The risks are off the charts

I will not talk much about the obvious—the discord between the authorities and modernist groups of the population. We won’t, because this discord occurred long before the incident and the authorities do not consider it a tragedy at all. On the contrary, by relying on the loyal majority, it seeks to discredit the disobedient minority, which is clearly demonstrated in numerous television programs. I will not talk about the severe trauma inflicted on the feelings of many ordinary Ukrainians who traditionally have a positive attitude towards Russia—it seems that such matters fall into the category of “excessive sentimentality.” I will draw attention to problems that may be considered significant by the authorities themselves.

The first problem is Russia's loss of trust in the community of leading world powers. This is at least if the crisis can be resolved relatively quickly and at minimal cost (without direct sanctions). Russia will find itself in the role of a country whose path to serious transactions on world markets will be informally closed. If now such facts occur only in some cases, then the prospect of “universalization” of such an approach arises with quite obvious negative consequences. Those who are informally discriminated against in the modern world are doomed to an increase in the technological gap associated with blocked access to innovations that can be obtained from reputable foreign partners.

The second problem is the prospect of a transition to elements of a “mobilization economy,” which is characteristic of countries that feel surrounded by enemies. This kind of psychology pushes for accelerated (even compared to the current high rates) rearmament, which is very poorly combined with the economic recession and the need to fulfill basic social obligations in order not to lose the support of its own supporters. No other method, other than mobilization (transfer of funds to the military-industrial complex from other sectors of the economy, tightening of discipline, significant reduction of relatively minor social mandates), has yet been invented for carrying out such a course.

But a logical question arises: is Russian society ready for mobilization? The answer to this can be found by recalling the history of the increase in duties on imported foreign cars - this led to residents of the Primorsky Territory taking to the streets amid a general decline in protest activity. Russians, as a rule, do not protest against injustice towards strangers (despite the growth of charity and volunteering, such altruism is still characteristic of a clear minority of the population), but are ready to actively defend their own interests. A mobilization economy is possible either under conditions of the dominance of an idea that captures a significant part of society (religious or quasi-religious, like communism), or with the large-scale application of coercive measures against the dissatisfied. It is easy to see that the Stalinist regime combined both factors - and it is also clear that none of this has anything to do with modern Russia. There is no need to talk about the idea, and an attempt to widely use violence will quickly lead to the fact that “the thread will break.”

The third problem is that Russia is taking on the functions of the patron of Crimea (and, perhaps, claiming a similar role for a large part of the Ukrainian South-East). The focus is on marginal groups that have no real influence in their regions, but are ready at any moment to lay siege to the local administration under pro-Russian slogans. It seems that it is in them that the Russian authorities see the true representatives of Ukraine. As a result, it was possible to achieve that the warring Ukrainian elites became closer on the basis of rejection of Russian interference. And now on Russia’s side are the discredited Yanukovych and people who are completely dependent on it. However, there are still residents of Crimea, a considerable part of whom enthusiastically welcome the “unknown” armed persons, but this is not surprising. For a long time, no one paid much attention to these people: the Party of Regions was confident that it would receive “Russian” votes in the presidential elections, and the opposition also understood that this was not its electorate. Now Russian deputies from all parties are courting them, and artists sing for them for free. But no matter how the fate of Crimea turns out, the holiday will end and everyday life will begin. And whether Russia is ready to take responsibility for these people with their current heightened expectations is a big question.

The fourth problem is relations with the Islamic community, which could be seriously complicated if the interests of the Crimean Tatar community are seriously affected. We are talking not only about Turkey (which informally patronizes this community), but also about other Sunni countries that already do not sympathize with Russia because of its support for the Alawite regime in Syria. At the same time, there are no real mechanisms that would allow combining Russian and Crimean Tatar priorities.

And finally, the fifth problem is the fate of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which is part of the Moscow Patriarchate. In the concept of the “Russian World”, the role of one of the main “spiritual bonds” of the Slavic peoples is given to Orthodoxy. But now the Ukrainian Orthodox (including in the person of one of the most authoritative bishops, Metropolitan Onufry, who now stands at the helm of the church) are opposed to Russian intervention. The threat of church schism prompted even Patriarch Kirill, traditionally completely loyal to the Russian government, to distance himself from its actions.

However, the image of “Moscow” will still be a big problem for the church in modern Ukrainian conditions - especially if numerous opponents quote the “military Orthodox” formulations of Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin and some other adherents of political Orthodoxy. The distance between the Orthodox in Russia and Ukraine will apparently grow - and this creates the ground for a rapprochement between canonical and non-canonical Ukrainian Orthodoxy, which until recently seemed impossible.

But life is changing quickly - few people could have imagined such dramatic events in Crimea until recently. And now this is reality.