
On November 8, at 15.00, in accordance with the daily plan of the fleet and the sealing plan, the Nerpa was plunged to the periscope depth for setting up the Irbis radio reconnaissance complex.
At 17.50, combat readiness was declared, the boat is preparing to lie down on the reverse course, the second shift should be shown to watch.
At 17 hours 54 minutes 10 seconds in the second compartment, a Revun sounded (a signaling device with a characteristic timbre of sound), and after a few seconds from the sprayers of the fire fighting system (volumetric volumetric chemical), a poisonous flamethrower began to enter the 2nd compartment.

... All those who were in the second compartment instantly felt a sharp caustic smell. Under the influence of evaporating fluid, people lost consciousness after several sighs. According to eyewitnesses, the fireman corroded the plastic of the devices and the soles of the shoes. Subsequently, the victims diagnosed various forms of poisoning, including toxic coma. Three days after the accident, a chemical analysis will show that the Loch tanks were refused by a poisonous technical fluid - a mixture consisting of 34% of the colad and 66% tetrachloretilene.
Reference. The physico-chemical examination conducted by the Kurchatov Institute calculated the concentration of the mixture received in the compartment: according to the colad-1780 MPCs, according to tetrachloretilen-33,400 MPs. The same examination determined the dynamics of filling out the compartment of the component of the mixture: the pairs of the low toxic coladon concentrated near the floor of the compartment, while at the height of human growth (1.7-1.8 meters) the compartment was filled mainly in pairs of tetrachloretillene. In a few minutes at a height of 20-40 cm from the surface of evaporation of the liquid mixture, the oxygen content decreased in air from 21% to threshold 12%. Specialists of the Kurchatov Institute came to the conclusion: in breathing in the toxic pairs of tetrahlorelene, people fell unconscious and died from a lack of oxygen (suffocation).
An emergency situation was complicated by the fact that the second compartment was residential, at the time of the accident there were 116 people in it. Moreover, the main command post of the ship is located in this compartment.
The commander Dmitry Lavrentiev in his voice declared emergency alarm, gave the command to go and concentrated on the control panels. The complex maneuver of the "seal" performed in three minutes. Only after that, Lavrentiev, feeling dizziness, joined the sd (hose respiratory apparatus). Since the announcement of emergency anxiety (and even earlier - as soon as the fireman went into the compartment), the crew of the "seal" began to act in accordance with the ship's sample for the struggle for vitality. But in the 2nd compartment there were many civilian specialists. They did not have crew skills, brought to automatism. Not everyone had PDA (portable respiratory apparatus), but for many they were faulty. That is why 17 out of 20 dead are civilians.
After surfacing, the commander Lavrentiev sends a report to the command post of Tof, forms emergency parties from the crew of 2-3 people and organizes an evacuation stream. The head of the medical service, the captain of the m/s Ivanov launched the post of medical care. Moving along all the decks of the 2nd compartment, he included people in the PDA and helped to evacuate those who were in an unconscious state. He himself lost consciousness, woke up in the 3rd compartment, returned to the 2nd, continued to provide medical assistance, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation ... The entire Lavrentiev crew impeccably fulfilled all the requirements for the struggle for survivability and prevented the mass death of people and the ship. 17 submariners will subsequently be awarded state awards. Three - posthumously.
On November 9, the “Nerpa” returned to the main point of basing. On the shore, among the meeting were the FSB - Morozov and Balyabis. Two crew members-the Sailor of the Contractor Grobov and the commander of the hold department of Vasiliev-were detained, documents were selected with the words: “They will no longer need you in prison” and taken away in an unknown direction. A day later, Vasiliev was released. Well, the sailor of the tomb signed the confession (1) .

Here it is necessary to explain why it is the coffins and Vasiliev.
Over the entire history of the Navy, not a single case of unauthorized operation of the fire fighting system was recorded. And only in 2008 the same type of emergency situations with suckers occur at once in two boats-at the Yuri Dolgoruky Premier League and on the “seal”.
It was on these boats that a new computerized control system for the control systems of the Molibden SU OKS was installed .
Molibden is a computer consisting of two central racks in the main command post of the ship. They are connected to several remote computers - cutting racks located, respectively, in each compartment. From all these racks, the operator can enter a command to launch a device or mechanism and track its condition. For this, each rack has a keyboard and monitor.
On both central racks of Molibden, there are recorders of events fixing the teams entered into the system.
... On November 9, the FSB officers, military investigators and industry representatives - experts of the Aurora NPO (enterprise -developer of software for molybdenum) climbed onto the Nerpa Premier League. Investigators, together with Aurora specialists, Lukov and Blinov, seized the registrar for some reason with only one of the two central racks. Employees of the Aurora NPO copied the information from this registrar, processed it and presented it in the form of a printout to the investigation. From this printout it followed that the command to activate the sucker was filed on November 8 at 17.54 from the cutting rack 7M2-21 of the Molibden system, located on the 2nd deck of the 2nd compartment. It was at this moment that on the 2nd deck of the 2nd compartment, the hold of the hold department Vasiliev took the shift at the sailor of Glubov.
I want to emphasize: the investigation reached the submariners of Grobov and Vasiliev with the help of NGOs "Aurora". But it is obvious that it was the Aurora NPO that was interested in the “human factor” to be the cause of the accident on the “seal”. On November 9, the employees of the Aurora NPO, perhaps the only ones, knew that on the Yuri Dolgoruky Premier League unauthorized (that is, in the absence of a human factor) and in an absolutely similar way, one algorithm (the supply of a fireman from the reservoirs of three compartments into one), the sucker system worked. I worked more than once. Three times!
At the "Yuri Dolgoruk" the actual supply of the fireman in the compartment did not occur by a pure chance: in connection with the repair and commissioning, all manual valves were closed. The reasons for the unauthorized operation of the sucker are still not known, but the specialists of the Aurora NPO established the so -called “software traps”. After which the emergency situations were not repeated.
IMPORTANT. Nor the designer of Molibden (St. Petersburg Marine Bureau of Malachite Mechanical Engineering) or NPO “Aurora” did not check reliability and did not install “software traps” on their other order-the Nerpa Premier League. The manufacturer of the Nerp, representatives of the fleet, the crew of the boat and the investigation directly learned about the history with the Yuri Dolgoruky Premier League three days after the tragedy of November 8.
By that time, the FSB officers had already received the testimony from the sailor of Grobov: “ ... being untrained and not having knowledge ... by arbitrary pressing of the cutting remote control panel of the 7M2-21, located on the 2nd deck of the 2nd submarine compartment, he formed and activated the emergency spikeing system for the sucker ... ”
... Actually, at the time of the accident, the foreman of the 2nd grade Dmitry Mikhailovich Grobov was a professional submariner with six years of experience, did not have complaints about the service. Judging by his secret notebook (conducted by crew members when testing new weapons and military equipment), the tombs perfectly understood the purpose of the cutting panel of control 7M2-21 and knew that a sucker could be launched from him. But the team’s code did not know and had no practical operating skills 7M2-21. Moreover, the commander Lavrentiev approved the instructions, in fact, prohibiting the use of cutting remarks to activate the fire extinguishing system. It was allowed to submit a fireman to the compartments on the “seal” only “in the old fashioned way” : from the central compartment and manually. The last method was trained by all crew members. These are the basics of the struggle for the struggle for survivability.
The team’s algorithm for filing a fireman consisted of 12 signs. That is, according to investigators, the sailor of the coffins accidentally pressed 12 keys in the correct sequence? The fact that coffins could not activate the sucker will prove the investigative experiment. I quote the protocol of verification of the testimony on the spot dated 11/14/2008: “ ... according to DM Grobov, after he <introduced the command and> pressed the“ Inter ”button (“ Enter ”. - E. M. ), he heard the sound of the Revuna ... The specialist was proposed to make his judgment regarding grave manipulations ... The specialist explained that the manipulations made on the keyboard on the detachment keyboard The Molibden OCS control device to the supply of a fireman to the second compartment from the three stations of the Loch system could not bring ... the command to feed the fireman in the compartment is submitted by the Plus button and by pressing other buttons, the command to feed the fireman is not executed ... "
In the criminal case on the "seal" there is a forced forensic psychiatric examination, which stated the sanity of the sailor Grobov. But in this case there is no examination on fingerprints from the keyboard of the shut -off control stand.
And yet. Next to the 7MO2-21 shut-off stance are two of the three toilets on a boat. Due to the multiplicity of the delivery team, there were always people near the toilets. The investigation easily found a dozen witnesses. Immediately before the accident, the witness Yurin was on the 3rd deck of the 2nd compartment and saw Dmitry Glubov, standing at the mine of sliding devices, and not at the rack 7MO2-21. Immediately before the accident, the witness Kurenko watched the periscope and, having heard the sound of the Revun, looked down, believing that the cable had twisted. He did not see anyone at the rack 7m2-21. Witness Rogozin was in the cabin, the door of which is located directly next to the shutoff counter. He came to the cabin literally 2 minutes before the start of the accident. I heard the sound of the Revenue, left the cabin - I did not see anyone. At the trial, the prosecution representative will say that the Revun is triggered 4 seconds after the launch of the fire extinguishing system. This is wrong. Revun works instantly. At the time of the trigger of the Revan at the rack 7m2-21, a person who launched a sucker would certainly be stood. Unless, of course, it was a person at all ...
The history of the seal project is the story of a terrifying mess and corruption. By 2004, it became finally clear that the Russian side clearly does not fit during the contract with the Indian Navy (2) . Therefore, the leadership of the Russian Agency for Shipbuilding and the Department of Shipbuilding of the Navy made a joint decision No. 702.2.1069 of May 19, 2004. By this decision, a number of experienced (that is, those who do not have analogues) of the technical systems installed on the “seal” (3) was assigned the letter “01” (serial). Including the letter "01" was assigned to the Su OKS "Molibden". It is for this reason that Molibden did not go through interdepartmental tests, which reveal and eliminate the defects of prototypes.

In 2005, the military pedant Dmitry Lavrentiev was appointed commander of the crew under construction. He fully equips the crew and drives it mercilessly. At the end of September 2006, Nerpa was tucked in a transport trigger at the Vostok ship equipment in the city of Bolshoi Kamen. The boat cannot go on its own, it is being completed literally on the go. The next year in the “East” is the NOS installation slave, the order on the formation of a delivery team and the beginning of the first (mooring) tests will be signed only in December 2007. The terms of the contract are finally disrupted, the funds for the construction of the NTI are sorely lacking. Sooting tests are held in July 2008. A mooring certificate on the sucker system will be closed formally, since it does not meet the requirements of the test methodology. So, for example, for the first time in the history of domestic shipbuilding, the mechanisms of the sucker system do not have “protection from fools” (4) , and in the instructions for the operation of the SU OKS “Moldibden-I” in terms of the sucker system, the “Safety ensuring” is completely absent.
But the biggest problems are associated with poor-quality software of the computerized control system of the Molidben-I ship. Already after the closing of mooring tests-September 10 and 18, 2008-on the "seal" serious malfunctions in the work of Molibden. The senior mechanical engineer Sazonov will write a letter to the head of the SPMBM "Malachite" Alexandrov.
“My proposals: to exclude the further use of the“ molybdenum ”system of this type (computerized) on military submarines (on the current) due to shortcomings ... and the presence of all the“ diseases ”inherent in the computer: the ability to“ hover ”during reloading, entering the work (long“ loading ”) and other ...”
This letter was received in the testing department of the Malachite SPMBM on September 27, and on October 1, Dmitry Lavrentiev was appointed commander of a delivery team for the factory running tests. At the time of the start of the factory running tests, the magazine of comments on the Molibden system (5) , which included information about the malfunctions of the system identified during mooring tests (including the facts of launching devices and mechanisms of the ship without the participation of a person), contained more than 50 records ...
... On October 21, 2008, the "seal" went to sea and ... returns back to repair the revealed faults. On October 29, the Nerpa is trying to go out again and is again forced to return to the base: both compressors of vacuuming the 4th compartment refused. The third attempt ended with a tragedy: on November 8, an unauthorized operation of the reinforcement of the sucker system occurred - just like at the Yuri Dolgoruky Premier League. That's just on the "seal", in addition to all, the tanks of the sucker were seasoned with an unsifty fireman.
In fact, the nuclear submarine "Nerpa" is under construction by order of the Navy of India-a strategic military object. That is, the immediate zone of responsibility of the head of the FSB of Russia, military unit 36048 (72nd brigade of under construction submarines and the Vostok plant, at which the reservoirs of the Harshes were refined with poisonous rubbish).
The FSB officer, who has achieved “confessions” from the sailor Grobov, and the head of the FSB department of military unit 36048 is the same person, captain of the 3rd rank M.N. Balyabis.
... Upon the fact of the supply of non-infected fireman, the criminal case was allocated into a separate proceeding and transferred for an investigation into the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Central Executive Committee. There it is buried.

For the first time in the history of Russia, the case of a military disaster at sea was considered by the jury. On October 14 last year, the jurors of a majority vote justified the sailor of Grobov and commander Lavrentiev. The acquittal buried the version of the “human factor” and emphasized the technogenic nature of the accident. Which, by and large, was clear to all specialists initially. But India did not abandon the "seal". The Indians only demanded that the commander of Lavrentiev and his crew bring the tests of the ship and the training of the Indian crew to the end.
At the beginning of this year, the boat safely made a transition through two oceans and was accepted into the Indian Navy. Just in case, the sucker system is on the “seal” and on all boats on which the Su “molybdenum” is installed, is transferred to manual operating mode.
Exactly the day after the election of the President of Russia - March 5, 2012 - the military prosecutor's office filed a detailed cassation appeal. The author of the cassation, the prosecutor F. Major, literally said the following: “Only two guilty in the accident - Lavrenti and coffins. They are responsible for the death of people. The court decision will be appealed and will be considered until the indictment of the verdict has been issued in the case. ”
PS on May 3, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation canceled the acquittal against Grobov and Lavrentiev. The case is aimed at a new consideration, which means that the continuation follows.
(1) The coffins refused these testimonies when the colleagues and the Russian naval public found the sailor for a lawyer.
(2) “Neru” was built in 10-year leasing for the Indian fleet.
(3) The boat installed 14 experimental-settings of weapons and military equipment, the latest missile and torpedo weapons. Thus, the K-152 Premier League is not serial, and there are no similar “seals” in the Russian Navy.
(4) The launch buttons of the 7m02 devices on the “seal” were equipped with transparent sealed covers only after the tragedy.
(5) Журнал был изъят следователем в качестве вещдока, осмотрен без описания содержащихся в нем записей и в последствии исчез из материалов уголовного дела.