Post-Bush syndrome

The nightmare of Russian politicians is beginning to take shape. As a result of "Super Tuesday" Senator John McCain, in fact, guaranteed himself a Republican presidential nomination. At the same time, in the final pairs with Clinton or Obama, the inflexible veteran has good chances. There are too many annoying traits in both Democratic contenders, and the Arizona senator is able to act as a kind of unifier.

Is it time to prepare for a new cold war?

McCain, of course, cannot be denied adherence to principles - he criticizes Russia for a long time, harshly and consistently. Other candidates, however, also did not particularly favor our homeland. If they showed interest in it (very little), it was negative.

But the fears are hardly justified.

American foreign policy has historically been defined by the alternation of two approaches: interventionism, that is, active intervention in world affairs, and isolationism. The worldwide "democracy promotion" of the Bush era should have given way to a more restrained course. Moreover, by analogy with the post-Vietnamese syndrome, many predict a post-Rac one for the country.

However, judging by the current campaign, the US does not plan to moderate its foreign policy ambitions. The 2008 elections are generally unusual: the focus is on international affairs. And it's not just that America is at war in the Middle East. The question is broader - how to ensure the world leadership of the United States, which has been significantly undermined in recent years? Indeed, in the conditions of global markets, the economic prosperity of citizens largely depends on the ability to strengthen leadership. Namely, this is what always worries the American (as well as any other) voter.

The recipes are different. But activity in all corners of the world goes without saying, as does the fact that Washington cannot afford to self-isolate. In part, this approach is a consequence of September 11, 2001: on that day, Americans learned that danger can come from the most remote corners of the planet. In part, it is connected with the recognition that the world of the 21st century is qualitatively different from previous centuries by the deepest interdependence of all international actors.

Bush's legacy, which any of his successors will have to overcome, is not only Iraq and America's reputation, tarnished even in the eyes of its close allies. For all its importance, these are particulars. The main thing to get rid of is a false goal setting.

International terrorism, the fight against which has become the content of US foreign policy, is not an independent phenomenon, but the result of a complex of phenomena that need to be unraveled for a long time and carefully. Many diverse processes unfold simultaneously, and their interaction often gives completely unexpected results. Therefore, a realistic approach based on a sober analysis of events and readiness for change is more effective today than messianism and ideological narrow-mindedness. In other words, what distinguished the administration of George W. Bush, especially during his first term.

The repair of American foreign policy will require precisely realism, a clear definition of priorities, the limits of the possible and reasonable. And this applies to any candidate. Most likely, despite the current rhetoric, the next president will be cautious in his actions. And the task, for example, of disarming Iran or maintaining a balance in Asia (where Russia can help or hinder), will outweigh the desire to return Moscow to a democratic path of development. It remains for us to argue here whether this is good or bad.