In the Kremlin

To the return of Putin

December 30, 2009 Stanislav Belkovsky

Every time on the New Year, we have hot talk in Russia about the upcoming return of Vladimir Putin to the presidential post.

A year ago, at the end of 2008, Politmond in its entirety reasoned that Putin would return in 2009. And almost at the beginning of the year.

He did not return. The devil knows why.

At the end of 2009, the same political unit whispers fiercely about Putin's return in 2012. Everyone whispers: both the Podkrevsky part of the bomond and purely opposition. The first hints that it would be nice for us to urgently rally around D. A. Medvedev, so that the terrible return-2012 does not happen. The second insists that if Putin, like April from the song of Viktor Tsoi, will return again, he will come forever. So - there is a threat of totalitarianism. And the return-2012 must prevent blood from the nose.

Personally, I believe that Putin will not become President of the Russian Federation in 2012. For 123 reasons. Of which, as in a joke about preference, only the first is important: it is terribly unprofitable to Russian elites. Which, in the case of a great return (BB), will receive many additional problems with their legalization/legitimation on an international scale.

But that is not the point.

Imagine for a minute that Putin will still return. And what?

Will anything seriously change for the worst compared to current times? Let's take a look after it.

Plot 1. Elections.

Will they be under Putin? Undoubtedly. In the best traditions of December 2007 and October 2009. No one is going to cancel such elections.

Plot 2 . Freedom of speech.

Its level will remain mainly unchanged. Since this level is determined mainly by the self -censor of the leaders of the media. And self -censorship - the desire of these leaders to earn more money, and lose less. Putin is not able to strengthen nor abolish the self -censorship.

Plot 3. Opposition.

In the BB era, opposition leaders will still be engaged in not politics, but by the near -political business. To ride on Mercedes and not try to take power. Putin will not prevent them from doing this.

Plot 4. Modernization.

In the case of explosives, it will take place in full. This means: Military frequencies for the introduction of any 4G standards will give mobile operators of the “Big Three”; The State Corporation Rusnano will receive from the budget many billions of rubles for the development of eternal life technologies; 18 groups of liberal and conservative thinkers will write reports where they will prove the inevitability of the seventh stage of modernization, at which the cash register is aggravated; In some areas of the Russian Federation, digital television will even appear, which, however, will not affect the situation with freedom of speech, for self -censorship (see plot 2).

In general, under Putin everything will be, as under Medvedev. There is nothing to be especially afraid, there is nothing to hope for.

Under Putin, it can be even a little better than now. After all, in the case of BB, Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev will become the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. Thus, in Russia for the first time after February 2004 a liberal prime minister will appear. Why the liberals do not rejoice ahead of time, I do not understand.

More precisely, of course, you need to be afraid. But not Putin at all with his eternal return. And the fact that the country, all the life -forming constructions of which are worn to the ground will go into a variety. But this business does not depend on Medvedev or Putin.

* * *

Reasoning about the terrible danger of BBs are built on misunderstanding - or intentional ignoring - the nature of power in modern Russia.

As already mentioned and written, power in the Russian Federation belongs to great money. This is called "Monetocracy." And the Center for Power arises from anywhere in the Russian Federation, where a well-known critical volume of administrative resource-civil and power is attached to a lot of money. In such a system, the presidential candidacy does not matter too much. If Putin was the successor of Putin Mikhail Fradkov or Sergey Ivanov, now something would be very different? Not really. All the same power of money under empty -haired beautiful conversations - and, which is characteristic, about modernization. And what else?

* * *

In the context of the foregoing, I still want to refute some common statements that do moral damage to President D.A. Medvedev.

A) During his reign, Medvedev did not make a single independent decision.

Let me. During his stay in the presidential chair, Medvedev made at least two large -scale political decisions, which Putin could not dare to. This is the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and amending the Constitution. What is it still Rozhn?

Although it is clear why such decisions as serious are not counted in our politicalballs. Bomond's consciousness, which requires coin, is extremely monetized. Therefore, only decisions related to money are considered important. Now, if and when Medvedev changes the head of Vneshtorgbank or President Transneft, then the Ecumenical High will begin on the topic "Dima finally took power." Actually, there was something similar about the resignation of Lesin, although this resignation has no political significance: one adviser is less, one more, is it all the same.

B) Medvedev looks not as convincing on the television screen as Putin, because in 2012 Putin will return.

Yes, Medvedev as a speaker weaker than Putin. So what? And Putin is weaker than Zhirinovsky. Is this what means that Vladimir Volfovich will become president in 2012?

In a country where the president is not chosen, but appoint, charisma, public persuasiveness and other personality factors are not of fundamental importance. If Medvedev wants-in the meantime, apparently, he really wants-he will remain in 2012. The lavors of the TV star will not help him and will not interfere.

Well, the campaign about BB will continue. Its meaning is clear. For the Podkrelevsky, he howled - this is the continuation of the same line “less evil” that they lead since the fall of 2005. Like, if not Medvedev, then the bloody security forces will come. If only they had already come, or something, so that we would look at them. Suddenly we will like them.

And for the opposition (sorry, Borya Nemtsov, you are my friend, but the truth is also not lying on the road) - this is a psychologically convenient way to set a completely solved task. Here will come 2012, the BB will not take place, and we will all say: “That's how we worked! We have a damn thing, it turned out. ”

So excuse me, ladies and gentlemen, but there really is no problem of VV-2012. The problem is completely and only in another: what will happen in 2012 in the place and with the place where Russia is today.

Photo by RIA Novosti