Cold War Ponaroshka
I must say that the Russian president (or those who throw him ideas for performances) very freely interpret historical events. In fact, a well -known courage is needed to compare the current ones, I note, not the most reasonable actions of Washington with the promoted by adventurism by the action that Nikita Khrushchev took exactly 45 years ago. Firstly, the current American about nevertheless is intended to intercept enemy nuclear missiles, and not for applying a nuclear blow to the cities of a foreign country. Secondly, the Kremlin not only did not announce in advance about his plans to place nuclear missiles in Cuba, but conducted the Anadyr operation to transfer missiles in conditions of strict secrecy. And thirdly, deploying missiles, Nikita Khrushchev least of all felt a desire to achieve consent to this from Washington.
It is amazing that Putin was obviously incorrect to the incorrect parallels of Putin just when Washington took clear steps to the compromise. US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, while in the Czech Republic, said that the United States can put into operation of the missile defense system in the Czech Republic and Poland until the presence of a threat from Iran is reliably established. The minister also proposed to agree on the admission of Russian communication officers to American OPA objects in the Czech Republic and Poland in exchange for Moscow’s consent to deploy the American system. However, Russian officials were not at all pleased with their obvious diplomatic victory. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov coldly noted that there were too many oral comments around, and Moscow, meanwhile, did not receive American offers in writing. The Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdyukov said after an informal meeting with the heads of military departments of NATO countries, that the position of Russia on the issue of the about remaining unchanged: "At least everything that we were offered is not satisfied with." Then Putin equalized the plans for the deployment of the pro with the attempt to deploy six dozen nuclear missiles in Cuba 45 years ago. Robert Gates, not hiding confusion, said that “Vladimir Putin’s statements at the Russia -EU summit diverge from the Russian -Russian -Russian negotiations on the pro. We do not understand how to interpret these tough statements. After all, President Putin personally admitted earlier that the United States made successful proposals on the issue of European Pro. ”
In fact, it is obvious that Moscow is not at all interested in achieving a compromise on the pro. The Kremlin needs a constant sluggish conflict with the United States on the problems of nuclear weapons and missile defense. Putin and his entourage are sure that in this way Russia regains the status of a great power, which albeit only in the nuclear sphere, but equal to the United States. That is why Moscow all the time achieves the beginning of “large” nuclear negotiations, which would discuss the problems of compliance with the contract on medium and lower-range missiles and extend the START-1 agreement. And in order to confirm the relevance of such negotiations, periodically threatens to withdraw from the RSMD agreement, as well as deploy unprecedented warheads that will be able to overcome the US system.

No matter how the Kremlin tries to puzzle the White House with a return to the rhetoric of the Cold War, so far, thank God, all this looks like a farce: it scares, but no one is scared. In fact, the role of a nuclear factor in Russian-American relations is steadily reduced. And, paradoxically, this decrease was predetermined by the very Caribbean crisis, which put the USSR and the USA on the brink of a real nuclear war. It was at the time of the confrontation that it turned out that neither side would risk using nuclear weapons of the first. Despite the 20-fold superiority in the number of nuclear ammunition (the Americans knew about this), the United States abandoned plans to strike at the USSR. It was easy for Robert Maknamara in the late 50s to theoretically calculate the amount of unacceptable damage that was able to keep from the attack. The USSR could not cause such damage to the United States. However, having become the Minister of Defense in the early 60s, Maknamara in practice realized that the likelihood that even one Soviet rocket would reach the American territory automatically cancel the plans for a nuclear attack against the USSR.
In order for nuclear weapons to be an important factor in politics, other countries must suspect a certain fraction of madness from the owner of such weapons. For this reason, the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK cause such anxiety in the world. Putin proved whether he wanted it or not, that he was a reasonable man. And not even too adequate parallels with the Caribbean crisis cannot spoil this reputation. At least for now.