Timeless government

The Kremlin failed to explain why the country needed new ministers

A few days after his resignation as prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev unfollowed the Russian government account on Instagram. This gesture exactly repeats what people do in the modern world after the breakup of a romantic relationship. You can guess that Medvedev is not too pleased to meet his "ex" on the Internet. At the same time, the ex-premier gave a television interview: sitting on a comical fur chair, he argued that resignation is actually a working moment, and that this happens when a person has been working in his post for a long time, in his case, almost 8 years.

Indeed, neither in the nineties nor in the 2000s did Russia know such a long government; an eight-year term in those years was achievable only for presidents who won two election campaigns. And now, during the time that Medvedev has been distracting popular discontent, many have forgotten what the purpose of the government's work is. For example, what powers does he have compared to the ubiquitous presidential administration, where decisions are made, and to the building of which people who know about this go with pickets.

For some reason, they don't go to the government White House.

The media intuitively understands that the change of cabinet is actually an important event, and they are looking for experts who can explain what is happening, as if we lived in Italy. But explaining the replacement of some ministers by others is not very good. Sentiments are growing that all this is generally unimportant and uninteresting - in the insulting logic for officials "and you, friends, no matter how you sit down." And the main reason for such apathy of the public towards the formally main political event in eight years is that even the Kremlin could not really explain why Mishustin was needed instead of Medvedev, others instead of some vice-premiers, Lyubimov instead of Medinsky, etc.

If we lived in Italy, then the new government would be formed as a result of the victory of the coalition in the parliamentary elections, and then we would specifically ask our elected representatives for this. If the government resigns, it would mean that the elected ones themselves see that it cannot cope, and it is dangerous to play such jokes with the voter. But our government only formally reports to the State Duma (both within the framework of the current Constitution, and in accordance with Putin's new amendments), but in reality it is formed by presidential decrees.

As early as January 14, the main political topic in the country was the clownish story that we would have a “party of tank lovers” ( Read Ilya Azar’s interview with its creator. * - Ed. *), and the next day the president announced that in the country a request for change has matured, which is why it is necessary to urgently adopt a new Constitution. Almost immediately after that, Medvedev resigned, and Putin accepted it.

There were no specific comments on what this resignation was connected with:

as if the relationship between the president and the prime minister were a state secret.

The record-breaking long cabinet of Medvedev did not receive detailed assessments from the State Duma either. She urgently switched to the implementation of other initiatives of Putin. In addition, the overwhelming majority of our parliamentarians are, after all, formally Medvedev's fellow party members and like-minded people, and according to Italian logic, they should now be protesting against the new cabinet.

As a result, we do not know whether the previous government worked well or badly from the Kremlin's point of view. And if it worked well, then why are these personnel changes needed right now. We don't know, although we can guess why some ministers kept their posts beyond Medvedev's horizon, while others left their chairs. The mystery even lies in whether the transfer of the young ex-Minister of Economy Maxim Oreshkin to the post of assistant to the president is a formal promotion or not. It is not clear why Medvedev retained his post as chairman of United Russia and why Putin did not take advantage of his dismissal to boost his own ratings. It is not clear what are the prospects for the personal trajectories of the rest of the ex-ministers. If the Medvedev government was punished, why? If the Mishustin government has carte blanche, then what does it consist of?

It seems that not only in society, but also in the Kremlin, they have forgotten a little how to dismiss the government.

Part of the clue is that Russia could get a new version of the Constitution this year that would change the procedure for approving a government. Under the Constitution, parliamentary and, possibly, presidential elections will be held without any special pauses, and this whole structure should be covered by a technical government that has not yet managed to turn anyone against itself. Six months later, Mishustin's cabinet can be reapproved, and then it will turn into an effective manager of the Russian budget. Answering the question of why such a rush is needed with all this, and in particular with the Constitution, Dmitry Peskov sincerely said that "this issue cannot be shelved." This is understandable - the president's rating continues to decline, by January 15, 38% of Russian citizens answered positively to the Levada Center's question about their readiness to vote for Vladimir Putin in the elections.

The social situation is deteriorating: for many years after Crimea, the country fell into the trap of lack of economic growth, and there is no way out.

Of course, the Kremlin needs to hurry, sow uncertainty, seize the moment, and manipulate the political field. Those hybrid practices that were tested in the previous decade in neighboring countries are urgently imported into Russia, and, as they say, our authorities brought them a lot of bonuses after 2012.