Brand "China"*

Print Joshua Ramo

Advice to the Queen of England, the "peaceful upheaval" and other nation branding failures

When Lin Zexu (1785–1850) was appointed Canton Police Commissioner in 1838, he had a solid career behind him. Like many brilliantly gifted people in other countries and at other times, he climbed the bureaucratic ladder to reach an extremely influential social position. Born and raised in the coastal province of Fujian, among mountains and tea plantations, Lin had a flexible and inquisitive mind, which was especially valued at the imperial court in the last decades of the Qing era. He was distinguished by an excellent memory, willingly took on the most difficult problems of government and had a subtle political sense. It is no coincidence that Lin’s colleagues nicknamed him “Clear Sky,” hinting at his ability to disperse the dark clouds of bureaucratic troubles. A talented poet, Lin was China's version of a "renaissance man," something that was not uncommon in the Qing era, when even emperors like Kangxi were convinced that power and justice originated in the love of beauty and justice. (We see something similar today: for example, the current Foreign Minister Li Jaoxing writes poetry; the head of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, is a big fan of opera.) Wen Jiabao, speaking at a press conference for the first time as premier in 2003, mentioned Lin while addressing the Chinese people. “From the day I entered service,” he said, “I repeated to myself Lin Zexu’s couplet: “I will do everything to fulfill my duty to the country, even if it costs me my life or brings misfortune upon me.” [1] . The point of this statement is clear: Chinese senior officials do not draw a line between personal life and politics.

In the spring of 1838, 53-year-old Lin was urgently summoned to Beijing. He was entrusted with a most complex matter of national importance. Emperor Daoguang, who ruled the country from 1820 to 1850, decided to end the opium trade. Half a century after the drug was first introduced into China on British merchant ships, the intellectual and cultural life of the Qing dynasty was paralyzed. The emperor became a powerless witness to the decline of his state. Opium killed one of Daoguang's sons, and many of the country's best minds fell victim to drug addiction. The Emperor was determined to put an end to the scourge and considered that “Clear Sky” was exactly the person who could do this. Endowed with supreme authority, Lin immediately went to Canton, a seaport where foreign ships unloaded opium produced in India and, loading the vacated space with black and green tea, set off for Europe and the United States. After months of investigation and careful preparation, Lin launched a war against the drug trade by distributing the leaflet “Advice to the Queen of England,” his most important literary work, at least historically speaking.

In the eyes of Europeans, the headline was unheard of insolence (“Who dares advise Queen Victoria?” British traders were indignant), but the text that followed was very colorful and convincing. In a leaflet that appeared on the streets of Canton on September 29, 1839, Lin briefly outlined his vision of the situation and asked the Queen to suppress the opium trade, which was so dangerous to China. “Suppose that foreigners brought opium to England and seduced your people, teaching them to buy and smoke this potion,” said one of the characteristic passages of this work. “There is no doubt that Your Majesty would be deeply offended and indignant” [2] . Although at the beginning of the 19th century China still considered itself the center of the world, Lin's message hardly gave rise to the accusation of arrogance. He did not want to appear either a nationalist or an isolationist. In his essay, Lin appeared rather as a man extremely concerned about putting an end to the importation of opium and taking the most severe measures against drug traffickers; all he wanted was to clarify his position, while at the same time discreetly advising England how it could become, in the parlance of 21st-century pundits, “a more responsible player on the international stage.” “We know that in London, the capital of Your Majesty’s kingdom, as well as in Scotland, Ireland and other places, opium was not originally produced,” Lin wrote to flatter the British crown, and then proposed to grow less harmful crops in other territories under its control. - for example, millet and barley.

It is unknown whether Queen Victoria read Lin Zexu's leaflet [3] . In any case, she did not heed his advice. A few months later, British warships arrived in Canton: China began the Opium War and internal unrest that lasted more than 100 years. In the period between the first shots from the Royal Saxon ship on November 3, 1839 and the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, China was subjected to aggression from nine different states; for many years the country was essentially deprived of a single government, it was torn apart by internal contradictions. Tens of millions of Chinese died. Everything that followed the Opium War, including the most significant events of the last 30 years, an era of prosperity and transformation, finds its intellectual or emotional basis in that ancient defeat. China's obsession with technological progress, its unrelenting desire for integration into the world community and its concern for compliance with international law are all somehow explained by the experience of the war caused by Lin Zexu's message.

The main "lesson" that the Chinese learned from the Opium War was that their state had to strengthen its power and, most importantly, become receptive to technical innovations and ideas coming from outside. “We absolutely need ships, weapons and a powerful navy,” Lin wrote to the emperor in 1842. But there was another reason for the Opium Wars, and it cannot be ignored. If we read Lin's message carefully and know well the circumstances in which it was written, we see in it a symptom of a frightening historical rift: China's image of itself and the rest of the world's image of the country have diverged sharply, like tectonic plates. Lin, writing at the very end of the two-thousand-year-old empire, saw in everything around him, like any other high-ranking official, undoubted evidence of Chinese power, and this feeling became as familiar and comfortable to him as the silk robes of the commissar in which he donned every morning . Unfortunately, the country really was like a fragile silk fabric. The image of China in the eyes of its residents and the image of China in the eyes of residents of other countries had nothing in common (bu hexie). Nothing could stop this country from reckless actions (bü kebimian).

In the late spring of 2004, several dozen scientists from China and other countries met in Boao, a resort town on Hainan Island in the South China Sea - just opposite the coast where Lin Zexu once published his "Advice to the Queen" - to develop a new a message from China to the rest of the world. The conference discussed a concept proposed by Chinese intellectual Zheng Bijian, known for his connections with Chinese President Xy Jintao. Zheng was the executive vice president of the CCP Central Party School during Xy's reign. Zheng's Chinese competitors gossiped a lot about how close he really was to Xy, but it is reliably known that his worldview was formed in the late 1970s, when, at the direction of Deng Xiaoping, he was included in a group of scientists who went to the West. It was then that Zheng began to collaborate with the reformist-minded Chinese Premier Xy Yaobang and met, as he himself says, Xy Jintao, at that time a rising star in Chinese politics. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Zheng played an almost constant role as an intellectual ambassador for Chinese leaders. His new theory of the "peaceful rise of China" became the modern equivalent of Lin's "Advice to the Queen": balanced, consistent and, one might say, purged of old hostility and arrogance.

The concept of “peaceful rise” was a response to the theory of the “Chinese threat” (zhoungguo wexie Thorn), shared by some Western scholars and politicians, according to which China at the beginning of the 21st century most resembles the rapidly developing, bellicose and confrontational Germany of the early 20th century China is a country that has suffered humiliated, but ready for revenge, will stop at nothing to fight for its “place in the sun,” argued future Bush administration member Paul Wolfowitz in a scathing article written in 1997 [4] . This means that a clash and perhaps even a war between China and the United States is inevitable. The meeting of scientists on Hainan Island in the spring of 2004 was part of an elaborate series of events designed to test, consolidate, and introduce to the world community a concept that Zheng hoped would refute such misconceptions: the concept of China's "peaceful rise" (heping jueqi).

However, a problem arose: the Chinese participants could not agree on the translation of the Chinese word "jueqi". Even if you can't read Chinese, just look at the ideogram "jue" to understand why literal translation can be difficult:

The trident symbol on the left is the Chinese "shan", "mountain". The "P" shape in the middle can be interpreted as a "plateau" or "earth layer", and the hieroglyph "chu" located below means upward or outward movement. Roughly speaking, the character "jue", which, like all Chinese characters, is a kind of pictogram, depicts a large and slightly flattened mountain, which is moved from its place by a push from below. The hieroglyph would be more at home in a discussion among geologists than in a conversation about international politics: it depicts an earthquake [5] .

Of course, Zheng’s intention was not to replace the “Chinese threat” with a “peaceful upheaval.” On the eve of the opening of the conference, its Chinese participants were invited to a closed preliminary meeting to discuss the most correct translation. One of the experts suggested translating the hieroglyph as “becoming.” For some reason, no one thought of the word “breakthrough,” which perhaps best expresses Zheng’s idea. Even during the conference, Chinese intellectuals, many of whom had lived and worked in the United States or Great Britain for decades and therefore spoke excellent English, asked their Chinese-speaking foreign colleagues: How well does the phrase “peaceful rise” convey the meaning of this character?

The then debate about the adequate translation of “jueqi,” which seemed to differ little from ordinary etymological discussions, had, as it turned out over time, much greater significance. Once the phrase “peaceful rise” began to be used in international intellectual circles, it was discovered that, contrary to Zheng’s calculations, it had the opposite effect. Skeptics not only did not succumb to Zheng’s assurances, but also saw in this phrase signs of undoubted hypocrisy. “How can you talk about “peaceful rise” and at the same time threaten Taiwan?” - China's critics never tired of asking. This issue was repeated particularly persistently at meetings in Europe in 2004 dedicated to the extension of the 1989 arms embargo on China. “If this is a “peaceful rise,” noted one influential American neoconservative, “why do they need your weapons?” Speaking about policy towards Taiwan, Zheng said that this is an “internal” matter of China, and his doctrine does not apply to this area [6] . Such an answer could hardly be considered satisfactory [7] . As US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted in the summer of 2005, “if no state threatens China, why are military investments and weapons spending increasing?” [8]

The most surprising thing is that the phrase “the rise of China” had been in use for more than ten years by that time. But as soon as Zheng added the innocent adjective “peaceful” to it, international experts became alarmed. “One thing is clear from Zheng’s work,” wrote one neocon, “China’s main goal, as before, is to strengthen state power” [9] . The words “peaceful rise” simply did not inspire confidence. They ran counter to long-held Western perceptions of the country and, as a result, sounded more like propaganda than a sincere expression of Beijing's intentions. No one knew what his true plans and intentions were, most press reports still portrayed China as a dangerous and unstable country, and the Western world looked at him with natural anxiety due to ignorance and prejudice. So the words “peaceful rise” not only were not encouraging, but further undermined confidence in China. As if you were trying to assure people that the coming earthquake will not bring destruction, no one will believe it, believing that you are, at best, sincerely mistaken, and at worst, deliberately lying.

Zheng faced a paradox. Why did the result turn out to be exactly the opposite of what he expected? Zheng tried to correct the matter, to give his formula a different meaning; he even wanted to prove that China had been a peace-loving country since its inception. Without the slightest success. Chinese leaders very soon abandoned the proposed concept and began to use the phrase “peaceful development,” which went back to Deng Xiaoping’s idea of ​​“peace and development” {heping yi fazhan) and caused less controversy both in China itself and beyond its borders. A little later, Xy Jintao put forward a more successful and convincing idea of ​​​​a “harmonious world” (hexie shijie) [10] . Zheng continued to defend his point of view, responding to criticism from China, but it was too late. He could repeat “peaceful” as much as he wanted, everyone heard one thing: “shock.” The point is that China's self-image did not matter much. All that mattered was what the rest of the world thought of him. Zheng's problem was a real puzzle that Lin Zexu could appreciate - it wasn't about how to translate "jueqi", it was much more complicated. In the end, Lin, in his message to Victoria, only sought to bring his thoughts to the attention of the queen, and not to cause a war.

Chinese image crisis

The greatest strategic threat to China today is its national image. It is unlikely that the country will be subject to external aggression in the foreseeable future. It is with China's national image (guojia xingxiang) that the most important strategic issues are initially associated, be it stable economic growth or a threat to Taiwan's independence. The solution of tactical problems directly depends on the national image - improving the quality of foreign direct investment (FDI) coming to China, cooperation with other countries in the field of technology and education, as well as the increasing penetration of Chinese companies into the world market. Even the desire of the country's leadership to maintain internal stability is closely related to how others see the country and how it sees itself. This is one of the few moments in Chinese history when the state, usually indifferent to the opinions of others, is forced to listen to what they say about it. The further development of the country and the success of future transformations depend on how China is perceived abroad and, most importantly, on the extent to which these perceptions correspond to reality.

The point is not that China's image is "good" or "bad" but, and this is a much more complex issue, that there is a big difference between what China thinks of itself and what the rest of the world thinks of it. This is not surprising: over the past 25 years, the country has experienced an unprecedented historical turn. As a result of rapid economic growth, millions of people have been lifted out of poverty, the development of a market economy has brought about great cultural and political shifts, and today a new generation of optimistic, ambitious and practical Chinese is building a future that no one could have imagined just 30 years ago. . Meanwhile, the government and party leadership will not decide whether it is worth pursuing ultra-modern technologies and innovations or whether it is safer to maintain the previous style of management based on ideological control and corruption. Each stage of reform is accompanied by new difficulties: the government is experiencing enormous tension, and Chinese society as a whole is under increasing pressure from contradictions. China's image has not kept up with the changes taking place. In the eyes of the vast majority of foreigners, China is a dubious mixture of outdated ideas, fantastic hopes and ineradicable prejudices and fears. The Chinese, in their judgments about their own country, fluctuate between arrogance and self-doubt, restraint and arrogance. Some officials and intellectuals are struggling to get a clear picture of what the country is now and what it wants to become. Others, on the contrary, try to prevent discussion of these issues. A state obsessed with the idea of ​​territorial sovereignty has lost sovereignty over its own image.

People abroad are not inclined to share the Chinese self-image: they are increasingly distrustful and suspicious of China and its international politics, especially now when the geostrategic and economic influence of this country is growing. Such an imbalance prevents China from accumulating the potential for external trust, which would minimize the costs associated with subsequent, even more difficult stages of internal transformation. This “split” image plays into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese state, in particular because it deprives the Chinese themselves of the ability to separate constructive criticism from malice and adequately respond to comments from outsiders. As a result, tensions are increasingly arising between China and the rest of the world, which invariably lie at the core of the same set of fundamental differences. Analysts in Washington and Xi'an, no matter how great the differences between these cities, are unanimous in the opinion that the cause of disagreements between China and the West is not an ordinary conflict of interests (liyi maodun), but a deeper and more intractable conflict of values ​​(jazhiguan maodun).

Most foreigners believe that:

— China is either a country of followers of Mao Zedong, “the last stronghold of communism on Earth,” or some exotic cocktail of “Fu Manchu” [11] , kung fu and other, more modern, stereotypes. According to a recent BBC survey, China's image abroad deteriorated in 2005 [12] .

— Chinese goods are made using outdated technologies and are of low quality; Chinese companies seeking to occupy a place in the world market (zou chuqu) fit into the national strategy of expansionism, which is characterized not so much by capitalist enthusiasm as by mercantilist greed [13] . From the point of view of international financial corporations, Chinese enterprises are simple and convenient tools for grabbing a fat piece by quickly making a profit from short-term investments. As a rule, they are not interested in long-term cooperation with China.

— China has very cheap labor. If you ask consumers and entrepreneurs to describe the Chinese economy, the responses will be dominated by the words “blind imitation” rather than “innovation.” The ardor of foreign entrepreneurs hoping for large profits is somewhat cooled by its well-known vices: as one popular author writes, “it’s sad but true: the Chinese system today has little in common with honest business - almost everyone here has sins” [14] .

— China cannot “earn trust” even in cases where its behavior is consistent with the demands of the international community. Difficult decisions made by the Chinese government in areas such as currency reform or nuclear proliferation go unnoticed outside China as if nothing had happened, and have little impact on its government image. But China's actions in other areas that run counter to international norms are met with far greater condemnation abroad than at home, often perplexing Chinese strategists.

— The positive image of China is associated primarily with the country’s rapid economic growth, which creates opportunities for profit. Few people outside a small circle of experts understand that China continues to face enormous economic difficulties. Even fewer foreigners are clearly aware of the scale of cultural, social and mental changes that this country is experiencing.

— Chinese government agencies are unable to provide foreigners with comprehensive information about modern China. Chinese consulates abroad are often chaotic, and they are not particularly clean. Chinese ambassadors, for the most part well-educated and charming in private, rarely appear in the media of the countries where they represent their country. The image of China promoted by the Chinese international television channel CCTV-9 is very clumsy. If in other countries television viewers have the opportunity to watch government meetings, on Chinese television such footage is rather the exception, so foreigners can only guess how the country is governed and how strong or, on the contrary, powerless the state system and the Communist Party are.

At the same time, the Chinese themselves believe that their national identity is undergoing unprecedented changes: in their opinion, China, even in comparison with what it was five years ago, has largely lost its “originality” and “uniqueness.” At the same time, they believe that China has become a more dynamic, stable and trustworthy state [15] .

Reform, urbanization and progress are eroding traditional Chinese values. Record divorce rates indicate that the family is losing importance as a vital element of Chinese society. Moving to the city, former peasants strive to change the material and spiritual way of their lives, and centuries-old rural traditions are replaced by new habits and new fears.

The younger generation of Chinese is keeping pace with technological progress; The leaders of companies such as Shanda and Linktone, who have refused to simply copy Western experience, are implementing their own innovative ideas and setting global standards. Young CEOs today running enterprises that were recently owned by the state are changing their appearance in accordance with their plans and dreams [16] . These businessmen are confident that China is capable of developing not only by borrowing Western ideas and adapting them to the local market (Zhongguo tese), but also moving along its own, unique Chinese path: the country, they are convinced, has enormous “innovative potential” and is able to create new technologies itself .

Chinese women, once torn between Confucian dogma, which demanded their unconditional submission to men, and the Maoist ideal of gender equality, now have to decide for themselves what their lives will be like. Many energetic young city women are independently looking for new roles for themselves in culture, economics and politics, although they sometimes experience difficulties trying to combine them with traditional family responsibilities.

The living, attractive culture of modern China finds fans all over the world. There are three Chinese films in the top ten most profitable films in the history of American box office distribution, and this despite the fact that there is not a single Indian or Japanese film there [17] . However, the authorities are largely following the path of least resistance, still serving foreigners with tired dishes - opera, martial arts and the tea ceremony - rather than promoting the popularity of new cultural leaders.

Such a discrepancy is dangerous not only for the ladies of China itself. A superficial, simplified understanding of what is happening in the country leads to the fact that foreigners who want to cooperate with China make serious miscalculations in both the political and economic spheres. There are many signs that China is ready to radically transform its image. However, in order to create a true picture of modern China, the country needs to get rid of some remnants of the past - both in the system of state institutions and in the psychology of its citizens [18] .

This article is an attempt to establish exactly where reality and the image of China we know diverge, and at the same time an attempt to get out of this labyrinth of misunderstandings using the concept of “continuous renewal,” which, in my opinion, best characterizes modern China. I don't know whether the rise of China is a "good" or a "bad" thing, and I don't want to look into it: I intend to simply discuss the problems that both China and the rest of the world have faced with a distorted view of this country. I do not intend to wash China clean; such an approach would be disastrous. I would just like to express some thoughts on how to clarify the image of China. Until it becomes a state that inspires trust, it is difficult to try to make this country more understandable to others.

I use, in part, the most extensive study of Chinese image ever undertaken as the basis for my argument. I conducted an analysis of the “China” brand specifically for this work [19] . In addition, wanting to determine as precisely as possible where exactly the image of China and Chinese reality diverge, I interviewed a number of Chinese officials, businessmen and intellectuals. This work continues my article “The Beijing Consensus,” where I tried to offer, so to speak, points of reference that allow us to comprehend the life of an ever-changing country and outline not so much the direction of its movement as its current state. My goal remains the same. Suppose we asked passers-by in the world's largest cities the following question: which five epithets do you think best describe modern China? What would we hear in response? How true are these definitions? How do they compare with how the Chinese themselves would answer the same question? China should not gloss over the incredible difficulties the country is experiencing, nor the clear uncertainty among its citizens about what will happen to it in 20 or 100 years.

China must develop a certain set of ideas, signs, brands and messages that will reflect the current situation in the country and its hopes for the future. This does not mean that the Chinese should abandon traditional culture; on the contrary, they will have to find effective ways of acting to allow the intellectual, cultural and commercial products of a renewed state emerging from the shadows to complement and strengthen the traditional image of China. Anyone who hopes that old-style broadcast propaganda campaigns can be effective simply does not understand the modern world. Those who pin their hopes for a renewed image of China on the 2008 Olympic Games are similarly mistaken. Isolated, single events only change the national image when something bad happens. But something good, no matter how significant this event may be, can have a positive impact on the image of the country only if a certain frame structure is already ready into which people will mentally insert the changed picture.

Using the national image: maximum efficiency at minimum costs

Chinese economist Xy Angan, speaking about the next stage of reforms, identifies four “transformations” (zhuanbian) that will determine the future of China [20] . From an agricultural country, the country will become urbanized, there will be a transition from a closed industrial economy to an open information economy, from a planned economy to a market economy, and, finally, a neglectful attitude towards environmental problems will be replaced by concern for environmental sustainability. I believe that China faces another important task: changing its national image.

Of course, recently this image, like everything else in China, has already undergone considerable changes.

So, in Fig. I depicts the results of studies conducted in major cities in China in 1997 and 2005. Respondents were given a self-administered questionnaire with the following question: “How accurately do the following definitions characterize China?” The survey results showed that in 1997, people were more likely to rate the terms “arrogant,” “surly,” “peculiar,” and “uncooperative,” while, for example, the term “trustworthy” had one of the lowest scores. However, in 2005, after another eight years of change and movement towards an open society, the ideas about “old China” - “arrogant” and “intractable ” - were replaced by fundamentally different ones, defined by the concepts of “trustworthy”, “energetic”, “ friendly". Those who previously called China “unfriendly” this time found such a definition completely unacceptable. Judging by the results of the latest survey, the Chinese perceive their country as a leader and believe that it is “gaining popularity”, “has come down to earth”, and its prestige has increased. (At the same time, however, they believe that compared to 1997, China has lost some of its uniqueness, originality and authenticity - apparently a consequence of the homogenizing process of globalization that leaves its mark even on a country that strenuously defends its own identity.)

The rest of the world does not share these ideas about China - or, at least, has not yet been imbued with China's new judgments about itself. Looking at China in 2004-05, he sees not only modern China, but also China in 1997 or 1947, or even 1847. Often he cannot find suitable words to describe what he sees and resorts to analogies with the USSR, North Korea or Germany of the 1890s that are not at all flattering for the Chinese rulers. Despite widely published studies in China showing that its image in the eyes of citizens in many countries is becoming more positive, in-depth research suggests that foreigners' distrust of China remains high. There is a chasm between China's self-image and the rest of the world's perception of China [21] . In Fig. Table 2 indicates a number of definitions associated with the concept of “reliability” of the state. As you can see, the opinions of residents of China and other countries are very different. The bottom axis of the chart provides a variety of definitions, ranging from “inhospitable” to “benign.” Two ko Small horizontal bars indicate the limits within which the vast majority of responses are located (with the exception of outliers). The shaded bar indicates the range containing 50% of responses in countries outside China. The thick horizontal stroke inside this bar indicates the median of the world sample. Chinese responses are labeled *PRC, where the * denotes the outlier extreme. (The definition of “trustworthy,” for example, was noted by almost 100% of the Chinese surveyed, while residents of other countries indicated it almost never. Chinese respondents considered the definition of “trustworthy” most applicable to their country, while residents other countries it was rated as least suitable among others.)

Respondents were especially unanimous that China was “unfriendly” and “untrustworthy”: in 2005, these definitions scored nearly equal percentages, with very little variation among respondents. As for the epithets “prosperous”, “worth the money spent” and “benign”, in China they were noted by the majority of respondents, but the judgments of foreigners, equally unshakable, are completely opposite.

Another telling example of the divergence is the following two charts, which show China's own perceptions and how other countries perceive it. Definitions suggested included "reliable", "pleasant", "cutting-edge", "energetic", "charming", "steady", "out-of-the-box" and, finally, "original". The first chart (see Figure 3) shows how the figures have changed over the past two years, after the number of cities was increased from five to eight. The Chinese believe that all these definitions are extremely suitable to characterize their country, with the exception of “originality” (we will talk about the reason for this a little later). In the second diagram (see Fig. 4) we can see what the average perception of China is abroad, and compare the characteristics that residents of different countries give to China. Again, if we put these two diagrams on top of each other, we will discover how different perceptions of China are within the country and outside its borders (see Figure 5).

Unable to keep track of the complex and rapid changes taking place in China, foreigners, when talking about it, use the usual clichés: “nationalism” and “communism” [22] . There is also a lot of talk about the Chinese economic “miracle” - a helpless attempt to grasp the essence of what is happening, which does not give the slightest idea of ​​​​what caused this growth, what its nature is and what the difficulties it caused.

Charts like the one above lead some Chinese intellectuals and politicians to conclude that some form of conflict with the West is all but inevitable. “True friendship between Washington and Beijing is unlikely,” wrote Beijing University professor Wang Jisi, who once advocated friendship between China and the United States , [23] in a 2005 article published in the journal International Relations. Many people in the West share this point of view. “Will China's Rise Really Be Peaceful?” John Mearsheimer, another scholar, asked skeptically in a late 2005 article who agrees that the phrase “peaceful upheaval” perfectly captures the dangerous incoherence of China’s broad strategy. "My answer is no. If China's economic growth is as rapid in the coming decades, the United States and China will be on the verge of a serious conflict that could escalate into war " [24] . In 2004-2005. China remained one of the least studied countries. As Fig. 6, general knowledge about it is still very scarce [25] . It is known that China is “peculiar”, but people hardly realize the reasons for this uniqueness and what consequences it is fraught with.

The dangers of an unattractive image and the use of “reputational capital”

In the next stage of development, China will face enormous difficulties. The complexity of the economic and political transformations that this country must go through, unprecedented in world history, apparently makes any unclaimed costs an unnecessary risk factor. China has enormous resources - financial, technical and human; Now is the time to increase reputation capital (mingsheng ziben). Reputational capital appears to be a means of mitigating international conflict. An adequate and attractive national image will allow China, as Chinese theorist Fuxin puts it, to “achieve maximum efficiency at minimum cost.” Many Chinese scientists believe that if China “becomes stronger, it will be loved.” However, not all so simple. Using the example of US international politics, we see every day that the power of a state and its reputational capital do not necessarily go hand in hand.

The processes that changed the country and opened it to the outside world are called the policy of “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang) in China. In 1979, when the opening-up process began, the share of foreign trade in Chinese GDP was 13%. By 2004, this figure had increased to almost 60%. The country was literally overwhelmed by new ideas, capital, and forms of life that came from abroad [26] .

The reason for such a rapid restructuring of relations with the outside world was the rare geostrategic foresight of Deng Xiaoping - especially remarkable because by 1977, at the time of his ascension to the pinnacle of power, he had not left China for almost 20 years. In the entire history of mankind, there are few such insightful statements by political leaders.

The consequences of this change of course are difficult to overestimate. Now China could forget about Mao’s “dispersal, mountains, caves” (san, shan, dang) attitude, addressed to a country that was to fight a war on two fronts in the near future: with the USA and the USSR [27] . Government paranoia, justified or not, destroyed any hope for genuine economic development [28] . But there was another important consequence of Deng's strategic foresight, which had to do with the problem of national image: China, he believed, should, in developing its economy, follow its own path and not worry about what other countries would say or how they would behave. . After all, if a world war is not expected, there is no need to think about what is happening outside of China [29] .

In the early 1990s, Deng's position largely determined the behavior of party leaders: they simply did not care about the international situation, which was unpredictable and uncontrollable. A spirit of practical “self-determination,” reminiscent of earlier attempts at modernizing China—say, the “internal strengthening” policy of the late Qing dynasty (1861–1895)—entirely governed strategic planning in China. In particular, he had a huge influence on the choice of course during the transition to further development. Instead of adopting the growth model recommended by the Washington Consensus or, like Eastern European countries, resorting to “shock therapy”—the reform strategies that later destroyed economies in countries ranging from Argentina to Russia to Indonesia—China decidedly chose your own special way. However, the very factor that allowed China's economic reforms to achieve their goal—namely, globalization—has gradually made it impossible for China to continue to ignore how other countries perceive it.

A lack of reputational capital increases the risk of reform failure and makes political destabilization more likely. The negative impact of such a deficiency can manifest itself in different ways.

I. _ Increased costs of economic reforms

The drafters of the 11th Five-Year Plan, introduced in the fall of 2005, do not turn a blind eye to the fact that the country's economic development model is not sufficiently thorough and stable. Over the past 30 years, Chinese society, once one of the fairest in the world, has become one of the most unjust; The environment is in dire straits, and today the country is trying to somehow reduce the damage caused to it by anti-environmental and low-productivity industries. One of the most striking differences between the new five-year plan and most previously adopted in the post-reform period is the importance it places on domestic “intellectual capital” (or, in the words of Xy Jintao, “domestic innovation”). In other words, it is recognized that China's rapid growth in recent years does not guarantee the same success in the next stage of transformation. The country's further rapid development depends on both access to advanced global technologies and local innovation, and both of these components are fundamentally important for China's national image.

The rest of the world's perceptions of China largely determine what kind of assistance other countries are willing to provide. They influence the size and timing of investments, decision-making on technology transfer, and also play a fundamental role in foreign companies’ assessment of the risks associated with doing business in China. Here, any failure in constructing a national image automatically causes a negative effect. This is especially true for decisions to export a particular technology, which are made not only for commercial reasons, but equally based on general perceptions of the country. There are also more subtle problems, as China's image affects both the quantity and quality of foreign investment. Key Western investors have been hesitant to invest heavily in China, suggesting that they still have a certain mistrust of it. And low-quality foreign direct investment (FDI), which comes from investors willing to accept a corrupt “game without rules”, is very dangerous because it often they help dirty dealers (moreover, they encourage them) and inhibit the adoption of advanced management techniques that always accompanies high-quality FDI; Finally, they are usually short-term in nature and involve high risk, which for Chinese firms means an unpredictable and ultimately costly investment option. If the situation does not change, these investments can completely displace good-quality and long-term ones from the Chinese market. The example of Chile and a number of other countries clearly shows that improving the national image (especially with regard to corruption) leads to increased profitability and quality of FDI. As a study by the National Bureau of Economic Research shows, “an increase in corruption from the level of Singapore to that of Mexico has as detrimental an effect on foreign investment as a 50% increase in the marginal corporate income tax ” [30] . High-quality investments are most often attracted to countries that have a reputation as a reliable partner—those where the business climate is shaped by laws rather than by corrupt networks and personal connections. [31] . And although China is among the world's leaders in attracting FDI, it still lags behind OECD countries in FDI per capita, continuing to attract investment mainly in coastal areas and finding investors largely among Chinese living abroad [32] .

Likewise, a dubious national image can hamper reforms in the commodity market, where businessmen's uncertainty about the stability of the Chinese economy is reflected in inflated prices. For example, mining companies, banking on increased domestic demand in China, are investing billions of dollars to build new mines; Shipping companies, based on the same considerations, lay down new ships. At the same time, they include in the price possible risks due to the uncertainty of future demand and the general situation in the state.

2. Increased likelihood of financial and banking crises Regardless of which method of currency liberalization China chooses and at what pace this reform proceeds, the damage to the national image may also negatively affect progress towards the convertibility of the Chinese currency. Research conducted after the 1997 economic crises in Asian countries shows that there has been a clear connection between the perception of a country's image in international financial markets (corruption and stability are especially important) and financial crises over the last century. This relationship is partly manifested by sharp deterioration in macroeconomic indicators (for example, an increase in the credit/FDI ratio or a decrease in the international reserves/credit risk ratios), which China seems to be able to avoid; However, crises can also initiate and deepen other, related factors - the illusion of financial health inspired by the influx of short-term capital investments, corruption or investor wariness caused by possible political destabilization. Although China's significant foreign reserve holdings protect it from a hypothetical financial crisis and, to some extent, from a capital account crisis, they are unlikely to prevent the confusion created by the lack of information about the state of the economy that could arise from the uncertainty of the political situation in China or its chronic inability to communicate clearly with international financial dealers. Robert Shiller's detailed study of American investors before the 1987 stock market crash describes exactly the kind of market imbalance that could undermine the Chinese economy—a situation in which mistrust and fear blind people to the facts and cause panic selling. valuable papers. In 1987, Shiller concludes, investors selling securities in collapsing U.S. stock markets were acting not out of common sense, but because everyone around them was in a rush to get rid of them. This economic phenomenon, known as herd mentality, deepens shallow crises—fueled by a lack of information and, as Shiller writes, “the cloudy intuitions that people arrive at under severe stress.” [33] .

3. Slowdown of rural reform

Anyone who has visited Chinese villages cannot help but be horrified by the plight of the Chinese peasants and the terrible suffering they have to endure. The new government managed to improve the situation somewhat (especially thanks to the san nong wenti and x/ya nongcun policies, designed to alleviate the plight of farmers), but the fact that China in the eyes of the rest of the world is increasingly gaining a reputation as a state hostile to foreign public organizations makes it difficult for new machines and tools to appear in the country, which could potentially speed up the solution to the rural problem. “We have practically stopped our activities in China,” explains the head of one of the large public organizations in the UK. “It’s simply impossible to work there.” While China tries to separate the “good” social organizations from the “bad” ones that, in its opinion, can cause political instability, the country is missing an opportunity to make the most difficult rural reform as easy as possible.

4. Growing international tension

One of the elementary rules of international politics says: if we want to understand the actions of a state, we first need to understand its interests and intentions. The recently released official government document articulating the goals of China's foreign policy once again proves the truth of this statement [34] . Not only does the country's unattractive image prevent it from convincing others of its good intentions, but it also continually deepens mutual misunderstanding, preventing partners whose minds are clouded by harmful prejudice from soberly assessing its true national interests. In addition, the unique (and rapidly changing) Chinese national culture, which is too different from the cultures of other countries, cannot “lay straws” where it is needed, that is, in complex situations that do not cause complications when interacting between representatives of related cultures.

5. Declining profits of Chinese enterprises

It is generally accepted that China has benefited from globalization. However, as reforms deepen, the country's leading companies are increasingly seeking to achieve leadership positions in the international market - a process that the Chinese call "going outward" or "going out into the world" (zou chuqu). The more competitive these companies are in the international market, the stronger they will become and the more successfully they will be able to support China's modernization. Such a strategy, meanwhile, puts forward a lot of new demands on a market economy that has not yet formed. What is the reputation of Chinese goods, for example? Are they considered high quality or shoddy, worth the money spent? Three-quarters of Fortune 500 CEOs admit that when purchasing a product, the origin of the product, such as the country of origin and the location of production, plays a significant role in their purchasing decisions.

The emergence of world-class companies in China will help it rebuild its relations with the rest of the world in a new way, moving away from relatively simple mechanisms of commodity exchange to more complex ones, involving the participation of foreign capital in the corporatization of companies. In the meantime, the persistent reluctance of the Chinese to enter Western securities markets creates a feeling among Americans and Europeans that Chinese firms are still not up to par with global standards. This may be true, but things must change. If China intends to get the maximum effect from its participation in the international system of relations, it needs to learn to extract both knowledge and material resources from its interactions with other countries. And no one can better represent China on the international stage than his companies.

Brand “China”: approaches to creating a national image

Why are we so concerned about China?

What is the reason for the exciting influence of this country? Visiting foreigners are certainly struck by the rapid growth of the economy and the mind-blowing changes taking place in Chinese culture and society. But something else is even more shocking: a billion people who are beginning to search for their identity. This picture sometimes inspires fear, not least for the Chinese government. However, today, all over the world, people want to determine their own lives, and what we see in China is also happening in other countries.

The process of self-creation is the most important of the global modernization processes. A young Ghanaian going to school for the first time feels as strongly as a Hunan farmer buying his first Western suit. For most of world history, people have not been free to define their identity. The fate of a person was predetermined by many different factors - the place of birth, the social status of the parents, their religion, etc. All forms of modernization of today's world hit one point, helping a person to prevail over the tyranny of his own origin and giving him in return the opportunity to freely choose his destiny, update yourself [35] . Although the process of modernization in China and other countries will not be completed soon, free self-identification will be the main factor in our lives. And since Chinese values ​​and global values ​​are closely linked in this regard, this is where we should look for approaches to clearer interaction between China and the rest of the world.

For example, the “American Dream” attracted people from all over the world in such an irresistible and instinctive way precisely because it expressed this new way of thinking about one’s life, characteristic of an entire people. America, which knew no division into white and black bones, endowed with seemingly inexhaustible resources, was a country where everyone had the opportunity to fulfill their cherished aspirations and make their life rich in the sense that he himself attached to this word. Everywhere in China today, from the art schools of Guangzhou to the computer colleges of Xi'an, there is the same intellectual adventurism as in 1920s Europe. “Self-renewal” is the word that most accurately characterizes modern reality [36] . Yes, China has no other choice. Reforms give rise to problem after problem, and the state, in order to survive, will have to exist in a mode of continuously solving these problems. The whole life of the Chinese must be imbued with a new spirit, otherwise the reforms will fail.

The country is quickly moving beyond the stage of simply transferring foreign ideas onto its soil and adapting them to local conditions, resulting in “versions with Chinese characteristics.” On the contrary, the requirements and opportunities of the Chinese market give rise to new ideas. This applies not only to the Internet, but to all political, economic and social life. The problem in China is that the spirit of learning and enterprise, which largely determines the internal life of this country, has not yet penetrated its relations with other countries.

If China intends to harmonize the perceptions of the country among the Chinese themselves and the rest of the world, giving its rise a more harmonious character, it should rely on the concept of “novelty.” The greater challenges that China is sure to face in the future will require even greater innovation. Discussions about China need to be infused with a theme of change and innovation, with Chinese people being honest about the failures of reform and how desperately their country needs new ideas. True, this emphasis on “newness” runs counter to their many attempts to emphasize the “antiquity” of China - opening “Confucius Institutes” everywhere and everywhere - but the world does not need to be reminded of China’s age. On the contrary, we need to help him become aware of what is happening in China today.

A good example is the recent branding campaign carried out by Singapore. His brand also had to incorporate the attractive features of Singapore - a high standard of living, quality food, first-class education and healthcare, and something in Singapore that the rest of the world does not see anything good about: harsh laws, the unresolved death penalty and a long period of over-centralized government. the "strong hand" principle. The solution to this challenge is a brand that represents Singapore as an outpost of legality in the realm of Asian wildness, a place that can serve as something of a base camp for private and business trips to the region. Singapore was presented as "your home in Asia". Which one of us likes a mess in our own home? Stability, previously perceived as something negative, was turned to the outside world as its strong side.

China, however, cannot be satisfied with the methods of Singapore or, for example, France, which recently launched a campaign under the slogan “we are open for business.” More extensive measures are needed here. China's national project is extremely complex, and only a large-scale brand like the "American Dream" can help solve the difficult task of defining Chinese national identity.

"White" brand for China: a way to interpret the "Chinese Dream"?

In marketing, there is one idea that China can use: the idea of ​​a white brand. The world's most powerful brands are “white” brands, i.e. desemanticized ones, ones onto which we can project our hopes, dreams and desires, just as a projector projects an image onto a movie screen. In essence, the very “whiteness” of these brands (in Chinese, it is not the word baise, white, that is more appropriate, but the word dan, denoting a kind of watery softness) suggests that we ourselves determine their market value for ourselves; we further comprehend them, bringing them into focus. We determine their market value ourselves, and this is fundamentally different from the situation when others determine it for us. And because we ourselves establish the value of these brands, we are much more attached to them than to those that are imposed on us. Among consumer goods, white brands include, for example, Levi jeans and Nike sneakers, and in the eyes of a surfer from New Zealand, a cowboy from Arizona, a schoolgirl from Budapest, etc., these things take on different meanings each time . Each of these people has the ability to project their own ideas about the value structure onto jeans or shoes: the product “suits” them not only because it is a comfortable thing, but also because it can be imbued with any meaning they choose, be it “ informality", "freedom", "America", "tradition". The strength of such brands lies in the fact that we do the branding ourselves.

The most powerful white brands are not consumer brands, but cultural, political or intellectual products. To some extent, this way of creating meaning can be felt by looking at the vast - but breathing with depth - blank fields in traditional Chinese painting or the formulaic Chinese characters, whose special meaning is revealed only to a person who is no stranger to poetry. This kind of “emptiness” is especially effective in politics, both good and harmful. Fascism, racism, nationalism, fundamentalism - all these are nightmarish examples of “white” brands that have turned into madness. One cannot, however, deny the ability of such ideas to mobilize the masses.

The idea of ​​harmonizing opposites is one of the most captivating in Chinese culture. But at the same time, it is precisely the opposites that coexist with each other in China that make all attempts to find a simple explanation for this country futile, and this, in turn, secures its reputation as “untrustworthy.”

It is extremely important to build a framework for external perception of China. However, trying to force foreigners' ideas about China into this frame is dangerous. Asserting that “China is not a threat” while increasing military spending is a sure way to undermine the trust of others. Explaining that China strives for peace and at the same time wants to have a strong army is an incredibly difficult task, even if it is true. The same applies to many other “inconsistencies”. Here is one example: it is argued that the Chinese economy is not stable enough to carry out broad currency reform, but it has accumulated foreign exchange reserves of a trillion dollars. Foreigners, faced with China's great complexity, tend to reduce their opinions of it to oversimplified formulas. It is especially difficult for Westerners to accept the idea of ​​combining opposites. Therefore, it is important to create a framework that allows the world to understand the contradictions and ambiguities of China, a structure that holds opposites within itself much like the Chinese character “dan” does. Here the concept of novelty, which by its nature is inseparable from the difficulties of pioneering, will help to find the way: it is through this concept that we can arrive at an image of China that will be as multifaceted and attractive as the “American Dream”.

In conclusion, I would like to propose several practical measures that could speed up the process of changing the country's image and bringing it closer to reality.

Specifying a frame structure

The first, most important measure is to agree that the most effective such construct for understanding modern China is the idea of ​​its continuous renewal. For the Chinese, it follows that in any image of China they must constantly emphasize the element of novelty and try to avoid outdated stereotypes when explaining what is happening in the country to foreigners. The Chinese need to talk to foreigners about the country's problems honestly and openly, make every effort to explain to them exactly what circumstances predetermine tension in their relations with other countries, and constantly remind them that they are only designing their future, pursuing one goal - to build a more prosperous and a freer society.

We acknowledge our inability to predict what China will be like twenty years from now, but it is still vital for us to know at least what its present condition is. From this point of view, any events in the life of China can serve as a reason for detailed discussion, regardless of whether what is happening outside its borders is condemned or approved. Corrupt officials, environmental pollution and social discontent are all very present in life in modern China. By putting on a good face on a bad game, the Chinese will only undermine the confidence of the world community in discussions on other issues. The most important thing is that not a single event in China - good or bad - is a surprise to the rest of the world and receives a clear, unambiguous interpretation from the Chinese side in the foreseeable future. u As for foreigners, accepting “newness” as a framework requires concerted efforts from them as well; These efforts should be aimed at discerning a new China, its most modernized component. Too often, foreign visitors to China remain as if inside an impenetrable capsule. Previously, when, for a variety of political, cultural and linguistic reasons, few people dared to plunge into the thick of folk life, this was excusable. Today, many of these reasons have disappeared. Perhaps one of the rules for observing fast-moving systems of all kinds applies here: the more recent data we have, the more accurately we can predict the trajectory of their future movement.

From propaganda broadcasting to network support

The most important change in orientation in addressing the problem of national image may be a transition from the traditional “propaganda broadcast”, in which China tries to tell others what to think about it, to a fundamentally different model based on the idea that the meaning of a nation’s brand is ultimately not determined by itself. country, and the rest of the world. This means replacing the vertical, top-down principle of image formation with a horizontal one, implemented on a much broader basis and involving a variety of ways to provide information about China. Change is not easy. China is a master at tricking foreigners; the phrase “dealing with barbarians” has a special connotation of meaning in Chinese, making it similar to the names of types of art, as if communication with foreigners was some kind of manipulation by a magician using a complex mechanism of mirrors and smoke screens. But in the world of modern media, it is too easy to distinguish reality from a mirror image. The only way out is to create a system in which everything that happens in the cultural, political and economic life of the country is honestly discussed, and which allows foreigners to find the path to understanding China themselves, receiving comprehensive information about both the bright and dark sides of this state. China must realize that its “brand” is not what it considers a brand, but what other countries consider it to be.

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* Joshua Cooper Ramo. Brand China. The Foreign Policy Centre, 2007 @ ForeignPolicy Center 2007. Translation from English by Polina Pereverzeva.

[1] Transcript of Wen Jiabao's press conference on March 18, 2003.

[2] Lin Zexu, “Letter of Advice to Queen Victoria,” in From Ssuyu Teng and John Fairbank, China’s Response to the West (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), repr. in Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World History, Volume II (New York: HarperCoHins CollegePublishers, 1995), pp. 266—69.

[3] According to one British diplomatic historian who served as ambassador to China, this is unlikely.

[4] Wolfowitz, Paul “Bridging Centuries - the fin de sidcle all over again”, Spring 1997, page 7 and “Remembering the future”, The National Interest, Spring 2000.

[5] The central figure in the hieroglyph "jue", similar to "p", is actually used to represent a dead body ("shi") and goes back to the ancient hieroglyph for the person who was behind the altar during the funeral service. Obviously, this circumstance does not add to the attractiveness of the concept of “jueqi”: by rising, China throws out of its path the lifeless body of the old world order. Among neoconservatives on both sides of the Pacific, few had any difficulty deciding which state would be buried and which should be its gravedigger.

[6] China’s Peaceful Rise, Speeches of Zheng Bijian 1997-2005, Brookings Institution Press 2005.

[7] See, for example, the hotly debated work of YanXuetong (“Peace” does not mean “security”) [ http://military.people.com.cn/GB/107B/4028621.htmI ].

[8] Cm. Rumsfeld's speech at: http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Jun/10-598697.html .

[9] Tonelson, Alan “Washington Dreams on About China”, Washington Times, October 7. 2005.

[10] HJT United Nations Anniversary Speech, Sept. 2005 [ http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t213091.htm ].

[11] 'The villain from the famous American film of the 30s "The Mask of Fu Manchu", seeking to destroy Western civilization. — Note. lane

[12] BBC/Globescan 2006 Survey.

[13] On the perception of Chinese products abroad, see the results of a Synovate survey of 6,000 consumers from the United States and Europe (2006): 12% rate Chinese products as “high quality”, 88% as “average” products (33 %) or low quality (55%) (Synovate Global Omnibus). According to the results of a survey by Interband (2005), 79% of respondents believe that the words “made in China” have a negative impact on the image of the product (The Strategy of Chinese Brands: Two White Papers, Interbrand, 2005).

[14] McGregor, 119.

[15] According to preliminary data from a Y&R BrandAsset® Valuator (WPP) survey of 5,000 consumers from eight Chinese cities (June - July 2005).

[16] Cm., к примеру, Li Cheng, The Rise of China’s Yuppie Corps: Top CEOs to Watch, in China Leadership Monitor, No. 14.

[17] “Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon” (2000) takes second place, having collected $128 million, “Hero” (2004) is fourth (53 million), “Kung Fu Showdown” (2005) is eighth place ( 17 million). In 11th place is House of Flying Daggers, which grossed 11 million. In terms of global box office, Chinese films occupy four of the top ten non-English positions. Cm.: Source Exhibitor Relations Inc., via The Numbers at www.the- numbers.com.

[18] I draw, among others, on the excellent work of Mark Leonard of the Center for European Reform and Geoff Mulgan of the Youth Foundation, who have explored the concept of national image and brand. In particular, the articles by Leonard "Britain TM" and Mulgan "British spring" helped me enormously in understanding such a complex issue as national image. Both articles are available on the UK Foreign Policy Center website: fpc.org.uk.

[19] China was one of the participants in Y&R's Brand Asset® Valuator (BAV) study, which surveyed more than 500,000 consumers in 45 countries over fourteen years. The survey was both oral and written (in this case, respondents were offered questionnaires to fill out independently); The results were processed by a team of branding specialists. I thank Y&R's BrandAsset® Valuator Group, especially In Toon, Ed Lebar, and Mr. Martin Sorell, CEO of WPP Group, for permission to use the research results.

[20] “The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The Case of China” by Shaoguang Wang, Angang Ни, М. E. Sharpe, 2001.

[21] Public opinion polls like the Pew Study or the BBC Poll, which ask respondents simple questions such as “Who is the greater threat to the rest of the world, the United States or China?”, do not provide much insight into how China is perceived. Besides the fact that the statistical methods themselves are imperfect, often only one or two questions are asked about China, making the data difficult to use in more serious studies. By turning to large-scale, multivariate studies like VAU, we will try to compensate for this shortcoming.

[22] WangYiwei <Chinese Hier.>

[23] Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America,” Foreign Affairs, September/ October 2005.

[24] Mearshimer, John, The Rise OfChina Will Not Be Peaceful At AU, The Australian, November 18, 2005.

[25] BAV studies typically cover 1,000-1,500 brands present in any market. Brand perception is ranked in percentiles, which gives an idea of ​​how brands are ranked in a given market. For example, in a survey in France, China's ranking among 138 brands was more than 99%, but among all well-known brands it was less than 65%, reflecting the degree of brand awareness among BAV participants rather than actual awareness of the brand. To assess the importance of a brand, respondents are asked how well a given brand aligns with their interests. To differentiate (highlight) brands, three definitions are proposed: “peculiar”, “unique”, “unusual”. High salience with low importance can be interpreted as follows: “I know that this product is unique, but I have a different taste.”

[26] Hu Angang, draft version of Selected Essays, page 22.

[27] During the Mao era, the population was continuously prepared for evacuation to remote areas in the event of war; special mines were drilled in the mountain slopes (shan) for the underground placement of industrial enterprises; the political leadership and vital factories were supposed to be hidden in giant bomb shelter caves (dang) - a clear reference to the early days of the CCP, when the party elite hid in the caves of Yan'an. This policy is still reminiscent of the many bunkers that remain in major Chinese cities.

[28] It is believed that General Lin Biao rather than Mao himself expected a war on two fronts. Be that as it may, Mao also considered a world war inevitable, relying on his intuition and finding confirmation of his guesses in the writings of Lenin. Another economic consequence of these concerns was the “three lines” policy, according to which all industrial enterprises were divided into three types, located in different zones: on the coast - light industrial enterprises, a few hundred miles from the coast - the bulk of enterprises, and in strategic areas areas (hard-to-reach provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou, remote both from the coast and from the Soviet border) - heavy industrial enterprises. The “mountain” component in the slogan “dispersion, mountains, caves” is reminiscent of Lin Biao’s sarcastic remark: China doesn’t have much, but it certainly has enough mountains.

[29] Conservatives who remained faithful to the ideas of Mao, who restored China to the sense of self-respect lost during the Opium War, often complained to Deng on this very issue. “A non-socialist world will never allow the country to develop!” they insisted. Dan responded with a sharp rebuke: “So let’s do something ourselves” (yousuo zowei). This ability to maintain economic development at any cost, which became the main long-term principle of national policy (changqi jiben guoce), became even more important after 1989, when the country, on the one hand, faced the threat of internal conflict, and on the other, could at any moment catch post-communist infection that affected one after another Eastern European states. “The point is not whether the Soviet Union will fall, but whether China will fall,” Deng noted.

[30] NBER working paper 8187. It is curious that in the “development phase” of the local market by international companies, a bit of corruption may turn out to be economically beneficial, which is why, when establishing work in this market, they prefer to create joint ventures rather than enterprises where they were would be full owners. This process allows for faster technology transfer. However, it also encourages international companies operating in such markets to limit risks, generally reduces the amount of technology transferred (especially the most advanced and high-impact technologies protected by intellectual property laws), and creates a pricing structure that integrates risks into the price of products - and this further increases the cost of FDI.

[32] The government is trying to change the situation, but the main FDI continues to come from Hong Kong, Taiwan, from Chinese living in other countries, and, to some extent, from intra-Chinese investors who first export capital and then return it in a “circular route” him to his home country as an FDI.

[33] Shiller, Robert, “Investor Behaviour in the 1987 Stock Market Crash: Survey Evidence”, NEBR Working Paper No. 2446, National Bureau of Economic Research.

[34] “China's Peaceful Development Road,” PRC Government White Paper. The document is available on the website: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-12/22/content_3955754.htm .

[35] See, for example, the works of Roberto Unger on social and political development.

[36] This raises the question of identity and influence in relation to

to postmodernism. If modernism attached great importance to the freedom of the individual, then postmodernism again began to constrain it with restrictions of a very different nature, from psychology to linguistics. This applies most directly to China. Postmodernism is ultimately rooted in the ideas of Lyotard, who characterizes the postmodern era as a time when change becomes something permanent and this breaks down the idea of ​​the status quo/progress. In my paper The Beijing Consensus, describing this process for China, I said that it had enveloped the country in a “fog of change” very similar to the philosophical confusion generated by the postmodern era.

Cm. «The Post Modern Condition», Jean-Francois Lyotard.

Prospects for political reform in modern China Branding in an era of phase transition