Repeated collision

Suddenly it turned out that the authorities were making decisions contrary to Berezovsky, without his participation and without taking into account his opinion about the likely consequences. And he went into opposition. “I can’t be a puppet, playing in a play that someone directed, I don’t like this direction,” the ex-deputy explained the reasons for his demarche. (Photo: Oleg Ivanov )

Boris Berezovsky left the State Duma so that, in his own words, “not to participate in the collapse of Russia and the establishment of an authoritarian regime.” He renounced his parliamentary immunity in order to “play on an equal footing with other oligarchs” who were in danger due to the “state-led campaign against Russian business.” And he announced his departure to the opposition to the Kremlin. “Today there is a need to create a constructive opposition to the authorities. Today, hundreds of thousands of people understand the dangerous direction of development of the authorities and understand that the authorities must be limited,” said Boris Abramovich, leaving the meeting room of the lower house. “I don’t want to operate in terms of a party or not a party. I "I note that the elites are being consolidated by the insane actions of the authorities. Another question is whether they have the will to act together against the authorities."

Actually, Berezovsky’s intention to go into opposition to the Kremlin is the main political news of the past week. And resigning from parliamentary powers is nothing more than a spectacular move designed to draw attention to Berezovsky’s person and demonstrate the seriousness of his intentions.

Devoid of influence
At the end of May, when Boris Berezovsky published an open letter to President Putin with harsh, but at the same time extremely clear and reasoned criticism of the Kremlin reform of the federal structure, most analysts perceived it as part of a complex game that the Kremlin itself had started. Thus, opponents of the presidential initiatives were, as it were, faced with a difficult choice: either agree with Putin’s concept, or end up in the same company with Berezovsky, which is simply unacceptable for a significant part of the political elite.

However, the events of the last two months have increasingly shown that the Kremlin is playing one game, and Berezovsky is playing another, in which Boris Abramovich openly opposes the presidential team. It was not without his participation that the governors thwarted the rapid approval of the presidential “federal package.” And last week, Kremlin technologists were ready for the Federation Council to veto the conciliation commission’s version of the bill on the formation of the upper house.

Meanwhile, information came from informed sources, primarily in the Kremlin, indicating that Boris Berezovsky had lost his main capital, what he was proud of and flaunted that he had created with such difficulty: influence on the president of the country. It was all the more difficult to believe in this, since Boris Abramovich was one of the scriptwriters and then the directors of the “Putin is our President” campaign; in addition, the leadership of the Kremlin apparatus is still carried out by Alexander Voloshin, whose reputation as one of the close confidants is now already a former deputy, it is still based on the immutable fact that the brilliant career of the head of the administration began precisely in the trade and financial empire of Berezovsky. Finally, it is worth mentioning that one of Berezovsky’s closest partners, Roman Abramovich, is among Vladimir Putin’s favorites. And yet, it suddenly turned out that the authorities were making decisions contrary to Berezovsky, without his participation and without taking into account his opinion about the likely consequences. Rumor has it that he allegedly learned about even the largest strategic operations - an attack on governors and an attack on big business - from television news broadcasts.

One gets the impression that Boris Berezovsky made two serious mistakes: he overestimated the reliability and devotion of his creature Alexander Voloshin and, on the contrary, underestimated the penetrating power and close ties with the head of state of the St. Petersburg security officers, whom Vladimir Putin brought with him to the Kremlin.

Employees of the presidential administration, considered almost Berezovsky's puppets, decided to play their own game. Voloshin, apparently, believed that over the past year he had acquired considerable influence on Vladimir Putin, so that now his position had been significantly strengthened and he could forget about who brought him to the Kremlin. Alexander Stalyevich really managed to form in the eyes of his patron the image of an irreplaceable administrator, ready to carry out any instruction, without burdening the president with unnecessary information about possible related problems, and even more so about the likely negative consequences.

The St. Petersburg security officers, led by Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov, of course, cannot lay claim to the role of brilliant administrators. Yes, they don’t strive for this. Their advantage is that Putin trusts them unlimitedly. They are not just his comrades, classmates and like-minded people. They are also old, time-tested friends. Finally, they are the only and main personnel resource of the head of state. And this is primarily due to their growing influence on the policies pursued by the president. Berezovsky underestimated these old corporate loyalties of Vladimir Putin. Now he has to enter into single combat with just this part of the presidential team.

Berezovsky was accustomed to managing political processes, manipulating high-ranking officials, thus achieving the adoption of the required decisions. Last week he spoke often and said a lot. But in the flow of statements and statements there are passages that seem to shed light on the true motives of the maneuver undertaken: “I cannot be a puppet, playing in a play that someone else directed, I don’t like this direction.”

Apparently, Berezovsky's plan includes two stages. To begin with, it is intended to demonstrate to President Putin that not everything is subject to the will of the head of state, that there are sufficiently powerful and influential political forces in the country that can effectively and successfully resist the will of the Kremlin. And this has already happened when considering the law on the formation of the Federation Council. The next task is extremely ambitious and difficult to achieve: to return to the elite club of politicians who have access to the development of the most important political decisions not because of their position, but because of their personal closeness to the head of state. Moreover, to return in a new capacity: as a representative of a force that has again taken shape and once again declared its rights and power claims. Really forces, not parties or influence groups.

On this occasion, a remarkable discussion unfolded on the pages of the weekly Vlast, owned by Boris Berezovsky along with the entire Kommersant publishing house. Deputy head of the Kremlin administration Vladislav Surkov in an interview with the magazine suggested that “Berezovsky wants to make a mess, and then come somewhere completely upstairs and say: “Well, what will you do with this mess? And I have the spoon!”

Boris Abramovich himself resolutely rejects accusations that he is “stirring up trouble” solely to preserve his own positions. He puts the interests of society as a whole in the foreground. In his article, he states: “Leadership is not important, what is important is that tens of millions of people do what I propose. All the political projects that I have presented to society in recent years have taken place: the 1996 presidential elections, the idea of ​​​​creating Unity, support Putin in 1999."

Gatherer of the Offended
In the name of restoring his former power and influence, Boris Abramovich is using completely new methods of political struggle. He gathers the governor's elite around himself. He is working in the Duma, rumored to be trying to form a friendly faction of single-mandate deputies in the lower house. The ex-parliamentarian intends to gather into one fist all the information resources at his disposal.

Last week it became known about the creation of a new media holding headed by former first deputy head of the Kremlin administration Igor Shabdurasulov. It is planned to gather ORT, TV-6, the Kommersant publishing house, Ogonyok, and Nezavisimaya Gazeta under one roof. However, problems may arise with ORT, the main information weapon of the new corporation, since private shareholders control less than half of the shares of the television company, and the majority belongs to the state. And the Kremlin can prevent the implementation of such a project. “Then we will simply transfer to the newly created enterprise the right to manage part of ORT’s shares,” Berezovsky decisively announced.

One must think that in the near future Boris Abramovich will take up the consolidation of the business elite. The latter, however, will not be easy, since large domestic entrepreneurs tend to entertain the illusion that sooner or later they will be able to “on an individual basis” come to an agreement with the authorities on peaceful coexistence, and that each of them alone, using old connections, will be able to negotiate an amnesty for themselves . “But even if the majority realizes the real threat hanging over them and their business, consolidation will not happen if there is no consolidator,” a political adviser to the head of one of the large domestic companies assured an Itogi correspondent. “Today, this role of a consolidator can only be fulfilled by one person - Berezovsky." They don’t like him, moreover, he is considered the embodiment of evil. And yet, despite his reputation as a malicious manipulator, a significant part of domestic financiers and entrepreneurs pay tribute to Boris Abramovich’s organizational and combinatory talents. Finally, everyone remembers very well how Berezovsky brought the captains of Russian business to the same table in Davos in 1996. However, back then big capital united around power, and not to fight it.

Last week, Berezovsky's task became more complicated - tensions in the relationship between business and law enforcement agencies decreased somewhat. Perhaps the Kremlin ordered that the entrepreneurs not be touched until their meeting with the president, scheduled for July 28. Therefore, prosecutors continued their systematic attack only on Media-Most: last Wednesday, investigators in the “Russian Video case”, after another interrogation of the head of the holding, Vladimir Gusinsky, issued a resolution on the pre-trial seizure of his property and in the evening of the same day they appeared at the businessman’s country house employees of the prosecutor's office and the FSB. Last week, tax officials also got involved in working with the holding: on Thursday, representatives of the tax police visited the company's office in Bolshoi Palashevsky Lane with the intention of "checking documents confirming the timeliness, completeness and correctness of payment of taxes and payments to the budget and extra-budgetary funds by the NTV-plus company for the period from 1997 to the first quarter of 2000." And this despite the fact that less than a month ago a similar audit was carried out by tax inspectors. One must think that the activity of fiscal officials was caused by a recent letter from the Prosecutor General's Office, which contained a recommendation to the tax services conduct a detailed audit of the activities of Media-Most.

However, most of Gusinsky’s business colleagues were not previously inclined to view prosecutorial attacks on the media holding as a sign of the government’s attack on private business. From conversations with both the immediate leaders of large financial and industrial groups and their advisers, one gets the impression that the ongoing pressure on Most is perceived as the Kremlin settling scores with an inconvenient political opponent.

All in all
Having launched an attack on the Kremlin, trying to gather around himself the business and regional elite offended by the new government, Boris Berezovsky not only wants to regain his lost influence over the president. He seeks to change his image. Having entered into a confrontation with the authorities, the ex-deputy wants to appear as a state-minded person, concerned about the fate of Russia, a fearless and selfless fighter for freedom and democracy in the eyes of the Russian and Western public (and the latter may be much more significant for the former deputy, since in the West Boris Abramovich is firmly labeled as the “godfather of the Russian mafia”). However, realizing this large-scale task may turn out to be much more difficult than consolidating the elites.

So that, God forbid, anyone thinks that he is just trying to save his business or avoid criminal prosecution for past affairs, Berezovsky willingly talks about his vision of political and economic reforms in the country. He even refused immunity. “Well, she’s just a Russian Angela Davis, not an oligarch,” one Kremlin official quipped.

Now all that’s left to do is to defeat Putin’s fellow security officers. They may not be experts at weaving complex political intrigues. But they are determined to bring down the full power of the administrative machine on opponents and critics of the regime, without particularly constraining themselves with the written, much less unwritten, rules of political life. They are ready to tolerate both the press and the opposition only pocket money.

The game started by Berezovsky is more than dangerous and risky. Nowadays, few people will undertake to predict its ending. However, it is well known that Boris Abramovich loves risk - firstly, because the reputation of a desperate political daredevil and brigand is perceived by him as a form of public recognition and even a kind of glory, and secondly, he knows very well that high-risk operations bring the biggest dividends .