
It is completely incomprehensible how various sadders learned the opinion of the people about the people before the appearance of scientific methods for studying this opinion. It is even more surprising that in our time, publicists and politicians allow themselves to judge the moods of society and its structure, having almost no sociological material at their disposal.
Regardless of what meaning we put into the concept of “honest elections”, this honesty is provided primarily by honest and high -quality surveys - otherwise the official result of voting is nothing to compare. If the opposition sets itself the minimum task to achieve the second round, then it should work with the electorate, which has not yet decided on its choice.
It is for the hesitation of the voter that the struggle in the real election is going on. Your "nuclear electorate" is agitated. But the undefined are studied along and down, distribute them into categories, form focus groups, capture the most humane changes in their moods and, accordingly, adjust the election campaign. Specialist in the study of public opinion is a key figure in modern electoral technologies. The candidate appears to his supporters, but appeals to the fact that he has not yet made a choice.
In Russia, as usual, everything is on a special woman. Her arshin is not common to measure - so there is nothing, therefore, to try. Putin collects rallies in his support, but does he know who are these people, what the Uralvagonzavod really wants, are they interested in "on Royan" in general and Putin in particular? What is this working class that performs in the same camp with large owners? The contemptuous nicknames that the opposition rewarded with the Posoputin crowd is nothing more than anti -sobs stereotypes.
On the other hand, the leaders of the opposition turn exclusively to their own. Yes, and these appeals are essentially not needed - participants in rallies on Bolotnaya and Sakharov say that they did not listen to what the speakers broadcast, they were important for them the fact of reaching the square, the atmosphere of a large party - this is the main positive. They did not so much protest or demanded how they had fun. The Soviet joke is in paradoxically repeated about clean paper instead of leaflets: "Why write? The people already know everything."
In a survey of the Levada Center, we saw the sociologicalcut of this protest society, but only the rude and superficial. It takes into account only four indicators: age, education, income level, occupation. But I personally do not say little the definitions "leader", "employee" or "worker". I did not learn anything about the life philosophy of the respondents, their way of life, their cultural interests. Who are the "angry townspeople", "generation of Facebook", "creative class", they are "office plankton" and "sniffing clowns"? “What is the“ middle class ”, and how much did they“ come to the Audi ”here, and where is the notorious“ mink fur coats ”?” Asks in his commentary to the Power Educational Education of the Levada Center Boris Dubin. So was the middle class there? Or was it, but disguised?
If this is the middle class, then how to explain the behavior of Putin, which, on the one hand, constantly says that the middle class should become a “social majority” and even claims that “the middle class exit from the narrow world of building its own welfare” is his personal merit, and at the same time write off this middle class from the accounts, solidarizing with the Uralvagonzavod?
In any case, the current share of those who in Russia decided to consider the middle class , below the estimate of the number of anti -Putin electorate. According to the General Director of the All-Russian University Valery Fedorov (his assessment, apparently, should be considered conservative), “every fourth voter of Russia will vote“ fundamentally against Putin ”. And the middle class, according to the last report of the Center for Strategic Studies of Rosgosstrakh, is 17 percent in Russia today.
And nothing is known at all about those who are neither “for” nor “against”. According to the last survey of the VTsIOM, there are 9.8 percent in Russia at the moment and the same amount of those who are not going to vote.
Meanwhile, the February rating of Putin (according to VTsIom) is 53.3 percent. And although in a commentary on the survey it is said that “V. Putin’s electoral rating continues to grow”, Valery Fedorov in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda clarifies that the rating does not grow, but fluctuates in the range of three percent, and the error of the study is 3.4 percent. But to win the first round, the candidate needs to dial 50 percent plus one vote. The error can cost Putin expensive.
According to the Levada Center, Putin's rating in the second half of January was 37 percent. According to this forecast, the second round is as if guaranteed. However, the share of the undefined is 28 percent, and if you add to them two percent of the firm supporters of Yavlinsky, then all 30. And Putin needs only 13 to win the first round.
Finally, according to the Thomas survey , Putin's rating in early February amounted to 47 percent, and the share of the undefined - 18 plus 9 percent not going to vote. But FOM, in addition to the electoral rating of candidates, also publishes the so -called current forecast - the distribution of the votes of those who will definitely come to polling stations. Moreover, the statements of the respondent himself about the intention is not enough - his true intention is determined by a special method. So, according to the current forecast of Thomas, 58.7 percent of voters will vote for Putin on March 4, and the turnout will be 59.3 percent.
In other words, even if the opposition manages to mobilize all the undefined, without exception, there are no chances for the second round - Putin will have enough and determined. If FOM is right, then Putin does not need any additional mobilization. Its current forecast has been growing steadily since mid -December. Probably, only Zyuganov could split the Putin electorate, but his rating after the timid outburst of mid -December (12 percent) fell to 9 again, and the current forecast decreases exactly from the point from which Putin began to grow, on January 21.
A comforting picture is drawn by a center for strategic assessments and forecasts. Its analysis is based on the division of the electorate into four psychological types. It turns out that honest elections will win in the second round Zyuganov with a result of 51.4 percent (the authors of the study proceed from the assumption that in the second round no one will vote "against all", so Putin has 48.6 percent in their forecast). However, sociologist Sergei Belanovsky considers the TsSOP methodology to be insolvent. But he believes the Levada Center.
The scatter of the results is such that it is able to endure any serious political strategist, not to mention the fact that we practically do not have a sociological portrait of a Russian voter, except the approximate. It is unlikely that it makes sense to blame sociological services of postscribes or unfinished. Just in 12 Putin years, they were weaned to predict anything other than the obvious. For this reason, we are not conducted by a full -fledged election campaign - not because it is impossible to win the elections of the current government, but because you don’t know what ratings to believe, what and who to win.