Not a step forward. How Russian generals managed to almost bury the idea of forming an army on a contractual basis - The New Times sorted out 
Experts perceived this text as an obituary of the military reform of the Putin era. After all, the implementation of the federal target program (FCP) on a partial transfer of the Armed Forces to a contract (officially announced its successful completion by January 1, 2008) began in July 2003 with an elite 76th division. And now the 76th, like another eight dozen parts and formations, which should have long been formed exclusively on a contractual basis, is waiting for the soldiers. In particular, the airborne troops today are 63% of the draftees.
The sad story of the FCP is a classic example of how officials in the absence of public control can fail any reform that does not meet their interests.
Who to fight? The fact that the reform is necessary became completely obvious after the attack of Basayev and Hattaba on Dagestan - the Russian army then turned out to be completely not Boage. What President Putin himself told the Federal Assembly in 2007: “For an effective response, terrorists needed to gather a group of at least 65 thousand people. And in all the Ground Forces, in the warhead units - 55 thousand, and they are scattered throughout the country. The army is 1.4 million people, and there is no one to fight. So they sent unwatted boys under the bullets. ”
The reason for this is understandable: the Soviet -style armed forces were arranged so that they could begin to act only after the removal of their reservists. In Dagestan, it took two weeks to deploy regular parts. Then
The possibility of announcing universal or partial mobilization in the country was seriously discussed - and this is in order to withstand several hundred militants.
Having become the president, Putin, who was well aware that the army was not able to protect the country, did not dare to carry out a radical military reform. Instead of completely abandoning the mass call, he agreed to limit himself to the transfer of several dozen parts and formations to the contract. It was assumed that the elite family of the Armed Forces-the Airborne Forces and the Marine Infantry, as well as several formations of the Ground Forces-will become professional and will be ready to go to the conflict area immediately upon receipt of the order.
Even this, more than modest, the plan forced the generals to occupy a circular defense. After all, they lost their extremely important function: preparation and in case of war, ensuring mobilization from 4 to 8 million reservists. And this means that many of them would just be needed by anyone.
The first line of defense was deployed on the financial front. Specialists from the military department with numbers in their hands proved that the transfer to the contract would cost exorbitant money. In December 2001, they gave the figure of 500 million rubles per division, in March 2002-1 billion, and in May-2.6 billion already included everything that, for example, could, for example, the cost of weapons, food and clothing reserves (as if divisions formed from conscripts can do without weapons and food). But on the misfortune of the generals, even their fantasy did not keep up with their fantasy for oil prices, which strengthened Putin's determination.
Three knives in the back of the reform and in July 2003 the FCP received the highest approval. But the generals were not going to give up. He began to cut the program by hook or by crook so that it lost all meaning. Initially, it was assumed that 76 parts and formations would be equipped with 147 thousand volunteers - ordinary and sergeants. During the five years allotted for the implementation of the program, the military department, referring to “objective difficulties”, purposefully adjusted these figures towards the decrease-first to 133 thousand, then up to 125. In January 2008, the head of the General Organizational Directorate of the General Staff Vasily Smirnov reported that the FCP successfully completed-100 thousand contractors were gained. But even then there was every reason to doubt that this figure corresponds to reality. In fact, a year later the same Vasily Smirnov told that in parts of constant readiness
Only 79 thousand professionals serve.
Another method of torpedoing the program was to exclude elements from it, without which it, in principle, cannot be implemented. From the very beginning, an obvious vice was laid in the FCP - it did not provide a system for preparing those who serve the backbone of professional formations - junior commanders. Only a sergeant-professional who has the necessary knowledge, combat and life experience is able to provide a real, and not based on grandfathers, discipline, be a guide to genuine military ethics, morality not a mercenary, but a defender of the Fatherland.
However, even in the absence of a sergeant corps, several dozen parts of constant readiness could be created. The military registration and enlistment offices followed
Turn into full recruiting points. In addition, it was necessary to develop special programs for the preparation of both sergeants and ordinary contractors. But no one had done any of this officials - their task was to fail the reform, and not move it.
The generals and the third way to strangle the program were invented, from the series "Follow your hands." In 2003, the first year of the implementation of the FCP, the main task was announced by the “Experiment” transfer to the contract of the 76th Airborne Forces division, and in 2004, the 42nd motorized rifle division, deployed in Chechnya, was supposed to be completely contracted. But there were few people who wanted to serve in a hot point. And then more than a thousand paratroopers from the 76th division who fought at that moment in Chechnya were simply transferred to the 42nd division. Thus, they were counted twice: first in the 76th Airborne Division, then in the 42nd Division of the Ground Forces.
In the evil will , and soon the Ministry of Defense broke out a decision, which, in fact, had finished the FCP. Contractors were allowed to recruit a military service from soldiers. They began to be driven to the "professionals", often resorting to violence. The platoon, for example, could be kept on a parade ground or in a cold tent until all the soldiers signed a contract. At the same time, 18-year-old boys, who were not too sophisticated in legal issues, directly lied-they said that, having served the permitted to the conscript for two years, they would, if they wanted to, interrupt the contract. But the deceived, dared boys did not dream of connecting life with the armed forces. It is no accident, according to the Main Military Prosecutor's Office, only in 2008 more than 7 thousand such “contractors” were deserted. Well, three quarters of those who nevertheless housed three-year contracts signed in 2005-2006, they were simply not renewed. As a result, in 2008, the generals encountered the need to force even more conscripts to sign the contract than in previous years. However, nothing came of this: the armed forces moved to a one -domestic call service, and it was almost impossible to force a contract to sign a conscript. The real shortage of contractors amounted to 68 thousand, that is, the FCP was half drunk, and 80 billion rubles, the released (experts are still arguing how much money reached the performers), were wasted.
Nobody suffered a substitution but punishment. The generals deftly modified the concept of constant readings. Until recently, compounds were able to immediately comply with a combat order, since they are equipped with trained personnel. Now from this formula the word "trained" has disappeared. There is only a requirement that the number of military personnel and the number of military equipment meets the full -time requirements. But the number can also be observed at the expense of conscripts. That is, everything returned to its circles. Moreover, it became obvious that if, according to the previously announced concept of military service, the conscript should spend six months in the training center, and six months in the drill part, then the personnel of the constant readiness compounds will significantly change every half a year. What combat readiness in this case can we talk about? And the joint service of conscripts and contractors will inevitably lead to a new explosion of hazing.
As a result, not officially announcing anything, the Ministry of Defense quietly decided that most of the military soldiers would not go through any training. “If the conscript is assigned to a position that does not require either training in the educational part or special education (for example, shooter), then it will undergo an initial training course (or, as it is often called the“ young fighter ”) directly in the part or in the compound in the consolidated unit,” the deputy commander of the brigade Alexander Melnikov said in an interview with the Red Star.
The Ministry of Defense determined the positions on which combat readiness depends (in the department it is most likely a commander, a machine gunner and a grenade launcher). They will be occupied by contractors. The rest are conscripts, and they will not pass any special training.
In other words, the compounds of the “new system” will remain modern only by name. Everyone will still send everyone-both contractors and practically untrained conscripts. Which we observed in August last year, during the war with Georgia. But the Russian bosses swore many times that they would not send military service soldiers to hot spots.
Back to the call is interesting that the generals managed to turn the reform as soon as the mass call lost all meaning. There is a decisive reduction in the officer corps, as well as the elimination of the cropped parts and parts of the abbreviated composition. This means an actual rejection of mass mobilization: reservists will have nowhere to call, there will be no one to command them. But then why cook them? Why annually drive 650 thousand young people into the army? Not in order to maintain its number at the level of 1 million. If no one is going to call on the people who have passed the army, then the call itself loses all meaning.
Only one intelligible explanation can be the desire to preserve it. The Ministry of Defense understands that somewhere at the turn of 2011/2012 the number of soldiers' posts in the Armed Forces will be equal to the number of young men who have reached the age of 18. That is, everyone will have to be picked into the army, having canceled delay even in health, which is quite risky on the eve of the presidential election. And if so, then now, while the demographic situation is not yet catastrophic, to take as many young people as possible into the army. The calculation is simple: the more we call, the more it will be possible to make the contract sign. Then it is clear why right now the generals were forced to give in to the pressure of a few reformers in the Ministry of Defense and finally seriously take care of the problem of the formation of a professional sergeant corps. Soon, on the basis of the Ryazan Airborne School, their preparation will begin - the selection of candidates promise to carry out harshly (with the obligatory delivery of the exam). At the end of almost three years (exactly by 2012), the junior commanders will have a salary of 35 thousand rubles, which the major does not dream of now. So the motley army, which will be able to keep in the armed forces, at least receive in three years the "right" junior commanders.
What did Putin’s military reform come to for the 6th year of its implementation? From the statement of the Airborne Forces commander Vladimir Shamanov it follows that everything that the country can count on today is nine ready -to -transfer battalions of the “increased” readiness that he is entrusted to form - apparently from professionals. Well, if there is a fairly serious conflict and nine battalions (three thousand fighters) is not enough? It was then that the reformers who opposed the mass call will definitely not be greeted, and the reform will once again be laid out into a long box.
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