2009 was a good year for China. In the midst of a global recession, the Chinese economy was still striving forward. US President Barack Obama came to China more as a petitioner to the imperial court than as the leader of the greatest superpower. Even the Copenhagen summit on climate change ended the way China wanted it to: attempts to oblige China or any other industrialized country to significantly cut carbon emissions failed, with the United States taking all the big shots.
The Chinese government under the Communist Party has every reason to feel at ease. Then why was it necessary to sentence to 11 years in prison the quiet ex-professor of literature Liu Xiaobo, who only publicly advocated freedom of speech and called for an end to the one-party system of government?
Liu co-authored a 2008 petition, "Charter 08", signed by thousands of Chinese and calling for respect for indigenous human rights. Liu is not a rebel calling for violence. His ideas, publicly stated in articles on the Internet, are completely peaceful. Nevertheless, he was imprisoned for "incitement to undermine the government."
It is utterly absurd to suggest that Liu is capable of undermining the colossal power of the Chinese Communist Party. Nevertheless, the authorities considered it necessary to make his example illustrative, so that others would be discouraged from expressing such thoughts.
Why is a regime that seems so solid afraid of mere opinions or even peaceful petitions? Perhaps because he doesn't feel as confident as he seems.
Without legitimacy, no government can rule with confidence. There are many ways to legitimize a political structure. Liberal democracy is only a recent invention. In the past, a system of hereditary monarchy worked, often reinforced by spiritual authority. And some modern despots, like Robert Mugabe, have used their former reputation as fighters for national liberation as a prop.
China has changed a lot in the last century, but has remained unchanged in one thing: it is still governed by a religious concept of politics. In it, legitimacy does not rely on mutual favors, necessary compromises, cunning and resourcefulness, which form the basis of the economic concept of politics on which, for example, liberal democracy is based. The basis of religious policy is a single faith implanted from above, ideological orthodoxy.
In imperial China, this meant Confucian orthodoxy. The ideal of the Confucian state is "harmony". If everyone adheres to a certain set of views, including moral standards of behavior, then conflicts will disappear. The subjects in this ideal system would naturally obey rulers as sons obey fathers.
After a series of revolutions in the first decades of the 20th century, Confucianism was replaced by a Chinese version of communism. Marxism attracted Chinese intellectuals because it was scientific, introduced modern moral orthodoxy, and, like Confucianism, was based on the promise of perfect harmony. In the end, in the communist utopia, conflicts of interest were supposed to dissolve. Mao's rule combined elements of the Chinese imperial system with communist totalitarianism.
However, this orthodoxy was destined to fade. Few Chinese, even among the highest ranks of the Communist Party, have remained a convinced Marxist. This created an ideological vacuum, quickly filled in the 1980s with greed, cynicism and corruption. This crisis gave rise to the performances that swept across China, collectively known as the "Tiananmen". Liu Xiaobo was in 1989 an active spokesman for the position of students in the protest movement against corruption in official circles, for the expansion of freedom.
Soon after the massacre in Tiananmen Square, Chinese Marxism was replaced by a new orthodoxy: Chinese nationalism. Only one-party rule can guarantee China's sustainable rise and end centuries of national humiliation. The Communist Party was the bearer of China's destiny as a great power. To doubt this is not only wrong, but also unpatriotic and even anti-Chinese.
From this point of view, Liu Xiaobo's critical views were truly subversive. They cast doubt on official orthodoxy and therefore on the legitimacy of the state. To wonder, like many, why the Chinese regime did not negotiate with students in 1989, or to agree in any way with its critics today, is to misunderstand the nature of religious politics. Negotiations, compromises and agreements are elements of economic policy in which every deal has its price. On the contrary, those who rule over the unity of faith cannot afford bargaining, for this would undermine faith itself.
I do not mean to say that the economic concept of politics is completely foreign to the Chinese, or that the religious concept of politics is unknown in the democratic West. But the attachment to orthodoxy is still strong enough in China to remain a passive shield against political criticism.
This state of affairs may change. In other Confucian societies, such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, liberal democracies are flourishing today, and there is no reason to believe that such a transition is not possible in China.
But it is unlikely that this will happen under external pressure. Many non-Chinese, including myself, signed a letter of protest against the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo. We hope that this will encourage him and give moral support to those Chinese who share his views. But it is unlikely to impress those who believe in the current orthodoxy of Chinese nationalism. Until China frees itself from the clutches of religious politics, Liu's ideals are unlikely to take root, and this does not bode well for China and, of course, the rest of the world.
Novaya Gazeta with Project Syndicate (C), 2010