Anti-Georgian (this does not mean the leadership of Georgia, but ethnic Georgians living, among other things, on the territory of the Russian Federation, including citizens of the Russian Federation) hysteria is coming to a natural decline. Rating points have already been earned; continuation is fraught with reputational losses. Soon the muddy wave will go away, leaving a long odorous trail.
What a great opportunity to demonstratively show Saakashvili the middle finger and press Georgians living and working in Russia to the wide, hospitable chest! What a reason, raising this finger even higher, to appeal to the Tbilisi intelligentsia! You are our brothers! All of you - directors, actors, musicians, doctors - if you feel stuffy in your wonderful hometown, come to us! We are always glad to see you, our home is your home! And even if this is pure rhetoric, even if few people respond, there would be nothing to respond to such a beautiful gesture from Saakashvili. But instead of dividing and conquering, i.e. respond sharply, but without losing one's head, to Saakashvili's provocative attacks, while demonstrating in every possible way affection for the Georgian people, everything is being done to increase the rating of the Georgian leader both in Georgia and in the world. Russia is solving the problem of Georgia in much the same way as the paratrooper who, not knowing how to impress a girl, suggested: “Do you want me to break your arm?”
The natural question is: what's the matter? Why does the Russian leadership choose such a seemingly obviously wrong (abstracting from its very difficult moral component) line of behavior? Is this an emotional choice or a conscious choice?
If you're emotional, it's bad. Because it’s bad if the first, reflexive reaction of our government to an external stimulus is exactly this. If conscious - then it’s completely bad, then this is the very beginning of a long, painful climb up the stairs leading down, completely down, to where it seems too small.
All of Russia's recent actions towards its neighbors are in favor of the first option. Suffice it to recall Ukraine and Abkhazia. In both cases, we observed a chain of completely uncalculated steps associated with an incomprehensible, inexplicable desire to keep all the eggs in one basket. And if we could calmly frolic with Sukhumi, practically without risking anything - well, where will the Abkhazians get away from us in any case? - then with Kiev the risks were large, unjustified, and we still can’t collect the firewood that was chopped then. Moreover, they chopped them down with heroic tenacity, with the holy faith that everything would be our way, that is, the Kremlin’s will. It is easy to assume that, having a history of such a violent manifestation of political temperament, such as, say, repeated public congratulations to Mr. Yanukovych on a victory that did not happen, our government can half-turn fall into the talented provocations of Mr. Saakashvili. And fire a warning shot in the head - in accordance, of course, with his ideas about beauty: if Saakashvili offends our people, let us, in return, touch the udders of our own, Georgian nationality! This is a classic. “You, fascist bastard, hang our little Jews - well, we’ll hang all your little Jews.” It is clear that activity towards the Russian Georgian diaspora also has a rational component: to force influential Moscow Georgians to put pressure on Saakashvili. However, almost any essentially emotional action has a rational component.
A similar component (rob!) was present even in the idea of a final solution to the Jewish question. But she was drowning in an irrational sea of manic Judeophobia.
There are, however, signs that support the second option, the option of informed choice. Firstly, this is the redundancy of the measures taken and, in general, a certain redundancy of the emotional reaction to Saakashvili’s attacks, even in the presence of a general extremely negative background. Secondly, two very interesting remarks by President Putin: about the interests of the “indigenous residents” and that, I am not quoting verbatim, but the meaning is exactly this: “The majority of the people will support us.”
Of course, the expression “indigenous residents” can be interpreted as a kind of everydayism, a colloquial synonym for the definition of “citizens of the Russian Federation.” However, President Putin is a lawyer and a very experienced political speaker. The difference between “citizens” and “indigenous population” is very clear to him, and he must have used exactly the words he wanted to use. As for the statement about the support of the majority of the Russian population, which in this case is undoubtedly guaranteed to President Putin (just as Saakashvili is undoubtedly guaranteed the support of the majority of the population of Georgia), this can be considered equally as usual in the mouth of the leader of the state ritual formula, as well as a clear, completely truthful designation of the main political goal.
The current government (I have no desire to use the vulgar agitprop word “regime”) until recently was devoid of clear, definite ideological supports. The liberal idea that fertilized the 1991 revolution and Gaidar’s reforms moved away, never fitting into the Russian mental tradition. The statist, civilized-patriotic idea is collapsing before our eyes under the yoke of wild, some kind of frantic corruption. Corruption itself is a wonderful, victorious practice, but, of course, it cannot be an official, much less a popular ideology. The resulting void must be filled. Classical chauvinism, mixed, as always and everywhere, with the strongest of all, the enduring feeling of social envy, is perfectly suited to the role of the ideological core. In fact, Stalin understood this when, already at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, he decisively replaced amorphous, sterile proletarian internationalism with the passionate Russian idea. In the USSR, unlike mononational Nazi Germany, great-power chauvinism was not total in nature and, most importantly, did not have a legitimate status. It had a latent, “secretive” character and was systematically framed in the form of a relatively soft idea of a “big brother.” The slogan “indigenization of personnel” was in use, meaning the priority of representatives of the “titular”, i.e. "indigenous" nationality in, first of all, nomenklatura appointments. There was, of course, blood. And closer to Stalin’s death, as his mental illness intensified, there was considerable bloodshed, but they did not manage to reach Hitlerite proportions in solving the national question.
The current government is not really afraid of anyone or anything except the street. Only the street can really interfere with her without interruption, with pleasure doing her own things, i.e. state affairs. In this context, the effectiveness of the revived great power idea is ridiculously obvious. Its strength lies in the fraternal fusion of hidden apparatus nationalism with the spontaneous xenophobia of the masses. If this idea is developed and given the form of a systematic state policy, all the ideological problems of the current government can be brilliantly solved.