Extreme risks

On October 23–24, under the auspices of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Emergencies, the Conference “ Georisk 2018 ” was held in the premises of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences. A lot of words were said about the extreme importance for the country of assessing various types of risk and the role of the Academy as the only organization in the country that can give scientifically sound expert conclusions and recommendations for various important and new types of risk to the country as a whole or for its individual regions.

The risk, as you know, is evaluated as a product of the probability of realizing a dangerous or unfavorable event (impact) on the expected amount of damage generated by this event. Moreover, the probability of an unfavorable event is usually estimated rather rudely, sometimes even in the form of gradation - “high”, “average”, “low” - and the amount of damage is often estimated to the maximum. The risk values ​​obtained by the gradation of different types of danger in terms of their importance are the basis.

Against the backdrop of close attention to various possible types of dangerous development of events (both for natural and anthropogenic reasons), the lack of interest in possible nuclear cataclysm and its consequences does not quite look quite logical. But earlier, in the 1980s, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR dealt with this issue quite closely, and since that time the danger of a nuclear disaster has only increased. Indeed, if, in the situation of the 1990s, the danger of nuclear war was estimated by experts at 1% in 50 years, then according to the realities of the last decade, such probability was estimated by different authors as 5% for 10 years and as 99% for 100 years (see, for example, the publication of the author in the TRV-FAC of August 13, 2015 or his monograph “Disaster and Civilization”). From this it is almost obvious that by the formula for calculating the risk of nuclear conflict, it is sharply superior to - incomparably more important - all other types of risk.

There is reason to believe that over the past few years, the risk of a large war has increased additionally, and in the light of the expected termination of the agreement on the ban on a small and medium -range missiles (RMSD), it will increase even more, although the impressive effect of small and medium -range tactical missiles is not so and significantly - as experts indicate, the additional consequences of using the tactical nuclear nuclear winter from –40 to –40 to –40 to –40 to –40 to –40 to -40.1 OS, which is clearly not fundamentally, and in terms of destroying large cities, the possible impact of small and medium -range missiles is also not so significant. The main danger is different: the presence of such missiles dramatically reduces the psychological barrier of the application of the Yao. The fact is that the use of tactical Yao of low power in its consequences is not much different from the results of a massive bombing, but it, as it were, justifies the use by the enemy of the Yao of greater power. Thus, the possibility of developing events according to the script of the snow avalanche - from small to large. With a completely expected result - as in a famous children's rhyme: "Two rams drowned early in this river in the morning." If, before the failure of the agreement on the prohibition of the RMSD, the occurrence of a large war was possible, perhaps, only as a result of a series of errors such as the false works of the system recognition and control systems for launches of missiles, now there is an additional danger of a large war on the principle of dominoes, when each subsequent step of escalation of the conflict is tactically acquired and at the same time impair the general situation.

Touching upon the problem of the danger of a nuclear war by mistake, we note two characteristic features of previously taking place and have become known as “almost the use of Yao by mistake”. Brief information about these four cases is given in the table. It is easy to notice that these cases are sharply different from the examples of “impossible” disasters at civilian facilities (Chernobyl, Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric power station, “Bulgaria”, etc.). “Impossible” disasters on civilian facilities almost always arose due to violations of operating instructions. On the contrary, it was often possible to avoid nuclear war precisely because responsible officers deliberately grossly violated the instructions (see table). In one case, the principle of the commander was violated, in the other - the rules for maintaining secrecy, in another case, the officer actually deceived the highest command. Such examples greatly depreciate the widespread statement that everything is provided for in the application of the Yao, and any unpleasant accidents are excluded.

According to the table, it can also be noted that the danger of randomly displaced the nuclear war increases sharply during periods of high international tension, when the parties have special reason to fear the enemy of the first disarming strike by the enemy. Of the four cases that have become known, three belong to short -time episodes of high international tension. It can be expected that the danger of the next such case - with an unknown outcome - is very great and currently.

Of course, there is an opinion that these fears are not groundless, then greatly exaggerated. In particular, the script of the nuclear night can be erroneous. And it is quite obvious that the discussion of these issues is of considerable interest. It seems that the site for such a discussion could be provided by the Academy of Sciences, especially since it is, as it were, directly included in its duties. As prescribed in the new Law on RAS, the Academy functions include an expert analysis of the arising important national economic and state problems, even with the right of legislative initiative on the results of such a discussion.

We note purely corporate interest. Complaints about the low authority of the Academy in state structures and in the public consciousness are widespread and the fact that this situation greatly interferes with the academy in its work. It is quite obvious that the discussion of the indicated problem could not but attract the widespread attention of state bodies and the media at a high professional level and thereby contribute to an increase in the authority of the Academy.

Mikhail Rodkin,
doct. physical. sciences, Institute of the theory of forecasting earthquakes and mathematical geophysics of the Russian Academy of Sciences