Why Medvedev?

Vladimir Putin has made his choice. The solution is both expected and not so expected. Expected - because Dmitry Medvedev has been the unofficial successor number one since the end of 2005, when he became a public political figure, taking the post of first deputy prime minister. Not really - since before September they talked more and more about Sergei Ivanov, and after September - about Viktor Zubkov.

It appears that the president has made his choice, and it is almost impossible that anyone in power will try to challenge him. This is too big a risk that only completely desperate people can take - like Comrade Lenin, who understood that the Bolsheviks were hopelessly losing the elections to the Constituent Assembly and were losing their chance of coming to power. Comrade Lenin did not have not only Rosneft, but not even a small oil well that could be taken away if his project failed. The current “siloviki”, firstly, are subject to strong internal conflicts and cannot act as a single whole (for example, the contradictions between the FSB and the drug police). And secondly, they have significant economic influence, which encourages them not to be recklessly confrontational, but rather to integrate themselves into a new system of checks and balances, where they can, if not win, then not lose much.

Why did Putin choose Medvedev? Apparently, the main thing lies in the system of relations between these people, which were initially hierarchical in nature, which distinguishes them from similar relations with other possible candidates. Indeed, Putin and Sergei Ivanov in the second half of the 70s were officers of the Leningrad KGB of equal rank (we add to this that after the September story with the failed premiership, the “Ivanov-successor” option was practically closed). Valentina Matvienko made a classic party-Komsomol career when Putin was still an employee of the station in Dresden, and owed her appointment as deputy prime minister to Yevgeny Primakov. Finally, Viktor Zubkov, although he had been subordinate to Putin since 1992, was then perceived by the current president rather as a “mentor” in the unfamiliar science of city management. Medvedev has always been a “junior” - in the mayor’s office, administration, government. Apparently, the current president is firmly convinced that Medvedev’s loyalty will continue in the future.

Another reason could be Medvedev’s well-known caution, which is a feature of his political style and is often mistaken for weakness (which, in my opinion, is completely wrong). Let us remember that all the events associated with the name of Medvedev - from the reform of the civil service to the liberalization of the Gazprom share market - were carried out very carefully, without radicalism and risk (but, at the same time, brought to real results). It seems that he will not claim dominance in the political system and will not change course too much - at least in the near future, the matter will apparently be limited to some reshuffling of emphasis. Although the accents can be important - for example, in relations with the business community. And since Medvedev will not claim a dominant role, he becomes an almost ideal candidate in the conditions of the system of checks and balances that Putin will try to build during the remaining time before the end of his term in office.

Finally, both his recognition and image features play in Medvedev’s favor. With the help of electronic media over the past couple of years, an image of a “sovereign man” who cares about the development of the social sphere, quite acceptable to voters, has been created. All the advantages in this area went to Medvedev, while the disadvantages fell to Zurabov (who initially had no intention of running for office). Therefore, there will be no need to conduct an overly expensive election campaign, as would be the case if the president chose a “dark horse” from his circle, little known to voters.

Considering that 40% of Russians, according to a well-known study by the Levada Center, are ready to vote for any successor, then Medvedev’s task is to convince undecided voters to vote for himself. There are many of them among the supporters of A Just Russia, who are quite loyal to Putin, but have a negative attitude towards the United Russia bureaucracy. That is why a somewhat unusual format was chosen for announcing the candidacy of a successor, in which United Russia retains its special role in the party system, but loses its monopoly on relations with the future president.

The author is Deputy General Director of the Center for Political Technologies