About paper and ravines

The closer we get to 2008, the more attention analysts pay to what will happen to the Putin regime after this date. And all the more attention to any signs that come from the Kremlin - be it a delayed presidential message or the balance of power in power structures. But, in my opinion, something else is more important - the mechanism for making decisions and their execution. It seems that this particular feature of the modern Russian state is key to determining the prospects for its development. Indeed, often even projects that are correct in concept turn into their opposite - a clear illustration of the well-known proverb about smooth paper and forgotten ravines.

Let's take, for example, the previous presidential address. The Presidential Control Department has just analyzed the results of its implementation. It turned out that no matter how much the arrogant caste of the bureaucracy was exposed (including at the presidential level), the transaction costs of small businesses alone amount to over 200 billion rubles. (a figure not far from its annual turnover). One can only be surprised that this business somehow still exists and is doing something - in Europe, such a level of costs was noticed only in the most unsuccessful years of the Middle Ages, when the British needed to ransom King Richard or when the French were ruled by a king who, in his madness, imagined that is made of glass and can break at any moment. So, most likely, one of the main reasons for the protracted work on the message is the desire to take stock of the implementation of the provisions of last year’s document (it is possible that the diagnosis made by the presidential controllers will organically be included in the text being prepared).

The question of the quality of decisions made is also important. Take, for example, the December gas offensive against Ukraine. It is unlikely that anyone in Russia believed that Gazprom should have continued to provide assistance to the Ukrainian economy (and, accordingly, to the local oligarchy, which, under Prime Minister Yanukovych, did not allow Russia to privatize Krivorozhstal). There are few illusions left regarding the Slavic brotherhood - just look at the Ukrainian postage stamp issued in Kuchma’s times, dedicated to Hetman Vyhovsky, who organized a bloodbath for Russian troops near Konotop (the battle scene is lovingly painted behind the hetman’s portrait). But it’s one thing to put forward a plan that is understandable to both the Russians and our European partners. For example, increase the price of gas to $95 per thousand cubic meters from January 1, 2006, to $140 from January 1, 2007, to $200 from January 1, 2008 (the numbers are relative, but the order could be approximately like this) etc. In this case, it would not be easy to accuse Russia of using the gas lever for political purposes (and if such accusations arose, they could be successfully countered). However, the exact opposite option was chosen - first to announce a “shock” price increase, to scare not only Ukrainians, but also Europeans by turning off the “valve” for Ukraine, and then retreat to the same 95 dollars, which could have been obtained with much less bloodshed.

By the way, there is now reason to believe that the second act of this story is coming - again there is talk of increasing prices (from July 1), but it is unclear by how much - either to $230, or to a lower level. Let's add to this an intermediary in the form of Rosukrenergo, whose transparency has not increased much from the publication of a couple of names of Ukrainian businessmen who are related to a 50% stake in this company. In general, there is a danger of stepping on the same rake a second time.

Another typical example is the sensational story of the sad fate of Georgian and Moldavian wines in Russia. It is clear that there is both a political component and a completely objective problem of poor quality swill. It would seem that it would be possible to organize harsh repressions against suppliers of products that differ even slightly from the established standards (this, by the way, is what all self-respecting countries do, and it is not at all necessary that there is an admixture of politics in the matter - rather, on the contrary). In this case, a good half of the wine supplied from these countries would immediately disappear from the shelves: it is clear that “Khvanchkara” for a hundred rubles is a mockery of the brand in a particularly sophisticated form. Moreover, experts in the industry's problems know very well how to “wrapp up” an unadulterated, but insufficiently conditioned product.

Instead, they mixed lambs with goats. Both dubious or simply fraudulent companies, as well as respectable participants in the Russian market, suffered. If the intention was to strike a blow at the political interests of the Georgian and Moldovan authorities, then it would be possible not to ruin normal Russian businessmen who had already paid their counterparties for shipments of high-quality and expensive drinks. After all, actions against scammers and “substandard” workers would cause serious damage to the economies of the respective countries, which have a lot of crime, but would not raise any puzzling questions for Russia. Otherwise, a paradoxical situation arises - reputable suppliers suffer losses, and counterfeiters re-stick the labels, disguising the pseudo-"Khvanchkara" as a pseudo-"Port".

Thus, we are talking about both insufficiently calculated decisions and flawed executive discipline - two problems inherent in a society with a strong and ineffective bureaucracy and with weak and, again, ineffective civilian control. As long as this state of affairs continues, pursuing a coherent and successful government policy looks like only a good wish.