About reforms and democracy. Part 2

About democracy

Analyzing the results of a decade of market transformations, Yu. Latynina says that Russia “fell into the classic trap Illiberal Democracy”: “There were many groups of interests generated by non -market society and interested ... in maintaining, first of all, their situation. Their tactical interests, with a weak, supple state, have always dominated their strategic interests. ” Then it categorically concludes: "In some historical conditions, reform, like slavery, should be introduced with an iron hand."

Even if you take the point of view by Yu. Latynina and assume that the authoritarian regime can effectively fight powerful groups of “annuity seekers”, it is reasonable to ask the following question: technically, after the collapse of the USSR, was it possible to establish “enlightened market dictatorship” in Russia? The weakness of the state did not arise at all because Yeltsin and reformers decided to "play democracy." In the fall of 1991, the Russian government did not have a single combat -ready regiment ready to fulfill the order; There was neither the state nor the customs border of Russia: in the ports of Odessa, Tallinn, Klaipeda, Ventspils the border by the allied authorities, the border was not controlled, and there was no arranged border between Ukraine, the Baltic states and Russia; There was no single system of justice, the police and the prosecutor did not work; The state was simply not able to fulfill its functions [ I]. And how would the tightening of the political regime fall on the mood that then reigned in society? Suppose some responsible politician in the evening of August 22, 1991 would go to the monument to Dzerzhinsky and said: “Dear fellow citizens! In the absence of a working state, democracy will be a weight on the neck of the reform. For the success of transformations, we all need to abandon political rights. ” I'm afraid he would quickly have to finish his exhortations.

However, the thesis itself about the need for an authoritarian regime for the implementation of market transformations is not at all obvious. In addition to the traditional indication of the fact that “there are two zimbabwe” for each Korea, it is important to note the following: the most successful transition economies were those countries that eventually made a breakthrough to democracy. Strong civil society, competition in politics have become important prerequisites for the success of transit in the countries of Bol. In this regard, the experience of Poland is noteworthy.

In 1989-1991, political confusion reigned in Poland. The architect of market reforms Leshki Balcerovich was subjected to severe attacks. Due to the inability of politicians to come to a compromise, Poland turned out to be one of the last post-communist states that adopted a new constitution. In the presidential election in November 1990, an unknown adventurer (Stanislav Tyminsky) received 23% of the vote. As a result of the 1991 parliamentary elections, representatives of 28 parties were included in the parliament, which is why the deputies could not come to a single decision on the privatization plan for a long time. The government included members of about ten parties, and its composition changed once every six months. Until 1992, all the observers unanimously claimed that the reforms had failed, and the government policy suffered Fiasco due to constant crises and universal bitterness. However, in the end, the market transformation of Poland was recognized as exemplary. The main reason is the most severe competition in politics and close control by society behind the course of changes. The sensitive civil society of Poland included the Catholic Church, the powerful trade union movement “Solidarity”, the councils of workers in enterprises, as well as millions of small farmers who in every possible way resisted radical market transformations, but whose active participation helped to reduce the volume of rents extracted by groups of interests during the transition to the market. Over the ten years of reform, the government replaced eight ministers of finance, which did not prevent them from pursuing a responsible budget policy [ II].

About the transition to authoritarianism

The main thesis of Yu. Latinina is as follows: “The historical role of reforms 1991-1999. You can formulate very briefly: they ended in failure and led to the power of Vladimir Putin. ” The question of why in Russia after 2000 the political regime was toughened is one of the most debatable.

The main challenge for young Russian democracy in the first two years of reform was the most severe constitutional crisis. Today, many indicate the fact of its dramatic denouement as one of the main reasons for the transition to authoritarianism after 2000. I must say that the events on October 3-4, 1993 were not historically predetermined. The president and parliament had a chance to agree. The agreement on constitutional stabilization, concluded on December 12, 1992 by the President and the Supreme Council through the mediation of the chairman of the Constitutional Court V. Zorkin, opened the way to the peaceful resolution of the crisis of dual power. The Supreme Council received the resignation of E. Gaidar, unworthy to him, in return for this until March 31, 1993, the president and the Supreme Council were supposed to develop either a joint or two different options for a future constitution, which were supposed to be submitted to a popular referendum on April 11, 1993. However, having received the resignation of Gaidar, the Supreme Council refused to fulfill its obligations under this agreement. On March 12, 1993, the congress adopted a resolution, which spoke about the suspension of the agreement on constitutional stabilization. Subsequent events - a referendum on trust in the president, the congress of people's deputies and the policy of the government; Constitutional meeting of the summer of 1993; the intention of the leadership of the Supreme Council contrary to the decision of the people to impeach the president; Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1400 of September 21, 1993; an attempt by armed seizure of power on October 3; mobilization of the president’s supporters at night from October 3 to 4; The events of the morning of October 4 at the White House - were a consequence of the rejection of the December (1992) agreements.

Yu. Latynina says that in the elections, citizens refused the support of the transformations: "During the entire reign of Yeltsin, the people de facto voted against reforms." This is wrong. In the parliamentary elections of December 1993, Gaidarovsky “The Choice of Russia” received the largest number of places in the State Duma among all parties and movements. The results of those elections reflected the real picture of the Gaidar reform assessment by society. A significant part of the country supported it. Larger - rejected. But there were many people who, without personally supporting Gaidar, in general, nevertheless, the 1992 market transformations were positive, which was reflected in the results of the 1993 April referendum [III]. Liberals of liberals in the 1995 and 1999 elections were not caused by the disappointment of society in the reforms, but by a delay in their implementation. After the government crisis was completed, the government had the opportunity to intensify market transformations, but this chance was not used: at the turn of 1993-1994, the president was convinced by those who believed that the people were tired of reforms and therefore it was necessary to make a “respite”. By and large, in the fact that in 1994 the opened window of opportunities for transformations was not used, one of the reasons for the 1998 crisis lies.

Returning to the problem of the failure of Russian democratic transit, it is worth saying the following. The dismantling of democratic institutions implemented in the early 1990s took place in all post-Soviet states (with the exception of the three Baltic republics), regardless of the form of government-presidential or parliamentary. The transition to authoritarianism was the result of the fact that the main political players were, on the one hand, a rented nomenclature, for which Autarchy is more convenient for the realization of corruption aspirations, and on the other, a passive society that did not have an experience of life in a stable democracy and therefore did not trust the temptation to support Supporters of the "order". The first, due to information asymmetry, good organization and direct access to administrative and financial resources, easily “circled around the finger” an apolitical majority of citizens, and the authoritarian revenge inevitably took place as a product of the consent of the elites with a complete non -resistance of society. If Zyuganov became the president in Russia in 1996, and in 2000, Luzhkov or Primakov became the president, it is likely that the events went according to the same scenario as under Putin, because it is largely an objective process, and not a matter of specific personalities or institutions.

[i] E.T. Gaidar . Troubles and institutions. State and evolution. SPb., 2010. S. 12.

[II] A. Oslund. Construction of capitalism. The market transformation of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. M., 2001. S. 566-567.

[III] D. Travin. Gaidar reforms: History and myth. // Vedomosti. November 23, 2010. No. 221 (2739). http://www.Vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/250229/reforma_gajdara

The author is a researcher at the Institute of Economic Policy. E.T. Gaidara

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