Boys games

The story of the Transnistrian referendum on the annexation of this enclave of Moldova to Russia, for which no less than 97% of the territory’s residents voted, lasted in the official media for exactly one day. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs made some kind of meaningless statement, from which it was not clear whether Russia recognizes the independence of Transnistria or does not recognize it (rather, it does not recognize it, like all other countries, but unlike the European Union, it seems to recognize the referendum).

Court political scientists gossiped about whether the republic had the right to independence and the desire to join big brother or not. We decided: it does. With that, everything went quiet.

There is something infinitely shameful in these games of the Kremlin with the Transnistrian Republic of Moldova and with the tossing autonomies of the North Caucasus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

After all, it is obvious: the Russian state does not need the population of these territories - poor, mainly engaged in low-profit agricultural work, exhausted by wars and the struggle of mafia clans - it is an extra burden and a headache.

However, the Kremlin beckons them with its finger, supports them with rhetoric, creates the illusion that in a little more time, rich Russia will accept them into its wide arms, stand up for them, and shed a golden rain of oil and gas dollars on them. And people, exhausted by instability, unemployment, and fears, believe everything. This is exactly what the referendum in Transnistria showed and, I have no doubt, another referendum in South Ossetia in November will show.

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, with a GDP per capita 8 times less than in Russia, and an average salary 3-4 times lower than in Russia ($302 - according to the State Statistics Committee). Obviously, the situation is no better in Transnistria, which lives on the illegal sale of the largest, as they say, warehouse of the remains of Soviet weapons and transit from Moldova to Ukraine.

The economic situation in Abkhazia and Ossetia is even worse; incomes there are seven times lower than the Russian average.

Both in Moldova and in the Caucasus, the main occupation is agriculture, which is not so hot in the Fatherland, and work in the domestic sphere, from which you also can’t get very rich.

Consequently, if Russia incorporated these territories, it would have to finance them on its own budget, which is unlikely to please other subsidized regions of the country.

Due to the low solvency of the population and, accordingly, low demand, these lands are not very attractive for Russian business. If they are not in a hurry to get to Belarus - and there, after all, is a former assembly shop of the USSR, there is a lot of high-tech industry, then you can’t drive them to Transnistria or Abkhazia and South Ossetia, with their prohibitive risks, with a broom.

But this is not enough: in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, semi-criminal clans are in power, who want money, but not control over themselves. A vertical power structure won’t work there, just as it doesn’t work out very well with Chechnya, into which money has been flowing for years like into a black hole. Creating jobs there is a task with many unknowns. Consequently, unemployment, which is the scourge of these territories, having received Russian passports, will rush to Russia.

In Moldova, 25 percent of the working-age population is looking for employment outside the country: the official figure for the unemployment rate is 8 percent of the population, but no one really considered the real one. In Abkhazia and Ossetia, up to half or more of the male population, if they have a job, is temporary, seasonal. Naturally, they too will be drawn to Russia: how could it be otherwise if they become citizens?

In the conditions of the already explosive migration situation in Russia, there is no doubt that whether it is Russians and Ukrainians from Transnistria or Ossetians and Abkhazians from the Caucasus, they will become another reason for all sorts of conflicts, including ethnic ones.

And then those who, without thinking too much about the consequences, vote for the admission of Transnistria to Russia (in a telephone vote on Ekho Moskvy, 63 percent of those participating in the survey voted for this), will immediately switch to the DPNI vocabulary - “come in large numbers here” .

Does the Kremlin understand all this? There is no doubt: he knows and understands everything. In terms of “profit - loss”, everything is in order there. Why do they play these games?

Why not? Out of spite. So that “those over the hill” remember that Russia is a great power, and if something happens... What? Well, as a last resort, we will build a military base in Abkhazia, although it is not very clear why it is needed there. A – South Ossetia? And this is because Saakashvili... And what about Saakashvili? But we don’t like what he says, and then the Americans give him money. Well - they give it! So, thank God that the Americans give, and we don’t pay from the budget. But no, it’s bad that the Americans are behind Saakashvili. Well, why is it bad? Just three years ago, in all serious political science analyses, Georgia was not called anything other than a failed state - a collapsed state. Saakashvili, at the very least, is beginning to pull the country out of chaos and lawlessness. So we should be happy: there is one less explosive place in the Caucasus! We are not happy. On the contrary, we are hinting at a potential military conflict.

And, finally, Transnistria, whose referendum Russia supported, pushed, and whose results were almost the only one to recognize (plus a couple of crazy people in the vastness of the former USSR). What's the interest there? Well, besides the fact that, of course, all three enclaves are a paradise for the Ministry of Defense, which for military assistance can budget footcloths for at least a hundred, at least two hundred dollars a pair - no one will ever check it anyway.

They answer: “Montenegro. Kosovo". Yes, the European Union recognized the independence of Montenegro. But he recognized it, first of all, because Serbia itself recognized the results of the referendum on independence - moreover, even before the referendum it stated that it would agree with the choice of the Montenegrins. Neither Moldova nor Georgia want to hear about any self-determination for their enclaves. As for Kosovo, the decision must be made at the UN Security Council, and it seems that Serbia recognizes this divorce too: there are too many corpses on both sides, the desire is too great - in Serbia - to finally turn the bloody page and rebuild your own country.

But the Russian authorities are not happy with this: the president has already promised that Russia will use its veto power in the Security Council. Target? Meaning? But we don't like it. But if Kosovo deserves independence, then South Ossetia and Transnistria have the right. Maybe they do, but without war and blood, a divorce from Georgia itself will not work - this is clear as day. So is it worth pushing for another war? Or is there nowhere to put the Stabilization Fund?

And in the end, all Russian foreign, as well as domestic, policy is a reflection of the same – extremely narrow – horizon of thinking. It all comes down to a simple thing - a boy’s game in the alley: take away and divide.