
This week, the AD Marginem Publishing House and the Garage Museum of Contemporary Art published the book of Belgian historian David Van Reibruk “Against the Elections” - according to numerous reviews, one of the best texts about the policy of recent years. In it, the author describes the modern crisis of democratic institutions - in fact, the history of the disease of modern democracies - and offers treatment methods. Colta.ru publishes the first section of the book by David Van Reibruk, which describes the main symptoms of the disease: a drop in confidence in the elections and democratic fatigue syndrome.
Something strange happens to democracy: it seems that everyone is striving for her, but no one believes in her anymore. The data of international statistics say that the number of people who consider themselves supporters of democracy grow in the world. The large World Research Project WVS ( World Values Survey - a World Review of Values, a project studying the values and beliefs of people) several years ago surrounded more than 73 thousand people from 57 countries, representing about 85% of the world population. A positive answer to the question is whether democracy is a good method of government, they gave as many as 91.6% of the respondents. Never in history is the number of people positively configured to the concept of democracy was so high.
Such enthusiasm for democracy is all the more surprising that 70 years ago, the positions of democracy were incredibly weak. In parallel with the fascist, communist and colonial regimes existing at that time by the end of World War II in the world, there were only 12 full -fledged democracies. Then their number began to increase slowly, and in 1972 there were 44 free countries. In 1993 there were already 72 of them. Now, out of the total number of countries (195), elected democracies 117. Of which 90 are considered free and in practice. There have never been so many countries with a democratic structure, democracy never had so many followers.
Nevertheless, there is no more former enthusiasm. The already mentioned WVS has also discovered that over the past ten years around the world there has been an increase in sympathy for strong leaders, “which may not be reckoned with elections or parliament”, and confidence in institutions such as parliament, government and political parties is at an unusually low level. One gets the impression that people like only the very idea of democracy, and not its practical implementation, in any case, not in its modern form.
Partly this decrease in popularity is associated with young democracies. 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, especially strong disappointment occurs in the countries of the former eastern block. The Arab Spring, apparently, is also far from everywhere ends in a democratic summer. Even in those countries where the elections (Tunisia, Egypt) have passed, for many the shadow side of the new system opens. For those who first get acquainted with democracy, the bitter truth lies in the fact that in practice it is not as beautiful as rainbow dreams about it, especially if the democratization of the country takes place against the backdrop of violence, corruption and economic decline.
But this is not the only reason. Even the convinced democrats covers a feeling of uncertainty, and nowhere this paradox is stunned as in Europe. Despite the fact that in Europe the concept of democracy has historical roots and is still supported by the majority of the population, confidence in the existing democratic institutions melts before our eyes. In the fall of 2012, Eurobarometer, the official research center of the European Union, stated that only 33% of Europeans retain confidence in the European Union. (In 2004, this indicator was 50%!) The level of trust in the parliament and the government of its country was even lower: 28% and 27%, respectively. For many years, these are the lowest numbers. Currently, from two -thirds to three quarters of the population do not trust the most important institutions of their political ecosystem. And although a healthy skepticism is an integral part of civil self -awareness, a logical question arises: what are the permissible boundaries of this distrust and when constructive criticism goes into a real disgust.
Judging by the latest data, this distrust covers the whole of Europe. It is not limited only by formal political institutions, but also applies to the sphere of public services, such as mail, healthcare and railways. Confidence in politics is only one of the faces of the common worldview. But if you turn to democratic institutions, then political parties (on average 3.9 out of 10 points, according to the residents of the European Union), are most distrustful, they are followed by parliament (4 out of 10), the government (4.2 out of 10) and the press (4.3 out of 10). However, this distrust is mutual. The Dutch politician Peter Cannes presented in 2011 interesting figures regarding how politicians in the Hague relate to Dutch society. From the government elite of the Netherlands, 87% consider themselves freedom -loving, open to the world people with innovative ideas. At the same time, 89% consider their people to be traditional, conservative and nationalist. That is, among politicians, the opinion is that they adhere to a higher order than ordinary residents. In other European countries, the situation is unlikely to differ.
Let's get back to a simple citizen. His increased distrust is often explained by apathy. It was as if growing individualism and consumerism were so dulled in his civil liability that faith in democracy was replaced by indifference. Now he is at best indifferent and switches the channel as soon as it comes to politics. They say that "a citizen is herself." This opinion does not fully correspond to the truth. Yes, very many people are practically not interested in politics, but there were a significant number of such people at all times. Now we are not talking about the fact that interest in politics is disappearing. On the contrary, according to research, it is higher than usual: now people talk more about politics with friends, relatives and colleagues. That is, the waves of apathy are not observed. Is it possible to calm down on this? This is a big question. The situation when interest in politics is growing, and confidence in politics falls, is always fraught with consequences. Indeed, between the fact that the citizen reads necessary, and the fact that the politician is doing before his eyes, between what seems important to him, and the attitude towards this state runs the abyss. And as a result - bitter disappointment. How can the country's stability be affected by the fact that more and more citizens are closely following Wereabouts (body movements) of those in power, experiencing less and less trust in them? How many ridicule will the system take out without losing strength? And is it still appropriate to talk about some mockery there, when anyone can now publicly declare their beliefs?
The world in which we live is directly opposite to the world of the sixties. Then a simple farmer could be completely indifferent to politics and at the same time completely trust politicians. Sociological surveys confirm that the farmer calmly accepted everything that was happening in politics, and such a faith in politics was widespread in Western Europe. The motto of that time sounded like this: apathy and trust. Today it sounds different: inspiration and distrust.
Time today.
Democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, dictatorship, despotism, totalitarianism, absolutism, anarchy - any political device should find equilibrium between two fundamental criteria: effectiveness and legitimacy. Efficiency is measured by how quickly the government finds successful solutions to emerging problems. The legitimacy is measured by how much the inhabitants themselves are included in the adoption of these decisions. How unshakable is the authority of the government? For effectiveness, the main thing is determination, for legitimacy - folk approval. At the same time, both criteria are inversely proportional to each other: the dictatorship is undoubtedly the most effective form of government (one person decides, and that's it), but it is rarely accompanied by sustainable legitimacy. The reverse example, when the country endlessly discusses any innovation with all the inhabitants, shows the highest level of support, but certainly not the ability to decisive action.
Democracy is the “best of the worst” forms of government precisely because he is trying to meet both criteria. Any democracy strives for a healthy balance between legitimacy and effectiveness. Criticism of democracy may concern either one or the other. And the system remains afloat, balancing like a skiper during pitching, transferring weight from one leg to another depending on the roll. But today Western democracies are experiencing a crisis and legitimacy and effectiveness. This is something new. This is not just a pitching, but a real storm. To understand this, let's look at the numbers that rarely fall into the editorials of newspapers. If you focus on a small rowan, considering the results of numerous surveys or elections through a magnifier, you can lose sight of large ocean currents and climatic patterns.
In the future, I will consider governments of different countries. It goes without saying that in addition to them there are local, regional and supranational structures. But it is at the national level that it will be most convenient to consider the state of representative democracy.
The crisis of legitimacy is manifested in three indispensable symptoms. Firstly, fewer people go to the polls. In the sixties in Europe, the turnout was more than 85%. In the nineties - less than 79%. In the first decade of the 21st century, this figure dropped below 77%, which became the lowest indicator since the Second World War.
If we talk about absolute values, millions of Europeans do not want to go to the elections. Soon there will be a quarter of the entire population that has the right to vote. In the United States, this trend is even brighter: in the Voter Turnout presidential election (voter turnout) is less than 60%, in the midsterm (intermediate) elections - only about 40%. The electoral absenteism becomes the main political course in the West, but no one talks about this. In Belgium, of course, the failure to appear for the elections is much lower in connection with the obligation to go to the polls (over the past 10 years, failure to appear on average about 10%), but this figure is growing: from 4.91% in 1971 to 10.78% in 2010. The appearance of the 2012 municipal elections in Belgium, the information about which was constantly executed in the press, in general became the lowest over the past 40 years, and in cities such as Antwerp and Ostend, absenteism has grown to 15%. The figure that concerns Antwerp is especially depressing: for several months, the struggle for the chair of the burgomaster remained the main topic in the Belgian press. In the Netherlands in the parliamentary elections in September 2012, 26% of voters did not appear. In 1977, only 12%were not attended. Democracy has serious problems with legitimacy if citizens no longer want to participate in her most important procedure - voting. Can then say that the parliament is represented by the people? Maybe it is worth leaving a quarter of the seats empty for four years?
Secondly, along with non-appearance there is a fluid of voters. European voters not only began to vote less - they began to vote more unpredictably. Anyone who nevertheless goes to the polls may recognize the legitimacy of the procedure, but keeps the loyalty of the same party less and less. Those organizations that have the right to represent voters have happiness to feel their support only for a very short time. Political scientists call this electoral volatility and suggest that it has incredibly increased since the nineties and reaches in some cases 10%, 20%and even 30%. The “steaming in the sky” voter rudders. The shifts of political layers are becoming more familiar. “Those elections that until now have passed in the 21st century confirm this trend,” says one modern political review. “Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden set new records when the popularity of the extreme right suddenly grew (in the Netherlands in 2002) or suddenly fell (in Austria in 2002), which is why the election results turned out to be the most unpredictable in the history of Western Europe.”
Thirdly, there are fewer people in political parties. In the countries of the European Union, only 4.65% of voters are members of any party. We are now talking about average indicators. In Belgium, 5.5% of voters have a party ticket (in 1980 there were 9%), in the Netherlands - only 2.5% (against 4.3% in 1980), but a gradual decrease is present everywhere. In a recent scientific study, this phenomenon was characterized as a Quite Staggering (incredible, stunning). After a systematic analysis, the researchers came to the following conclusion: “In extreme cases (Austria, Norway), a decrease in the number of party members is more than 10%, in the rest - about five. All countries, with the exception of Portugal, Greece and Spain [where democratization occurred only in the seventies], also note a sharp long -term decline in absolute figures: a decrease by a million people or more in the UK, France and Italy, half a million in Germany and almost the same in Austria. Political parties in the UK, Norway and France have lost more than half of members since 1980, almost half in Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland and Finland. These numbers are impressive, they seem to hint that the very essence and meaning of party membership have changed beyond recognition. ”
What does the legitimacy of the democratic device say the fact that fewer people seek to join the most important players within this device? How bad is that political parties are among the institutions that enjoy the least trust in Europe? And why do the leaders of these parties are so rare about this?
The crisis is experiencing not only the legitimacy of democracy - experiences serious problems and effectiveness. It is becoming increasingly difficult to control the "firm hand." Sometimes a decade and a half passes before the matter comes to the vote for the adoption of the law in parliament. More and more forces are spent on forming governments, many of them are unstable, and when their mandate comes to an end, voters are more strictly punishing them. And the elections, in which less and less people are involved, often make governments less effective.
Let's analyze the three symptoms in detail.
Firstly, negotiations on the creation of coalitions last longer, especially in countries where complex political combinations are required. And this applies not only to Belgium, which since June 2010 broke all records and spent a year and a half without a government, but also Spain, Italy and Greece, where, after the last elections, the formation of cabinets went with great difficulty. Even in the Netherlands, the process acquires more and more unpleasant features. In the post -war period, from nine coalitions, negotiations on the creation of which lasted more than 80 days, five belong to the period after 1994. The reasons are different. Undoubtedly, one of them is that the texts of the agreements become more voluminous and include more and more details.
This evolution is all the more remarkable that the times are now unpredictable and is required to respond more flexibly to suddenly arising pressing problems. However, apparently, the distrust between the participants in the coalition is so much and so great the fear of a possible future punishment by voters that the political course now has to be prescribed to the smallest details, and then from the coordinated text it is not possible to retreat either to iot. Each party seeks to achieve the best transaction, everything should be carved in a granite in advance, it is important to protect its program, preserving it in the most pristine form. As a result, we have long negotiations.
Secondly, now the parties that are part of the government are subjected to more and more pressure. A comparative study of representative governments is a rather new area, but still the results are impressive. Especially the results of the study of how the European voter “rewards” the party for which he voted. What fate awaits the government party in the next election? In the fifties and sixties, parties joined the ruling coalition, in the next elected cycles lost from 1%to 1.5%of the vote, in the seventies - 2%, in the eighties - 3.5%, and in the nineties - 6%. With the beginning of the new century, we are already talking about eight or more percent. In the latest elections in Finland, the Netherlands and Ireland, the ruling parties lost 11%, 15% and 27% of their voters, respectively. Who will now want to rule in Europe with a firm hand if the price for participating in the government is so inexorable? It is much more rational at the moment to stay on the sidelines, in any case, if this does not affect the financing of the party, as it happens where the state pays it.
Thirdly, public administration slows down all the time. Большие инфраструктурные проекты, такие, как новая ветка метро в Амстердаме, соединяющая север и юг города, новый вокзал в Штутгарте, завершение кольцевой дороги в Антверпене или строительство запланированного международного аэропорта недалеко от Нанта, либо не доводятся до конца, либо завершаются с большим трудом. Национальные европейские правительства во многом потеряли свой авторитет и власть из-за того, что они привязаны к десяткам местных и наднациональных игроков. И если раньше для правительства такие проекты были источником престижа и свидетельством профессионализма, то теперь они в лучшем случае — ночной кошмар. Гордые времена проекта «Дельта», заградительной дамбы Афслёйтдейк, сети TGV 14 и тоннеля под Ла-Маншем прошли. Если национальным правительствам не по силам даже построить тоннель или мост, что они вообще могут сделать без посторонней помощи? Мало что: ведь они связаны по рукам и ногам национальным долгом, европейским законодательством, американскими рейтинговыми бюро, транснациональными корпорациями и международными соглашениями. В начале XXI века то понятие суверенитета, которое было фундаментом национального государства, стало очень относительным. Из-за этого национальные правительства уже не в состоянии адекватно разобраться с серьезными проблемами нашего времени: изменением климата, банковским кризисом, офшорным мошенничеством, миграцией, перенаселенностью.
Бессилие — вот кодовое слово нашего времени: бессилие гражданина перед лицом правительства, бессилие правительства перед лицом Европы и бессилие Европы перед лицом остального мира. Насмотревшись на бардак у своих ног, каждый бросает взгляд вверх, но в этом взгляде нет ни надежды, ни доверия, а есть отчаяние и гнев. Власть сегодня — это лестница, на которой каждый присутствующий клянет остальных.
Политика всегда была искусством достижения возможных целей, а сейчас она стала искусством достижения микроскопических целей.
Потому что неспособность заниматься структурными проблемами сопровождается чрезвычайным вниманием к проблемам тривиальным, подогреваемым съехавшими с катушек СМИ, которые вполне в русле рыночной логики стали относиться к раздуванию ничтожных конфликтов с куда бóльшим интересом, чем к своей задаче помогать разбираться в реальных проблемах, тем более что тиражи падают. Другими словами, как никогда ранее мы имеем дело с властью обезумевшей моды. Парламент Нидерландов озадачился этой проблемой в 2009 году. Отчет парламентской координационной группы свидетельствует о недюжинной проницательности: «Ради того чтобы выжить на следующих выборах, политики все время заняты зарабатыванием очков. А СМИ, приобретающие все более коммерческий характер, более чем охотно предлагают им свои возможности, из-за чего эти три составляющие [политика, СМИ и бизнес] крепко завязаны друг на друга, создавая некий “Бермудский треугольник”, в котором мистическим образом все тонет, при этом все удивляются, отчего же это происходит. <…> Представляется, что вследствие взаимодействия политики и СМИ в политике все бóльшую роль играют случайные факторы. СМИ живут новостями. Сами журналисты в частных беседах говорят от том, что происшествия пользуются у СМИ бóльшим спросом, чем хорошие дебаты, которые тоже случаются».
Хороший термин — «случайные факторы». Цифры не дадут соврать. За последние годы число устных и письменных вопросов, внесенных предложений и дебатов по горячим темам в нидерландском парламенте резко взмыло вверх — и вместе с ним количество просмотров политических ток-шоу на нидерландском телевидении: ведь для народного избранника нет ничего важнее, чем набрать побольше очков, пока работают камеры. «Депутаты рады каждый день заявлять о том, что они “удручены”, “шокированы” или “крайне неприятно удивлены”, — отмечает в своем отчете один из информантов. — В XIX веке в нижней палате было, вероятно, слишком много престарелых юристов; в нынешнем их слишком мало».
Если погоня за популярностью одерживает верх над исполнением обязанностей, если предвыборная лихорадка становится хроническим заболеванием, если компромиссы называются не иначе как предательством, если партийная политика систематически вызывает презрение, если участие в правительстве оборачивается для партии резким уменьшением числа избирателей, то стоит ли ждать, что в политику пойдет идеалистически настроенная молодежь? Парламент может зачахнуть без притока свежих сил. Все сложнее становится находить новых людей, у которых бы горели глаза: вот и вторичный симптом кризиса эффективности. Политикам уготована та же судьба, что и учителям: раньше это были уважаемые люди, теперь их труд презирают. Очень емко выражает суть происходящего название одной нидерландской брошюры о привлечении новых талантливых политиков: «Найти и удержать». Удерживать их непросто: ведь талантливые политики выгорают быстрее, чем раньше. Председатель Евросовета Херман Ромпей недавно сказал следующее: «Работая в условиях нынешней демократии, люди “изнашиваются” ужасающе быстро. Мы не должны допустить того, чтобы демократия “износилась” сама собой».
И в этом вся суть кризиса эффективности: демократия теряет зубы, но, удивительное дело, производит все больше шума. Вместо того чтобы, осознавая свои слабость и ограниченный радиус действия, стыдливо сидеть в уголке и говорить вполголоса, политик может (да что там — должен) кричать со всех крыш о своих достоинствах — выборы и СМИ не оставляют ему другого варианта, и желательно при этом сжимать кулаки и стоять на своем, вздернув подбородок: ведь это красиво и создает впечатление активных действий. Так ему кажется. Вместо того чтобы смиренно признать, что устройство власти эволюционирует, и искать новые формы управления, которые имели бы смысл, политик продолжает играть в выборно-медийные игры, часто против собственной воли и против воли гражданина, которому все это начинает надоедать: такая высосанная из пальца, наигранная истерика не способствует возврату доверия. Кризис эффективности только усиливает кризис легитимности.
Результаты соответствующие. Симптомы, которыми страдает западная демократия, столь же многочисленны, сколь и расплывчаты, но если собрать их все в одном месте (неявка на выборы, размытость избирательных предпочтений, сокращение численности партий, административное бессилие, политический паралич, боязнь оттолкнуть электорат, недобор рекрутов, компульсивный поиск одобрения, хроническая предвыборная лихорадка, изнуряющий медийный стресс, подозрительность, безразличие и прочие недомогания), то перед нами возникают очертания синдрома демократической усталости — болезни, еще не описанной, но тем не менее явно присущей многочисленным западным демократиям. Давайте посмотрим на уже существующие диагнозы.
Редактор: Александр Дунаев
Перевод: Ирина Бассина, Екатерина Торицына