We have long planned this issue - about the variety of forms and mechanisms for exiting authoritarian-totalitarian regimes. They gave the working title: “Transition Formula.” We discussed for a long time what stories were needed and looked for authors. Meanwhile, the formula definitely didn’t add up. Moreover, over time, reasonable doubts arose: are there universal patterns that describe the “transition”? Optimistic transitionologists, who began their studies in the 1990s, in the euphoric atmosphere of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, by the end of the century had moderated their ardor, and even after ten years actually recognized the need for significant refinement of the original concepts. Practice has not confirmed the assumption that the transition from authoritarianism to consolidated democracy is a deterministic and linear process. In many countries (not excluding our fatherland), clearly “frozen” in the middle of such a transition, “hybrid regimes” have emerged, combining the appearance of democratic procedures with authoritarian management practices. And, it seems, they established themselves for a long time, revealing remarkable abilities for socio-political balancing act and adaptation.
In the end, we called the number differently: “Regime Change.” Such a title already implies a more complex nature of the transit, hinting that a sick society is forced to switch several times from “general regime” to “ward” and even “strict bed” - and back. In other words, none of the theoretical models currently used by sociologists provides an exhaustive answer to the key questions: what factors set in motion the “trigger mechanism” of regime breakdown; at what stage does the motion vector change direction (and is there a “point of no return”); what is the influence of political and non-political, formal and informal institutions on the course of transformation.
The practical experience accumulated in this regard in different parts of the world is varied and contradictory. Conventionally, the “exemplary model” of a consistent break with the past and significant progress along the path of democratic improvement continues to be the transformations carried out in Germany. But few people, even the European neighbors of the Germans, manage to come close to this model. However, there is an opinion according to which Germany was able to overcome its dark past only because it lost the Second World War and, in essence, was forced to transform... One way or another, in many countries, after the end of the civil conflict or the overthrow of the dictatorship, the injustice committed in the past, is not smoothed out at all or is only partially eliminated. The characters refuse to “settle scores” and declare their desire to start a new life from scratch. But here’s the problem: in most cases, the result of voluntary amnesia is the ineffectiveness of the institutions of the new regime. Under these conditions, it is clear why, since the mid-1990s, the subject of research by historians and sociologists has been methods of effectively overcoming the consequences of dictatorship, and above all, measures of so-called transitional justice.
The results of the work of scientists summarizing the experience of change seem to us certainly useful. Despite the clear public dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in our country, many fellow citizens, for obvious reasons, are even more afraid of reforms: the fear of “instability” outweighs the desire to change anything, even if we are talking about the most necessary and vital things. Whether such an intermittent state can persist for a long time and serve as the basis for any kind of stability is an open question; In this regard, members of the editorial board were divided into gloomy optimists and moderately cheerful pessimists.
The shortage of detailed political projects in such circumstances is easily explained, no matter which camp you take. The integrative mission for supporters and opponents of change is perfectly fulfilled by the “common enemy”; any positive programs immediately disintegrate the united front into many separate columns. But there is a more complex problem. Regime change appears to be a process in which the linear relationship between action and result, characteristic of “peacetime,” is not observed. When entering such a process, it seems that it is important not only to choose a goal and inextricably linked guidelines (for example: an independent court, transparent taxation, etc.), but also to be consciously aware of the variability of the movement, which does not obey a strict, predetermined scenario. The “road map” that will be required here should not be a trivial route sheet indicating the “correct” course and control points, but rather the broadest possible overview of the problem field, covered with a complex interweaving of paths, with the application of tools that will help navigate this field without severe injuries and losses. We would like to consider this issue of our magazine as preparatory materials for such a roadmap.