The application for the creation of a new political project - based on five parties (People's Party, Revival of Russia, Patriots of Russia, Social Justice Party and Social Democratic Party) - did not become a sensation. There had to be something to do with the excess number of political organizations that are crowded into the not very broad center-left electoral platform.

The motives of the party members are clear - none of the parties participating in the new project can overcome not only the new 7 percent threshold, but also the old 5 percent barrier. True, before the last elections, some of them, relying on sociological studies that promised them 15-16% of voters, hoped that they would cross the threshold. At the same time, the studies were not at all “inflated” - you just had to carefully read the question asked to the respondents, which sounded something like this: “Are you ruling out the possibility of voting for Party X?” Of course, a certain number of citizens are ready to answer this question in the affirmative - if we are talking about political entities that are not very well-known and do not cause persistent allergies. Why not, in fact, support some kind of Party for the Revival of Russia - that’s a nice name? And the next day the same respondent will speak favorably about the People’s Party, and the day after tomorrow about some Social Democrats, etc. If you add up all these polls, you get a double or triple count. When a citizen turns into a voter and goes to the polling station, he will not even remember the parties that he was asked about several months ago, but will calmly vote for one of the leaders of the election campaign well known to him.
It is clear that now even the most gullible party boss will not believe that the 15% predicted in this way will ultimately be converted into seven and a half. And if so, then we must try to combine our efforts to achieve our cherished goal. However, the new – just announced – project will immediately face several problems, each of which can become fatal.
The first problem is electoral. If the rating of several parties is within the statistical error, then simple summation does not give the required effect. Simply put, zero plus zero always equals zero. Even if you add up half a percent and half a percent, then in the best case you get one percent (and even that is not guaranteed, since some voters may not like the new party format), and not, say, three. The cumulative effect is impossible without the appearance at the head of the project of a charismatic figure who can seriously interest potential voters.
The second problem is internal competition. Let's remember how A Just Russia was created? At first, Rodina and the Pensioners Party were essentially decapitated. It would be naive to assume that Babakov and Zotov, who replaced Rogozin and Hartung, had serious claims to leadership in the united party. Mironov led the “fair Russians” without any problems. In the new project there are five political figures approximately equal in their current electoral weight. Why is former State Duma speaker Seleznev worse than, for example, former sponsor of the Communist Party Semigin? Or both – former KGB officer Kishenin, who in 2003 headed the list of the bloc of the Social Justice Party and the Pensioners Party? It is possible that, due to internal competition, the new project may be implemented in a reduced form, or even fail altogether.
The third problem is demand. Namely, who, besides the leaders and party activists themselves, needs this project: given that it is now important for the Kremlin not to get confused in two pines - the “party in power” tested in the last elections and the newly minted contender for this role. The presence of a third “pine” can lead to even greater complications and, therefore, seems unnecessary. As for voters, it is now quite difficult for them to digest the sudden disappearance of Rodina (whose fate many of them, albeit without much emotion, were still interested in) and the emergence of Mironov’s project with still unclear prospects. They have no time for the latest delights of modern party building.
The fourth problem is close proximity. In the by no means dimensionless center-left electoral niche, there already exists a “Fair Russia” with a Senate speaker and a presidential cousin. As the unforgettable General Lebed said, two birds cannot get along in one den. And if so, then a higher-status project has more prospects.
Perhaps the only serious chance of the new project is to solve the third and fourth problems at once. Namely: the party may be in demand by United Russia as a spoiler (that is, an electoral player taking away votes from a competitor) for A Just Russia. In this case, working on the same site with Mironov’s team can turn from a minus into a plus. It is one thing when one strong center-left project may appear in the Russian party system in the foreseeable future, and quite another when two weakened ones compete in this clearing. In this case, the dominance of United Russia in the party system will not be threatened, and the new project will have a chance for a not very happy (spoilers usually do not get into parliament themselves), but relatively stable existence.