With a king in my head

The Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church is an event that interests non-believers almost more than the Orthodox of Russia. In this sense, the cathedral is similar to a congress, and the decisions of the cathedral are similar to the resolutions of Soviet congresses, which notified the masses of changes in the general line. But behind the external similarity lies at least two fundamental differences. One thing of the highest order: the life of the Church, by definition, is oriented toward eternity, and therefore all decisions on earthly affairs are of a secondary nature and do not affect fundamental issues that have been resolved once and for all. The second difference is of a lower, if you like, practical nature: it is in the Russian Orthodox Church that there are no mechanisms for translating conciliar decisions into reality.

This does not mean that the decisions of the council do not become a reality at all. They do, but regardless of the will of the council. The canonization of Nikolai Romanov is a striking example. For many years, icons of Nicholas and his family were placed in churches and sold in church stalls. If the council had not canonized Nicholas, all this anarchy would have continued happily. The main argument in favor of canonization was the miracles allegedly occurring from the icons and the streaming of myrrh from the icons (however, the church authorities neglected their duty to verify the authenticity of the stories about these miracles). But who allowed these icons to be painted and displayed for worship? Nobody. Consequently, there is a vicious circle: canonization is carried out on the basis of what should be a consequence of canonization.

What will canonization change in the lives of ordinary believers who previously did not revere Grand Duke Nikolai Alexandrovich? You can spend your whole life in church, honoring only the saints chosen by your own heart. Intensively offer icons of St. Only conservative clergy (they are a minority) and liberal clergy will venerate Nicholas - in order to hide their liberalism. The progress of the campaign for the canonization of St. Nicholas showed that its participants revered not the passion-bearer, but the autocrat. And the cathedral, in full accordance with this veneration, did not canonize the servants killed with the royal family, although the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad in 1981 canonized all those who died in Yekaterinburg, even the Catholic lackey.

Can other decisions of the council, be it good or bad, affect the life of an ordinary Orthodox parishioner? For example, at the opening of the cathedral, the Patriarch spoke out in defense of the private life of citizens, proposing to establish “public control” over everything that could “lead to a violation of the secrets of private life and freedom of movement.” At the same time, to the right of the Patriarch sat the mayor of Moscow, who was baptized by him. But it is clear that the Patriarch did not call for the abolition of internal passports or even the notorious bar codes, without which salaries are not calculated in many places. The Patriarch is not some kind of human rights activist.

In his sermon, the Patriarch criticized priests who “impose their will on the believers.” So what? Where should a parishioner turn if in the church closest to him the priest demands not only to repent of his sins, but to go to confession only to him and also talk about all his everyday problems? If he doesn’t allow you to take communion without completing a three-year catechesis course? If among the sins that cannot be forgiven and are an insurmountable obstacle to communion, he names prayer with Catholics or failure to attend the all-night vigil? You can't do anything with such priests. The only reasonable way out is to start going to another church, fortunately there are still more churches, where the ferocity of the canons is tempered by their non-fulfillment and where Orthodox life is not designed according to books and, although not very smart, is kind and warm.

So the wonderful sermons of the Patriarch that the clergy should not push people away from the church with “insensitiveness and rudeness”, that they should not build expensive comfortable houses for themselves, but should allocate money, for example, to work with youth, to create a church page in on the Internet - all this is rhetoric, not supported by personal example.

Over the three years since the last council, the budget deficit of the patriarchate has amounted to more than half a million dollars. There are almost 20 thousand parishes in the church, and their contributions to the patriarchate for the first half of the year amounted to 1 million 100 thousand rubles - fifty-five rubles from each parish. If we assume, as the Patriarch himself has done repeatedly, that there are one hundred million Orthodox Christians in Russia, then each of them donates exactly a penny and one tenth to His Holiness. The cathedral is also held with sponsorship money. The Patriarch threatened next year to “stop funding religious educational institutions and synodal institutions” and said that he himself has long been receiving salaries from sponsors he did not name, and not from the flock.

Much fuss was made around the adoption of the “Fundamentals of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.” It was pointed out that none of the fifteen Orthodox churches in the world has such a doctrine, which, indeed, prefer not to formalize such things. Well, this means that we do not look up to them, but to the Catholic Church. The difference is that the social doctrine of Catholics is devoted to truly social problems, and the cathedral dealt mainly with political issues. The monarchy is recognized as the best political system (Orthodoxy is the state religion), but with a sigh it is noted that this cannot be returned. Globalization has been denounced: “The Church raises the question of comprehensive control over transnational corporations and the processes occurring in the financial sector of the economy.” It is stated that “the Church can count on the help and assistance of the state,” and then follows a long list of issues in which it counts on this. The last point is assistance in the fight against dissidents. In return, the Church, recognizing war as evil, allows Christians “to participate in hostilities if it is about protecting their neighbors and restoring trampled justice.” In general, the section on war is written in the worst traditions of medieval casuistry, with arguments like: “Those who take the sword will perish by the sword” (Matthew 26.52) - in these words of the Savior the idea of ​​a just war finds justification." Meanwhile, these words of Christ simply note that that everyone is doomed, including those who think they are fighting a “just” war (and who among the combatants thinks otherwise?) Finally, the doctrine recognizes the right of the state to use the death penalty, as if pushing the government to lift the moratorium.

To the vexed question of restitution and the protection of private property in general, a completely Soviet answer is given: property is inviolable, but “an exception may be such a seizure of property on the basis of the relevant law, which, being conditioned by the interests of the majority of people, is accompanied by fair compensation.”

However, something liberal creeps into the social doctrine. Cloning is considered unacceptable, but “in vitro conception” (“artificial insemination of a wife with her husband’s germ cells”) is allowed. Contraceptives that “interrupt already conceived life” are condemned, but those that “prevent fertilization” are allowed. In general, questions of this kind are left to the discretion of the spouses; the confessor is assigned the role of advisor.

While no punishment is provided for the arbitrariness of priests, a whole scale of punishments has been developed for journalists: from “warnings” to “canonical punishment for those guilty of sinful acts, if they are Orthodox Christians.” That is, if this article, for example, is considered a “systematic deliberate distortion of information about church life,” then its author can be excommunicated from the Church without any trial by a single decision. However, it was added that sometimes church authorities react too painfully to fair criticism.

Ultimately, the council paid most attention to what the authorities were interested in and what the majority of the Orthodox were indifferent to. Those who go to church are not too interested in whether the Church defeats the sectarians or not. The Patriarch believes that he is winning, that the activity of non-Orthodox preachers has “choked” and that their “insolence” has been “rejected by our people.” In fact, people treat non-Orthodox missionaries differently, and, say, the number of Protestant communities is growing faster than the number of Orthodox ones.

Liberal Orthodox Christians were much indignant at the fact that instead of the Local Council (with the participation of the laity) required by the Charter on the governance of the Russian Church, a council of bishops was convened (under the pretext of a lack of money and space). But in the Catholic Church they have never heard of councils with the participation of the laity, but this nevertheless does not interfere with religious life. So the problem is not that the lower classes were not represented at the council. If they had been represented, perhaps they would have canonized Lenin and Dzerzhinsky at the same time - in order to promote the consolidation of society. The problem is that the Church is really a part of society, albeit one that has touched the Holy One. When you pray, it seems that the Church is heaven on earth. When you read the council documents, you remember Berdyaev’s sad joke: rather, the Church is earth in heaven.