The verdict is predictable, just as, probably, everything that happens next is predictable. The further fate of Tymoshenko is a subject for bargaining between Ukraine and the European Union. The Yanukovych government wants to sign association agreements with the European Union, providing for the creation of a free trade zone, but the West makes it quite clear that if Tymoshenko is in prison, then either the agreements will not be signed at all, or they will not be ratified by the parliaments of the European Union countries. The stakes in this game are high, so it is possible that one of the possible options will be chosen to solve this problem. On the one hand, Tymoshenko was found guilty, which means that Yanukovych can now say that she is a criminal, that he was right when he accused her. On the other hand, there may be an amnesty option. There may be an option to decriminalize the article of the Criminal Code under which she was sentenced. Now Yanukovych’s bill on decriminalization has been introduced with the Radu; it does not provide for the decriminalization of this particular article, but amendments can be made to it, and this option, as I understand it, is considered probable. The third option is to reduce the sentence to something symbolic. There are quite a few options for getting out of the situation; the question is a political solution, an agreement between Ukraine and the West.
As for Russia, the figure of Tymoshenko itself is of little significance for it. On the contrary, Tymoshenko’s stay in prison, as well as the situation in which Ukraine’s relations with the West have worsened, may not be so disadvantageous for Russia. That is, if relations between Ukraine and the West continue to become complicated, then Russia will have the idea that it is possible to return to discussing the topic of including Ukraine in the Customs Union. For Russia, the Tymoshenko case is unpleasant for the reason that the legitimacy of the agreements that were signed in 2009 is being called into question. Ukrainian authorities insist on reviewing these agreements. Therefore, Russia, without having any particular sympathy for Tymoshenko, took a rather critical position in relation to the trial, but precisely in the context of the fact that the agreements signed by Tymoshenko are legal and normal. Regarding the possibility of revising these agreements, there are different options. Ukraine, for example, can turn to international courts that resolve economic disputes, but it is unlikely that it needs a protracted and scandalous process. Therefore, the parties can agree on the basis that, on the one hand, the agreements remain in force, and on the other, Ukraine receives some relief in the context of supplies, say, for public utilities. As I understand, these topics were discussed in September in Zavidovo at a meeting between Medvedev and Yanukovych. If the issue of agreements is fundamental for Russia, then the questions of what concessions and in exchange for what are possible within the framework of these agreements are discussed.