Semi -Europe
The development of the Ukrainian political crisis last week once again confirmed the intermediate - a kind of “semi -European” - the nature of Ukraine, which is not included in the European community, but really wants to get into it. All the main players behaved with non -European contempt for the law and procedures, but constantly looked back at Europe in order to understand when to stop, so as not to lose the European prospect for their country and personally.
In modern Europe, much of what happened in Ukraine is considered reprehensible. Let us recall a very recent example with the confrontation of the president and the parliamentary majority in Romania. There, the parliament expressed distrust of the head of state (having every right to do so), the Constitutional Court (a strong and authoritative body, whose decisions are mandatory for all participants in the political process) found that there were no grounds for criminal prosecution against the president. Then the parliament - also in accordance with the norms of the law - brought the question of distrust of the president to the referendum. The President - as it should be - temporarily refused to fulfill duties in favor of the Senate speaker - his political opponent, who, in turn, provided both supporters and opponents of the head of state complete freedom of agitation. The people spoke out in support of the president, who returned to the performance of their duties.
Recall that Romania is one of the most “young” members of the European Union, however, like other European countries, it acts in accordance with hard legal European principles that prohibit the threat of use of force against political opponents, arbitrary displacement of officials, and pressure on the judicial system. Any violator of these principles is subject to ostracism on a European scale. For all the imperiality of political customs in Romania (we recall that the president there was accused of illegally listening to telephone conversations of their opponents, but they could not prove this) European identity does not allow its hystabrication to neglect democratic principles. One and a half decades ago, in the same Romania, the conflict between the government and the opposition was resolved with the help of mining fists, which the rulers used opposition legal entities. This was shortly after the overthrow of the dictatorship of Chausko, when the largest Eurooptimists did not read Romania in the EU by 2006.
In modern Ukraine, the rules of the game are far from European-they are closer to the Romanian early 90s (although somewhat softer-taking into account the European perspective). Let us recall only the latest events - such as the power confrontation of the pro -presidential state preservation and pro -government special forces from the Berkut. The tightening of the detachments of the internal troops, loyal to Viktor Yushchenko, and the opposition to this "traffic cops", who retained loyalty to Viktor Yanukovych. The resignation of the Chairman of the Constitutional Court Ivan Dombrovsky, who was under severe pressure from the Anti -Jushchenkovsky forces, and the President of the Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun (which is doubtful from the point of view of the law) when appointing his duties from Western Ukraine Viktor Shemchuk, who was not even the deputy prosecutor general - he was only the Crimean Prosecutor. The legitimacy of the latter appointment is not decided to protect even many people very sympathetic people.
Over the past days, the hawks have been strengthened in both opposing Ukrainian camps. Such as the newly -naked chief of the Yushchenkovets state preservation Valery Geletey - until recently, this brave young colonel commanded the Kyiv seniority. Or retired General Alexander Kuzmuk, who became Deputy Yanukovych for power structures - his career as the Kuchmovsky Minister of Defense was interrupted after the "Orange Revolution". All this strengthened fears about the possible force scenario of the resolution of the crisis. Moreover, the legitimacy of all the main institutions in the country, which was already no longer shining, long -standing democratic traditions, turned out to be seriously undermined. Society is split: the president entered Clinch with the government, as a result of which a third of the population wants his impeachment, and over 40% against this idea. The parliament was gathering at his meetings and was engaged in lawmaking, the legitimacy of which recognized one part of the company, and the other was not (in accordance with the conditions of the compromise, the laws adopted during this period will have to be confirmed by the coming week). The Constitutional Court, whose authority was previously not too large (it is well known that many judges fell into it exclusively for political reasons), was discredited by accusations of engaging and corruption.
Nevertheless, the political class of Ukraine was able to find a compromise, which consists in holding the parliamentary elections on September 30. This is not very happy with the president, whose rating has recently grew up (part of the voters who previously disappointed in it due to his previous indecision has returned to him)-it is clear that Yushchenko would like to hold elections as early as possible, while this positive trend for him and his “our Ukraine” remains. This is not very happy with Yulia Tymoshenko, who has just received part of the administrative resource-after the appointment of her faithful ally Alexander Turchinov, the first deputy head of the National Security and Defense Council (taking into account the “fluidity of personnel” in the Ukrainian government, there is no guarantee that he will hold out for this post until September). This does not suit the speaker of the Rada Alexander Moroz - the rating of his Socialist Party leaves her a little chance of being represented by the Rada. You can, of course, go to the block to Yanukovych, but then many party functionaries may be outside the parliament. This is not very happy with the “regionals” who, with an adverse progress of the election campaign unfavorable for them, lose the leadership of the Cabinet of Ministers - if the socialists do not go to the Rada, but the “People’s Self -Defense” of the former head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Yuri Lutsenko will break through, which is now on the rise and can go to the polls independently.
However, the features of any compromise are that it does not completely suit any of its participants. The Ukrainian compromise is based not only on the peculiarities of the local political elite, which prefers not to bring conflicts to the “point of non -return”, when they can really be resolved only by force, which was clearly manifested on the “revolutionary” days of December 2004. No less important is the European factor that forces the parties to elementary restraint. It is clear that if the Ukrainian crisis entered the power phase, then in the European perspective for the current political class of the country (already far from unconditional) it would be necessary to put a cross.
At the same time, Yanukovych wants no less to Europe than Yushchenko - their difference is that if the first considers the European transit of Ukraine as a styer race, the second is an impatient sprinter. It is no coincidence that the opponents of Yushchenko almost more often than his supporters tried to enlist the sympathies of the West, appealing to various European structures. In this case, the “European Factor” played a restraining role for Ukrainian politicians, preventing the development of events in the power option. But, at the same time, the crisis once again demonstrated that before the full European integration of Ukraine, with its weak institutions and the neglect of politicians to the law, is still far away.
Author - Deputy General Director of the Center for Political Technology