Lenin and "White Crimea"

It is not a triumphal procession from Crimea to Moscow that one can free Russia, but by creating at least on a piece of Russian land of such a order and such living conditions that would pull all the thoughts and strength of the people groaning under the red yoke.

P.N. Wrangel

At the end of the civil war, the White Army of Baron Wrangel dug in Crimea. The peninsula, adapted for defense by nature itself, was extremely difficult to take. Yes, in fact, and there was no need from a military point of view. The White Army in Crimea was in isolation and could no longer pose any threat.

Nevertheless, Lenin threw all his forces to storm the Island of Crimea, demanding to take it at all costs. The losses of the Red Army during the capture of Crimea were huge (according to some estimates, about 10 thousand people killed and wounded with a total number of killed and wounded in the entire civil war of about 660 thousand people). Why did the leader of the Bolsheviks so strongly demanded the capture of Crimea?

The answer is that with at least a long coexistence of Bolshevik Russia and the White Crimea, a sample appeared for comparison. Moreover, it was possible to compare what it was possible to achieve in a few years in vast territory with the richest natural resources and on a small rocky and desert peninsula with a dry climate. It was this comparison that Lenin was afraid of fire.

The fact is that Baron Wrangel, having analyzed the mistakes made during the revolution and the Civil War, came to the conclusion about the need for reforms, and primarily land reform to attract the peasantry to their side.

A large number of works have been written about Wrangel's reforms. The scatter of assessments of these Wrangel reforms in historians is very large. From the recognition of their potential success to the complete denial of any value.

Here are examples of two extreme opinions.

Contemporaries of events evaluate Wrangel's reforms as successful, but failed to bring fruits as a result of the capture of the “island of Crimea” by the Bolsheviks. Boris Pushkarev describes what his father, who served in Wrangel’s troops witnessed: Wrangel was not only an outstanding military leader - he combined the talents of a major politician and administrator. Correcting the errors of the previous two years, he put things in order in the civil administration and spent two indigenous reforms: agrarian, assimilating land in property, and the establishment of local self -government. In national policy, the simplified concept of “unified and indivisible” Russia lost the idea of ​​federal relations with Ukraine and with the peoples of the Caucasus. Crimea under Wrangel became the most mature prototype of that corruption of Russia that would come out of the Civil War in case of victory over the Bolsheviks. There was no question of any “reaction” or “restoration” of pre -revolutionary orders: Wrangel sought to “lay the foundations of the new Russia” ... That is why his political heritage is relevant for us today [1].

Modern post -Soviet historians, at least some of them, evaluate these reforms as impossible. Here is what Alexander Shirokarad writes: the technical impracticability of the creation of Wrangel and Co. Rice Corner in Crimea is obvious now, and then, in the distant 1920s. But even if you assume a fantastic option for creating a paradise, how would the Russian people know about it? In the ideological struggle, the Reds won the White in 1918. I'm not saying that counter -revolutionary propaganda mercilessly punished the Cheka. Well, let's say we would have reached the peasants of the central provinces of proclamation with stories about paradise life in Crimea. The rhetorical question: the peasants believe that the same Denikin generals and officers instead of robbery, Bacchanalia and Bardak suddenly built in the Crimea the earthly paradise?! In the meantime, the essence and the matter, the Red Army would be knocked out by the baron from the Crimea.

It is very difficult to write about the economic reforms of Wrangel. And the point is not only that they remained on paper. Actually, no clear laws and rules of the Wrangel administration were developed, but there were only declarations of intent [2].

There is no time to talk about Wrangel's reforms, since there was no time for their holding, Crimea, albeit at a high price, was taken and the base for reform was thus successfully eliminated.

Moreover, the enemy himself understood the significance of the reforms carried out by him and their attractiveness for the people. In the same way as they understood the meaning of these reforms and their possible impact of the Bolsheviks.

Here is what I wrote about the meaning of the example of Crimea for the rest of Russia and the importance of Wrangel’s land reform Nikolai Ross: measures were taken to deliver information about land reform and to the other side of the front. Leaflets and brochures were distributed by the earth or air route. The following is the secret report of the head of the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Commander -in -Chief of October 13: “In the area that was engaged in our army, as well as in the nearest rear of the red frontline lane, we scattered the“ land law ”. The Soviet authorities take all measures so that these leaflets do not fall into the hands of the population and, finally, recently, according to the information, the Soviet authorities have been falsifying our land on land; He is apparently provocative content: the points of obligations of the peasants are completely distorted, is definitely indicated to the entire benefit of the landowners. I believe that in this regard it is necessary to strengthen our propaganda; It is necessary to indicate and warn him that the Soviet authorities provoke; After presenting the order itself, it is necessary to imprint the warning of the above meaning. Of course, after some time, the Soviet authorities will be applied again, and therefore it is necessary to monitor this issue and varize clarifications. ” There is evidence that the Reds gave out 1000 rubles for each copy of the Law on the Earth, and the shelters were shot, but that, despite all the measures, the prisoners of the Red Army often found copies of the land law and “other appeals” [3].

Wrangel's reforms remained not fully implemented due to the hasty liquidation of the White Crimea by the Red Army, which was not considered losses.

But history knows other examples when, much later, the Chinese communists did not have the determination of Lenin and, thanks to the firm position of the rest of the world, could not eliminate the “second white Crimea” - Taiwan Island. It was the presence of Taiwan Island and the huge achievements of this small island state that led to the realization of the need for reforms in the PRC. An example was too open.

In the post -Soviet years, Georgia showed Russia under the direction of the team Mikhail Saakashvili the same example. It was clearly demonstrated that many “unresolved issues”, such as the fight against corruption, restore the confidence of the people to the police, the fight against bureaucracy and red tape in resolving issues, can actually be resolved in the presence of political will in five to eight years. And the questions have already begun to ask: "Why did Georgia succeed?"

The Russian-Georgian War of 2008, which led to the emergence of a huge number of refugees, the rejection of significant territories and, ultimately to the defeat of the team Mikhail Saakashvili in the elections and destruction of the achieved, removed these issues.

Now in Ukraine a new experiment has been born, which may act as a sample for comparison. If Georgia is a small country and it could be easily explained that what can be done in small Georgia cannot be implemented in huge Russia, then if reforms in Ukraine, these explanations will disappear by themselves. Ukraine is the same large country as Russia. And this is a fraternal Slavic country, inhabited by the people with the same mentality. And then the question will arise in full growth: "Why did Ukraine succeed?"

1. B.S. Pushkarev. Wrangel in the Crimea. [Speech at the NTS conference “White Russia from the past to the future” in Sevastopol on October 1, 2000.]
2. A. Shirokorad. Looked by Wrangel's chance. Crimea - Bizerte - Gallipoli. Series "Military Secrets of the XX Century", M.: Veche, 2009.
3. N. Ross. Wrangel in the Crimea. Franfurt/Main: Possev-Werlag, 1982.