that the intolerance of the risk is not related to Putin exclusively with the all -devouring desire to remain in power at any cost. The rhetoric of stability, "swinging the boat" accepted by him - all this from the same psychological repertoire.
This feature is clearly visible in Putin’s economic policy, the result of which is mixed. On the one hand, the results of this policy are catastrophic - complete dependence on energy, the outflow of capital, a terrible investment climate, the decay of high -tech industries, the extinction of small and medium -sized businesses and the like. On the other hand, Putin’s team managed to relatively painlessly pass the period of an acute crisis, from which many Western countries still have not been erased. But these merits - large reserve funds, budget balance - are exclusively in the field of stabilization and reduction of risks. In other words, Putin is absolutely incapable of innovation and incentives for development, but is effective in the field of insurance and creating a margin of strength. It is no accident that it was formed in the bowels of state security .
It seems to me that the entire dramaturgy of the elections was not built around in advance of a clear result, but around the end to the end and not formulated strategy. Dissatisfied with the regime tried to reduce the level of predictability of events, and Putin with inhuman stresses tried to sharply strengthen predictability. He managed this due to partial delegitimization of his own power.
The fact that the predictability coefficient of preceded elections has become such a significant component, says a lot.
Unpredictability intensifies as democratization. Mubarak, of course, is much more predictable than those who replace. Putin, painfully responding to international factors of economic destabilization, undoubtedly attributes democracy to the category of dangerous destabilizing factors. In February, at the Russia 2012 forum, Putin clearly formulated the dilemma that was worried. He asked the Nobel laureate, economist Paul Krugaman, whether he believes that democracy is non -viable, as he takes the people to the streets and thereby prevents politicians from taking the decision necessary to minimize economic risks. Democracy in the minds of our president is an annoying element of unpredictability in a world that needs in order.
Krugman replied that only democracy allows us to adjust the mistakes inevitably made by politicians in the silence of their offices. I would add that democracy and the related unpredictability, although they do not insure from failures and failures, carry another important positive element.
In the XVIII century, the idea of people about time and history changed. The concept of "new time" appeared (neuzeit). The German scientist Rainhart Kozellek, who studied this concept, wrote that the “New Time” canceled the idea of time as a constant reproduction of the past and the idea of the present as a moment determined by the past. This orientation has changed towards the future, and historical events began to be understood as a chain of accidents. For a clear reason, people are in a random dual feelings. But only an accident allows you to take place a new one. Only unpredictability provides forward movement.
The more we are directed to modernization, the more we must come to terms with the risk. This is clearly seen in the example of the rapid development of what Venture Capital is called - “venture capital” (when adapting this term, the Russian language was lost by the Venture with Aventure and Adventure - “Adventure”). Venture capital is the money invested in innovative production, the result of which is poorly predictable. If an attempt is crowned with success, he can bring large profits, but the danger of failure is great. Since 1946, when the first two venture companies arose in America, venture capital has constantly increased in volumes. Silicon Valley arose on the basis of this risking and ready for loss of capital. It is he who is the engine of the technological modernity.
The modernization epic around Skolkov shows to what extent the current Russian state is not able to think in the categories of unpredictability. Instead of creating flexible financial structures with a high risk of Skolkovo, from the very beginning, it was conceived according to the model of the Soviet “mailbox”, whose main task is to minimize risks, and therefore innovations.
The past elections have split the electorate into two unequal categories: those who want changes, who are tired of the endless predictability of archaic political and state structures, and the heirs of socialism, with all their might clinging to immobility, stability and predictability. It is stupid to condemn the latter. Some opposition journalists in their hearts call the Putin electorate "cattle", "black", "anchovies". Such vocabulary is unacceptable. The stagnation agents became both crooks afraid to lose access to the "trough" and unfortunate, more than anything else afraid to lose the little that they have.
Putin entered a dialogue with modernity as an agent of immobility, ready to "die near Moscow", but to prevent innovative risks. Fantasies on the topic "Putin 2.0", "Putin and changes" seem completely groundless to me. It is in this context that the figure of Prokhorov, the only participant in the election campaign, understanding the essence of the business and the risk associated with him, and, as I believe, not without a certain risk for himself, which was involved in this hopeless game. In any case, he seemed the only "modern" figure in this dusty booth of old puppets.
Unpredictability is not only a property of modernity, new time. In the theater, this is a sign of reality that can invade the performance and change its move. Strange, serious observers forced the protagonist of the play to suddenly feel in cardboard decorations and, perhaps, for the first time during his stay in power, the wind of changes. It was the unpredictability for a moment that turned the waved backs into a pumpkin, and drawn horses in real mice. All this, of course, is ghostly. But Putin for the first time on his body experienced a breath of this wind and the uncomfortable of life in the unpredictable modernity.