Putin's regime without Putin

Who will rule Russia after 2024? Representatives of the establishment have little doubt that the modernization of power in the country will not happen, even if the head of state is replaced

The political future of Russia after 2024 is the subject of a study by Levada Center Deputy Director Denis Volkov and Andrey Kolesnikov, Head of the Russian Domestic Politics and Political Institutions Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center, based on interviews with experts in management training, economics, economic geography, information technology and representatives of large and medium-sized Russian and foreign businesses that have experience of interacting with Russian government agencies.

It won't get better

The authors of the study note that the changes are only simulated. The main goal of the political, managerial and business elites for the 2024 elections is not to modernize the country, but to ensure a smooth and safe transition of power. For the powerful of this world, both main scenarios are acceptable - "Putin remains" and "Putin leaves, but leaves a successor."

Investors and entrepreneurs interviewed by the authors of the study are sure that changes for the better are impossible.

“None of our interlocutors had any illusions about the readiness of the highest officials of the state (let's call them the superelite) to democratize the political system, liberalize the economy and, in general, to modernize the state and society. But no one drew apocalyptic scenarios of revolution or the collapse of the country due to the inefficiency of the system of state capitalism and political autocracy built over 20 years,” the authors of the article say.

But the change of power is inevitable, if only because of natural causes. Therefore, the state needs a new technocratic elite in order to maintain an acceptable level of efficiency of the political system. The basic idea of ​​technocratic transition is to change the faces in power without changing (strengthening) institutions and without introducing political democracy.

There are other reasons to look for new mechanisms for the sublimation of technocratic personnel. This is a demand for fair, and therefore effective management, and the poor functioning of social lifts, which have practically stopped, and - at the same time - a shortage of high-quality managers (administrative level of directors of departments of ministries, deputy ministers, regional leaders).

At the same time, all appointments for such a replacement are coordinated with law enforcement agencies. To ensure “stability”, the absolute political loyalty of key personnel is more important than their effectiveness.

Why is the loyalty filter so important? Management is carried out manually (and often with low efficiency) due to the fear of losing political control over key positions. Sometimes even the potential appointees themselves do not really want to participate in the race for high positions in power. Among the reasons are the negative perception of government officials by the population, the fear of losing a high position and reputation due to the unpredictability of the assessment system, restrictions on property ownership, declaring income and salaries lower than in business.

But “loyalty,” according to the respondents, creates a problem: officials feel responsible only to the federal authorities, and not to citizens. This leads to the fact that the real solution of problems is replaced by formal reports, and meaningful modernization is replaced by digitalization. Hence the current situation with the implementation of national programs in the regions. Goals are measured by control figures, not always clearly verifiable, taken from the ceiling.

Total state control for self-preservation

The Putin system is looking for how to maintain social and political balance until the end of the political cycle and beyond. The management system is based on the presumption of omniscience and omnipotence of the state and its bureaucracy, on the absolutization of state control (hence the close attention to the targeted spending of funds and attempts to selectively fight corruption). The state “buys out” civil activists with the help of grants and tries to control private business.

Despite the fact that manual control from the highest level covers an insignificant percentage of all decisions made in the country, there is absolutely no need for Putin to interfere in all processes: managerial decisions, court verdicts, indictments are articulated, issued, and applied taking into account his potential position on any issue. In a significant part of cases, this position of the "imaginary Putin" is misinterpreted, and then it is necessary to turn on the manual control mechanism, correcting serious mistakes.

The possibility of Putin's departure depends, according to the authors of the study, on whether in 4 years it will be possible to find a transit scheme that is safe both for him personally and for the basic foundations of the regime. Putin will not radically change anything in the system.

“The current Russian political regime has found its identity: conservative values, imperial consciousness, militarization, anti-Westernism, a special path based on mythologized ideas about history, the memory of the Great Patriotic War as the main glue of the nation and a method of legitimizing power. We can assume that this is the state ideology, around which a consensus has developed both among the elites and the masses. However, the inefficiency of the socio-economic model generates demand, albeit extremely uncertain, for change,” the authors of the article write.

The process of imitation of changes (the same digitalization) may well suit both the elites and ordinary people. One can argue about whether the “Putin majority” has become, as a result of economic stagnation, the sum of political minorities and whether this is not eroding the national consensus. But for now, the system is able to cope with manifestations of social discontent and maintain a state of relative political equilibrium.

Generation of "successors"

To transfer power to Putin, it is important to find by 2024 the same figure as he was for Boris Yeltsin. “But to ensure the stability of the system itself, it is even more important to preserve “Putinism”, that is, the continuation of authoritarian, isolationist and dirigiste policies in the absence of Putin,” the researchers note.

During the formation of the government of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2018, Dmitry Patrushev (the son of Nikolai Patrushev, who is part of Vladimir Putin's inner circle) received the post of Minister of Agriculture. Prior to this, the sons of representatives of the “inner circle” usually received high positions in state banks and state corporations (sons of Nikolai Patrushev, Sergei Ivanov, Sergei Kiriyenko, Dmitry Rogozin, Alexander Bortnikov, the “dynasties” of Kovalchuk and Rotenberg). The authors of the report suggest that this is the beginning of a collective succession: in 2024, the generation of sons of Putin’s associates will inherit part of the country in the form of assets that exist in a system where “power equals property.”

The main problem of the transit of the “superelite” is that “property fused with the state cannot be inherited” (quote from an expert interview): if fathers fall out of the power system, then sons cease to be successful business leaders.

If the president leaves, Putin's successor could be the system he created and his political "children." Nevertheless, much, including the choice of a succession mechanism, will depend on the mass mood that will develop by 2022–2024.

At the same time, the problem of 2024 does not exist in public opinion. More than half of Russians still want Vladimir Putin to remain president.

It is noted that in focus groups, Dmitry Medvedev is called a possible successor, who, despite a low rating, was already president. In addition, the names of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are heard, less often - Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin and communist Pavel Grudinin. “All this seems somewhat strange, but such is the mass public opinion, which has a very serious inertia,” the study says.

But there are those who believe that the successor will be a person whom we do not yet know or do not notice. As was the case with Putin and Medvedev, it may arise a year before the elections. The system of government in the country is still clan-based, and in it, as the sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya puts it, “Sechin cannot become president, but his protégé can.”

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