Soldier on Osh

Until recently, the Russian authorities in Kyrgyzstan were built on the principle of "in spite of mom to the frostbite." Kurmanbek Bakiev angered the Kremlin by keeping his promises in exchange for loans and financial assistance to close the American military base in Manas. The fulfillment of this promise for Russia would not be of practical importance, but it is considered in the Kremlin as an important symbol of Russian predominance in the post -Soviet space. And in Moscow, a lot of contributed to the overthrow of Bakiev, absolutely not calculating the possible consequences. However, after the overthrow of Bakiev in Kyrgyzstan, a chaos arose, which quite predictably resulted in the massacre of the Uzbek minority in the south of the country. After all, this conflict was smoldering here, periodically aggravating, since Soviet times. And there was enough visible weakening of the central government in Kyrgyzstan to blame it with a fire.

Accusations at the address of the ex-president of Kyrgyzstan in the organization of anti-Uzbek pogroms are hardly fair. Rather, they are provoked by participants in the Antibakiev Revolution, which are under the slogan "Kyrgyzstan for the Kyrgyz." And for this reason, the government cannot act too much against the pogrom, since they are to some extent its support. It is not to normalize the situation using the force of hunters. Meanwhile, the real number of victims of the riots, according to the recognition of the head of the Provisional Government of the Rose Otunbaeva, is several times higher than the official figure (190) and is probably already approaching 1000. The obvious for the whole world was also the fact that the new Kyrgyz authorities do not control the situation in the south of the country, because they do not have a combat -ready army and police, which, with all their desire, cannot suppress the riots.

Uzbekistan, whose "foreign compatriots" became victims of pogroms, is objectively primarily interested in the entry into the zone of riots of troops or police forces - either international or their own. In the latter case, Tashkent could only act within the CSTO mandate. However, the Kyrgyz government is unlikely to agree to such a scenario of the development of events, since the input of the Uzbek troops would mean the actual loss of Bishkek even nominal control over the situation in the south of the country.

The best option would be the introduction of the UN peacekeeping contingent to the Kyrgyzstan. However, this requires considerable time, at least three months, and during this time the situation in Kyrgyzstan can change in a root and unpredictable way. The entry of CSTO troops also seems problematic. Meanwhile, the continuation of the riots in Kyrgyzstan threatens the destabilization of the situation in the neighboring states of Central Asia, primarily in Uzbekistan, where more than 100 thousand refugees have already arrived.

The introduction of Russian peacekeepers under the CSTO flag seems more likely. Certain circles in the Kremlin may wish this to take another step in the restoration of the Soviet empire - especially since the United States, under the pretext of "rebooting" of American -Russian relations, has already distanced from the situation in Kyrgyzstan. However, too many objective circumstances prevents this. To begin with, neither in Russia nor in other CSTO participating countries there are practically no police forces that can suppress the riots and intended for actions outside the national territories. In principle, the European Union and NATO have such forces, however, the possibility of their involvement in the current conflict in Kyrgyzstan is close to zero, especially taking into account the unfavorable situation in Afghanistan. The military in this situation may be useless, since there will be no distinguishable enemy, even in the form of partisan detachments. And to disconnect the crowds of the armed people, Russian soldiers are not trained. They can only bear in vain losses and cause new victims among the conflicting parties, but not to turn the situation.

It remains with Felix Kulov to hope that "this chaos, which was, sooner or later should somehow organize." At the moment, the influence of external forces on the situation in Kyrgyzstan is very limited. And if the current riots in the south of the country will not stop by themselves, at least after the exile of the bulk of the Uzbek population outside the country, further destabilization of the situation in the region may begin. It can be associated both with a possible change in the current government in Bishkek with radical nationalist elements, and with the possible entry into the conflict of the Uzbek troops, since Tashkent is unlikely to endure for a long time more than 100 thousand refugees. Therefore, over time, Uzbekistan can decide on the entry of troops even bypassing the structures of the CSTO. The introduction of Russian troops cannot be excluded, despite the reluctance declared in Moscow. But even such a step is unlikely to lead to stabilization.