Transit (15)

Considering the various aspects influencing the possible attempt of the new President Medvedev to return to 2000 and repeat what Putin failed - authoritarian bureaucratic modernization, it is necessary to answer the following two questions posed in the Transit-13 article:

5. What are the resources of the dissatisfied?

6. Are there resources to suppress them (i.e. Medvedev’s resources)?

The following reasoning, which necessarily involves such an object of analysis as Medvedev, is not an attempt to predict his fate. Scenarios related to the new president are important to us. Because they are the ones who influence our lives.

Let's start with the dissatisfied. As suggested in the previous article, the most dangerous faction among them are the determined security forces. Their main resource is control over the relevant authorities, primarily the prosecutor’s office, the investigative committee, and the FSB. They have individual supporters in other law enforcement agencies and civilian departments. Their resources include rootedness in power, relatively stable ties between supporters, and a willingness to go to the end in the event of a real threat to their interests.

An important tool (and therefore a resource) in the hands of the civil bureaucracy is sabotage. It blossomed like mold on long-unwashed dishes during Putin’s eight-year term to alarming proportions, taking on either a spontaneous or an organized form. It was clearly visible whenever measures were suddenly taken that were contrary to the interests of the bureaucracy, for example, some rare anti-corruption decisions. I have repeatedly encountered examples of standard behavior of the following kind of bureaucracy. When someone, addressing our bureaucrats, referred to Putin (not only to his words, such as those spoken during the reading of the Address to Deputies, but even to official documents signed by him), the standard answer followed: “So what? Why are you bothering here with your Putin?” Moreover, this reaction of bureaucrats is typical not only for matters relating to domestic policy, but also foreign and security policy. Sabotage and widespread disregard for public interests have become commonplace along with the growth of corruption in all areas of government. Always and everywhere, officials favorably carried out presidential instructions only when the interests of the boss and subordinates coincided. But this extremely rarely corresponded with the interests of citizens and the country.

Now imagine what it will be like for Medvedev, with his more than modest legitimacy, who is already being shown in every possible way: “You are nobody, and they can’t call you.” And then Putin will be around for some time, who will actually control the civil bureaucracy as prime minister and the security bureaucracy as Putin. Moving, therefore, to the next question - about Medvedev's resources, we immediately state that Prime Minister Putin will not be President Medvedev's resource.

In general, the latter has a clear shortage of resources. After the inauguration, only four can be specified. The first is its constitutional powers. But this resource is empty if there are no levers for their implementation, and there are also not enough of them (more on this below). The second is a small group of people who have invested in the Medvedev project for a relatively long time. It is clear that these people are important to him not only as a support group. Behind them are their corporations and groups dissatisfied with Putin. The third resource is a small but slowly growing group of experts and officials who believe that the future belongs to Medvedev, not Putin. Some are counting on new feeding, others (a minority) sincerely hope to influence the situation in the country through it.

Sparsely, as is easy to see.

The fourth resource is not actual, but potential. These are all kinds of groups dissatisfied with Putin. It can be assumed that, through the mediation of his associates, Medvedev will begin to tighten up this resource in the near future. Let's try to understand these groups in order to understand Medvedev's immediate actions.

I would start with the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Perhaps one of the most far from reality myths introduced by the current propaganda machine is the myth of the revival of the Russian army. Insignificant content (compared not only to the FSB, but even to many categories of civilian officials), extremely low military order; on the one hand there is a failed military reform, on the other there are taken away corruption troughs. To this should be added the dissatisfaction of the generals with the constant “geostrategic humiliations.”

Officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs at various levels have no less reasons for dissatisfaction. Equally low content, bordering on neglect; pitting the police against citizens; the constant use of the police as a corruption bogeyman: when it is necessary to scold someone or choose someone as a ritual victim, they turn out to be employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Add to this the important fact that both departments are potential power resources. This means that there is a subject for bargaining and collusion, for pulling to one’s side. The point is obvious: loyalty and support in exchange for increased funding and stability.

The first thing that follows from this is that among the reforms of the Medvedev administration in the coming years there will be neither army reform nor reform of the law enforcement system. Meanwhile, the country needs both.

Second: this resource will be important for Medvedev to solve two problems. The first is fending off threats emanating from a group of radically dissatisfied people. The second is the transition to your own active actions. What I mean is this. The danger for Medvedev may grow so much that the only means of defense will be to go on the attack. In this situation, he can exercise his inalienable constitutional right: to reappoint anyone in the executive branch at any time without any reason or explanation. An operation that could be called “Night of Long Decrees” may be necessary. But the execution of these decrees must be supported by the forceful resource of execution. This is where the results of early bargaining come in handy.

Another option cannot be ruled out: the latent development of a new power structure (this has been very fashionable in Russia for the last fifteen years). There is a well-prepared base: the Institute of Bailiffs. They are humiliated by incredibly low salaries. They have legal powers that can be expanded as part of improving the judicial system, which Medvedev intends to do according to his own statement.

Medvedev’s next important potential resource is regional elites. At the very beginning of Putin's presidency, regional leaders were removed from solving federal problems and the main regional lobbyists were deprived of opportunities. All that was left to them was the notorious State Council. This anemic creature was sometimes tasked with developing some programs. But can anyone remember anything implemented from his developments? Maybe something exists, but the country doesn’t know about it. After all, the State Council from time to time appeared in the information space only as another decoration in which a scene from the soap opera “President Putin” was played out.

During Putin's eight years, many regional powers were stolen through the adoption of laws that violated the constitutional rights of the regions. Having deprived governors of their election, Putin, it would seem, went towards meeting many of them halfway, enticing them with irremovability. But as a result, many regions experienced an invasion of the Varangians, who intercepted the usual channels of enrichment. Those who remained in office suddenly discovered that they had lost important informal positional advantages. So, the hidden dissatisfaction with Putin among the regional elites is extremely high. And Medvedev is quite capable of entering into an alliance with them, promising to restore part of their former power, explaining this by a return to the principles of federalism.

There are many useful uses for this resource. Let me remind you, for example, that regional bureaucrats are the key sabotage squad, which I wrote about above. Its ability to screw up any federal undertaking is limitless, as has been demonstrated repeatedly over the centuries. They are no less effective in the senselessly stubborn implementation of Moscow’s most idiotic decisions, easily bringing them to the point of complete absurdity and demonstrating to citizens all the wretchedness of the federal government. Therefore, if they wish, in a short period of time they are able to arouse the hatred of the population towards the government and the prime minister.

The third potential resource available for use is entrepreneurship. The resource is undoubtedly rotten: intimidated, disconnected, greedy, and has not learned, with rare exceptions, to play for the long haul. His only virtue is anger against the bureaucracy and its leader. Please note: Medvedev has already sent many tempting signals towards business. It is not difficult to win supporters here. It is enough to weaken the corruption pressure at least a little: the one from whom the noose has been removed does not soon notice that he is breathing poisoned air. It breathes!

The fourth invaluable resource is the media. The current generation of those who can be conventionally classified as politicians in Russia attach great importance to this resource and constantly exploit it. I suspect this is justified. Recently, a colleague from Germany complained to me: “In Germany, politicians say what the press has previously written.” This, of course, is another form of influence, which has practically died out in our country. But the example given is another confirmation of the universal importance of the resource. One of the ways Medvedev can buy the favor of journalists is to legislatively resolve the issue of the relationship between owners and editorial teams.

Finally, the last, fifth potential resource I mentioned above is organized public support. It is the most difficult to buy, because the only thing civil society needs is freedom. And it’s very scary to give it. This is only possible in very critical situations. However, I would not be surprised if Medvedev, to begin with, actually implementing Putin’s existing instructions, tries to soften the situation of non-profit organizations by revising the new Procrustean legislation affecting them. Let me also remind you that freedom is precisely what is least amenable to dosage and is not controllable in the sense of maintaining it at a predetermined level (I wrote about this above). Therefore, an attempt to liberate society will immediately lead to an expansion of the zone of freedom.

Concluding the story about resources, I must note the following important fact. We have no right to forget that the country may have a second top of the vertical of power in the person of Prime Minister Putin. It cannot be ruled out that the latter may end up in the camp opposing Medvedev if he tries to prolong his stay in this post. It is clear that the government headed by the prime minister can understand the importance of the resources listed above no worse than we do, which will lead to competition for control over them between the president and the prime minister. This will be fun!

Well, for example. Imagine that the struggle between the president and the prime minister for the favor of regional elites will begin. Does this remind you of anything? Right! The struggle between Yeltsin and Khasbulatov for the regions in 1992-1993. It doesn't take a prophet to predict what kind of weakening of federal power this might lead to. There is no need to lament in advance. Let me remind you that against the backdrop of the past weakening of federal power, the shoots of federalism sprouted. It is our fault that we did not support their growth with legal institutions and ultimately ruined them. This is not the only example where the weakness of government strengthened the country.

But I'm talking about something else. So: the double-headed nature of the vertical of power can lead to competition between heads for the listed resources. Like any competition, it can be fraught with positive consequences: the authorities will be forced to give back what they forcibly took away earlier, while trying to outdo themselves. (But even such a beneficial process can become dangerous if it goes off scale.)

Finally, in all these constructions and possible battles there is one absolutely uncertain element: what will happen to the Duma? Who will take control of the most corrupt detachment of the bureaucracy, the Duma majority? Or will there be a split, paralysis of legislative work? Impossible to predict. Here such a wonderful fan of scenarios appears that you want to give up everything and write a political thriller.

But I will still try in the next article to give answers to the three remaining questions from the Transit-13 article: On what can consensus be achieved? Can Medvedev engage the radically dissatisfied? Whose will he take?

To be continued

Author - President of the INDEM Foundation