Disaster on schedule

The European Union is waiting for reform: most of its 27 members agreed with the proposal of Germany and France to tighten control over the budgets of EU member states. Not all countries are ready to go for it: Great Britain is categorically against it, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Sweden have doubts. This means that the eurozone in its current form, with a high degree of probability, is living out the last months, if not weeks.
After 2008, almost every economist faced the persistent question: how did you miss the crisis? Meanwhile, the current crisis - the European one of 2011 - was predicted by them quite accurately. Moreover, the numerous risks of the eurozone were not discussed by specialists today, but back in those years when the single currency was just being created. It was in the 1990s that a number of major macroeconomists—Rudy Dornbusch and Paul Krugman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Martin Feldstein of Harvard, Barry Eishengreen of Berkeley—published a series of articles pointing to the possible problems of the euro area: the very ones that are now destroying it. And in 2010-2011, the threats they warned about became a reality, and events began to unfold exactly as scientists had feared.
What was initially, according to economic authorities, the main problem of the eurozone? The fact that under certain conditions, as the same Feldstein rightly pointed out, some countries will need a soft monetary policy (assuming that there should be more money in the economy), while others, and in the same period of time, will need a tough one (money in the economy should be smaller). This is exactly what happened: for several years before the crisis, investments were rapidly flowing into Spain, Italy, Greece, attracted by the rapid development of these economies and the growing real estate market. Wages in these countries grew much faster than, for example, in Germany. After the 2008 crisis, the demand for products produced by Spanish, Italian, Greek companies fell. Meanwhile, experience shows that private firms prefer to lay off part of the workers in case of difficulties, and not to reduce the wages of all employees. Not surprisingly, Spain now has 21% unemployment, Greece 17%, and Ireland 14%.
How would a loose monetary policy help - lowering the rate at which banks borrow money from the European Central Bank, or simply buying some ECB assets with freshly printed euros? Rising prices at constant wages would reduce the costs of firms: in other words, they would not have to lay off so many workers and it would be easier to hire those who are currently unemployed. A little inflation would also help those countries that have significant debts - Greece and Italy (when prices rise, debt becomes cheaper), but most importantly, it would save Spain, which has low debts, but which needs a strong reduction in wages to make companies become hire workers and the economy began to grow. „

European outsiders urgently need a loose monetary policy, but this is resisted by the leaders - France and Germany, whose residents inflation will not help in any way, but will make them poorer

“European outsiders urgently need a soft monetary policy, but this is resisted by the leaders - France and Germany, who do not have such problems and, accordingly, whose residents inflation will not help in any way, but will make them poorer. We need some kind of mechanism for financing some regions at the expense of others - it exists to one degree or another in any country in the world. No sovereign state, be it America or Russia, leaves its regions to fend for themselves simply because the region is poorer or in a difficult situation. But these are sovereign states, and in the eurozone - a monetary union, without fiscal and without political ...
Therefore, political mechanisms are needed to resolve these contradictions - for example, a full-fledged parliament or government. But precisely because they do not exist, the eurozone is being torn apart before our very eyes. As the experts warned...