Translated material
Two dissasens dissent
The Islamic Renaissance in Russia took place. Islam “found legitimacy”, which is not surprising, because in the conditions of the new Russia it should have happened. Islam is part of the sociocultural being of Russian society. Thousands of mosques have opened, a system of religious training is created, stable contacts with foreign co -religionists have been established. The consciousness of ethnic Muslims has changed. Their mentality is realized at three levels - ethnic, Russian (civil) and religious.
Much has been done during the Islamic Renaissance. But, no matter how disappointing for the followers of the Prophet, the unified Muslim ummah of Russia did not work out. There are two large Muslim areas - the Caucasian and the Russian actual, which is conditional, but could be called by the name of the second largest people of the Federation - Tatar. Honestly, both terms are unsuccessful. To say Russian means excluding the North Caucasus from Russia. Tatar is also incorrect, because except for the Tatars in Moscow, the Volga region, in the Urals, millions of Muslims belonging to other ethnic groups live in Siberia. For simplicity, we will call him Russian, holding it in the mind that this conditional, “worker” term hugs all Russian Islam with the exception of the North Caucasus. Of course, it should be invented by the term more clear, but scary to join the sophisticated inventors who recently invented the Russian Islam.
Each of the two areas is self -sufficient from the point of view of the cultural and proper religious tradition, prone to internal consolidation, is busy solving their own problems, including political, and above all, relations with the authorities.
Both areas, despite sporadic attempts to demonstrate a desire for integration, live their individual worlds. Muslim leaders from the capital or Tatarstan are accepted in Makhachkala or Nalchik as dear guests, but they are treated there primarily as a Muscovite and Kazan. Thank God, neither that nor the other never claimed the role of the pastors of the Caucasians. And this was the main basis for mutual respect. Although in the same Chechnya there are also offended by co -religionists from other Russian regions that did not show proper Islamic solidarity during both Chechen wars. In truth, it was especially not to count on it.
* * *
“Russian” Islam, in turn, cannot be recognized as monolithic. There is Kazan, Ufa, Volga, Siberia. There is also Moscow - the largest Muslim city is not only in Russia, but throughout Europe (according to various sources in the pioneers from 800 to 1,500 thousand Mohammedan). There are regional leaders, there are ambitions. Nevertheless, integrational trends are gaining strength. It seems that a deep organizational split among the Muslim clergy is coming to an end. The head of the Central Spiritual Directorate Talgat Tajutdin, who claimed the role of the “first Muslim”, loses - the Council of the Muftis of Russia. An outstanding person, an ambitious person with a broken psyche, who headed the spiritual administration of the Muslims of the European part of Russia and Siberia during the years of Soviet power, Tajutdin loses his positions both in the Muslim community and in the eyes of a somewhat tired of his unpredictable energy of power. The “cavalry” announcement during the Iraqi Jihad campaign of the United States was regarded in the Kremlin as a more than an unsuccessful joke.
The head of the Omsk Muftiyat, Zulkarnay Shakhirzyanov, believes that the exit from the “squabbles between the mufti” would be “building a single power vertical and the final delimitation of powers between spiritual administrations”. So far, even the president himself does not manage to build such a vertical. But to achieve a greater interaction of Islamic structures is quite possible. Yes, and necessary.
The Council of the Muftis of Russia, arising as an opponent of Tajutdin with his comrades, has become a self -sufficient organization, today, perhaps the most influential. It seems that they understood this in the Kremlin. The authority of the chairman of the SMR Ravil Gainutdin is recognized as a religious elite. Which for the most part was stable. Its key figures are the Saratov Imam Mukaddas Bibars, Nizhny Novgorod - Omar Idrisov, the Mufti of Tatarstan Gusman Iskhakov, the mufti of the Asian part of Russia Nafigulla Ashirov and some others have gained experience not only in the religious but also public spheres and continue to strengthen their authority. Imam is not a secular politician: one “presidential term” may not be enough to take place as an authoritative spiritual leader.
And it is more convenient to deal with secular authorities with proven people not prone to eccentric antics. For example, in the Saratov region, the ligament “Governor of Ayatskov - Imam Bibars” is an unconditional factor in the stability of interethnic, and therefore political relations.
And interethnic relations in the Russian Federation, even in general, are calm, but far from cloudless. It is interesting to see how the relations between migrants-Caucasians and indigenous Muslims develop. As a rule, these relations are even. Although sometimes there is tension, as was the case in the Astrakhan region, where the follower of Wahhabit Ayuba Omarov, or in the Volgograd region, moved. But even there, it did not reach the “assault”.
Believers visit the same mosques, although sometimes there were attempts to organize chapel houses on an ethnic principle. By the way, the Caucasian Mosque, that is, the mosque, especially visited by immigrants from the Caucasus, exists in Moscow. It is believed that Caucasians living in Central Russia are more religious than the Tatars. However, it can be assumed that their increased religiosity is mostly explained by the desire to preserve their ethnocultural identity in an alien environment.
The mosques did not become the foci of the religious and political opposition, although around some of them there were circles (small) radical youth.
Russian Muslims turned out to be a very persistent immunity to the theological trends unconventional for them - Mazhabs and ideologies. So, the interest in Wahhabism, which our politicians and some superformists, are trying to excommunicate from Islam, was, so to speak, an infantile character (I remind you, we are not talking about the Caucasus). They were carried away by individual young people, they talked about Wahhabism in several mosques. But in Russia he was not given to transform into a stable, especially mass ideological movement. He did not pass the test. And here, in addition to its incompatibility with Hanafism, in addition to the inheritance from the Soviet era of religious apathy, a certain (though not decisive) role was played by counteraction measures from the Sunni clergy and, yes, guessed-special services.
I would venture to make a paradoxical assumption that, in a sense, the Wahhabitic vaccination even benefited Russian Islam, showing the futility of its further indocation.
As long as the question was resolved what to do with the neophytes-vajhabits, in Kazan they were seriously carried away by the Islamic Reformation, Neojadidism, showing the world a new phrase “Euroislam”. The authorship belonged to the political adviser to President Shaimiev Rafael Khakimov, who was immediately subjected to stiff, sometimes incorrect criticism. I think that Khakimov’s opponents should understand that Euro -is is not a concept, not ideology, and even more so not theology. This is just a replica, but a productive replica, capable of having a positive effect on modernization processes in Islam. In Europe, and now in the States about this, how tightly thought about it.
The Euroislam stimulated the development of theological and at the same time ideological polemic, for example, about the ratio of Ijtihad in Islam (the right to independent judgment) and Taklid (following someone else's authority). So in Russia gradually, still in simplified forms, but the art of theological discussion is still reanimated. Which indicates that Islamic culture in Russia gains normative features.
Even more about the “normalization” of Islam is evidenced by the fact that Muslim events talk less about politics and more about religious and family matters-what means to contain mosques (only in Tatarstan it requires one million rubles), from which to pay a salary of imams, how to recreate a vacuum system, how to prepare qualified personnel for teaching in a madrasah.
Some mufti have developed their close -knit “teams”. Many imams turned out to be excellent business executives. (One of the Muftiev once admitted to the author that “in life he is a builder.”) In May, in the Bulgaras at the plenum of the spiritual administration of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan, distinguished imams were awarded. The main prize is Nine. In a word, Russian imams are immersed in workdays. The well -being of religion depends on its material technical base, the creation of which can be safely attributed to the department of Islamic Renaissance.
In the very beginning of the 1990s, Islam came to politics (or politics came to Islam). Parties and movements were created. Some of them (the Party of Islamic Renaissance, the Nur movement, the Union of Muslims of Russia, “Refah”) claimed the status of all -Russian. Political Islam inspired newspaper men and experts in publications on religious radicalism, about the hordes of Wahhabis dug in mosques.
Then the Muslims had a chance to create a centralized socio-political movement, and there, following the example of co-religionists of the early twentieth century, his faction in the State Duma. The chance was missed.
Some Islamic politicians, climbing the steps of the political staircase, from time to time speaking with the permitted critic, switched to a path of exquisite servilism. Others, for example, the former head of the Union of Muslims Nadir Khachilayev, left the distance, and failed to master the skills of the Moscow-Byzantine intrigue.
None of them managed to clearly and pragmatically formulate the sociocultural, confessional interests of Russian Islam. And are there any such interests? The question is not idle. Muslims think and will think about him.
In 2003-2004, the next elections are coming-Duma, presidential. It is in these critical periods that applicants for high posts recall Muslim voices. And Islamic politicians are concerned about how these voices are exchanged for ... their own well -being. Those and others had a good good thing.
Will the Muslim electorate be seriously in demand on the ballot derby? Or such giants as United Russia and Communists, “Islamic appendage” is no longer needed? In any case, in the opinion of the religious authorities themselves, the role of the structures subordinate to them, as well as the confessional factor in general, will be insignificant.
A characteristic bar: the Islamic Party of Russia recently appeared on the political horizon. If this happened 10 years ago, she would attract universal interest. Now, if they notice the party, then perhaps the striking Khlestakovshchina of its leaders will be impaired. Judge for yourself. According to the party leader Magomed Rajabov, Muslims in Russia 25 million, in the IPR - three million members [1] (Hold on, Communist Party!). True, most Muslims are not yet aware of its existence. However, our recent history knows cases of a sudden phenomenon of parties, even presidents directly from non -existence.
But, whatever you say, political Islam on the scale of all of Russia, by and large, did not take place. In any case, he was not in demand by the Muslims of the Federation as an effective tool for achieving his goals. “Muslims of Russia,” noted by Moscow analysts Gulnur Gazieva and Sergey Melkov, “characterizes a low degree of interest in politics” [2] .
It is significant that the everyday calm of Russian Islam is observed at the moment when in the world they started talking about the Islamic-Christian (more precisely, Islamic-west) confrontation, that “something needs to be done with Islam,” that Muslims should change their attitude to the ongoing process of globalization, etc.
In connection with September 11, the war in Afghanistan and the midday in Iraq wrote a lot about the inevitable growth of interfaith tension in Russia. In a sense, such materials, with all their objectivity, were provocative. But there is almost no one to blame here: in fact, there was an concern for concern. In addition, the end of 2002-the beginning of 2003 was marked by the feminization of Jihad. I am far from the thoughts separated by many, that female terrorist attacks primarily serve the creation of the Wahhabis state. But Islam will need an even greater “protection” from its negative perception in society.
Nevertheless, even emergency circumstances did not destroy ethno-confessional consensus. (Note that they did not cause the growth of radical moods among Muslims.)
* * *
Against the backdrop of the everyday calm of Muslims of the central part of Russia, the Volga region, the Urals, Siberia, the situation with Islam in the North Caucasus looks more tense.
The revival of Islam in this region developed in the same areas as in the rest of Russia. However, there were also significant differences due to the features of the development of the North Caucasus and, most importantly, the political situation in the 1990s. The ethnic community in the North Caucasus is more traditional. Here Islam was not subjected to destruction, similar to the one that was performed in most of the territory of the Russian Federation. In conditions of constant tension, including with conflict in Chechnya, Islam could not but acquire a high degree of politicization, becoming an instrument both in the internal struggle and in the confrontation with the center. Finally, an acute confrontation between the local Sufi Islam (tariffism) and the “new”, which came from the Middle East, was marked here, radical Islam - “Wahhabism”.
Islam has become an instrument that in its interests use a variety of forces-from secular and moderate-religious to the most radical, using terrorist methods in their struggle.
The most Islamic Republic of the North Caucasus - Dagestan, and here the role of Islam in politics was and remains relatively high. It was in this republic that the ideas of Islamic alternative and the North Caucasian Islamic fundamentalism were crystallized - both in its moderate and “Wahhabitic” forms. In Dagestan, ideologists of Islamic fundamentalism were formed, such as in the early 1990s, the Amir of the Islamic Renaissance of Ahmedkadi Akhtaev (d. 1998), a supporter of the creation of the Islamic state in the North Caucasus Sheikh Bagautdin. In 1996-1999, according to various estimates, the number of “Wahhabis” ranged around four thousand people. However, there is reason to believe that taking into account passive supporters, there are much more of them.
It was in this republic in 1997 that a powerful “Wahhabian” Jamaat was formed as part of the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, Chancurna and Kadar, the so -called. The Kadar Zone, which the leaders of local Islamists declared Islamic territory. The “Wahhabis” and their supporters refused to obey the authorities whom they accused of corruption, of the inability to solve social issues, etc. There were attempts to establish the laws of Sharia on the “Islamic territory”. This caused the discontent of those Muslims who continued to profess the Tarikatian Islam traditional for this area. Between both groups of Muslims, clashes began to occur. In 1999, the “Wahhabis” of the Kadar zone supported the invasion of the detachments of the most influential Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. In response, the authorities stormed the rebellious villages, destroying the leaders of the “Wahhabis”, destroying them at home. Subsequently, adherents of “Wahhabism” were resettled through the territory of Dagestan.
Islamic jamaats arose in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adygea, which, according to experts, is one of the characteristic features of the modern Islamic movement [3] . There is information that several small jamaats formed among the Muslims of the Republic of North Ossetia - Alania. It should be noted that the complete identification of the members of any Islamic jamaat with the followers of Islamic radicalism and, especially terrorists, as the Russian special services often do is incorrect. Most of the “jamaatchiks” are young people of rather moderate views who are by no means going to fight for the notorious Islamic state, but advocate observing Islamic traditions and morality. They open their propaganda openly and inform the authorities about the events they are working.
On the other hand, in the republics of the North Caucasus there really are radical groups, there are camps in which Chechen and Arab instructors prepare future Mujahideen. It is also known that some terrorists were trained in these camps. The level of training in such centers is usually low (lower than in the Middle East), the preparation periods are short, and “students” usually have the opportunity to leave the camps at their discretion.
Местные власти не делают разницы между умеренными и радикально настроенными членами джамаатов. (Кстати, по данным местных спецслужб, «ваххабитов», которыми именуются все члены джамаатов, в Кабардино-Балкарии насчитывается до 500 человек, а в Карачаево-Черкесии — примерно 300. Правда, проверить эту информацию по независимым источникам практически невозможно.) В результате по обвинению в совершении терактов заключению подвергаются мусульмане, к ним отношения не имевшие. Известен случай, когда в Кабардино-Балкарии местный министр внутренних дел был вынужден даже извиниться перед ошибочно задержанным юношей, обвинявшимся в теракте в Пятигорске, которого он не совершал.
Что касается Чечни, то здесь радикальные идеи, связанные со всеобщим введением шариата и строительством исламского государства, так и не получили широкой поддержки. Первый президент Чеченской республики Джохар Дудаев неоднократно подчеркивал, что его целью является построение светского, демократического государства. К исламу он апеллировал только в связи с переходом чеченского кризиса в военную стадию, приняв в качестве идеологии сопротивления центральной власти джихад. Тотальная же исламизации Чечни, к чему призывали местные приверженцы «ваххабизма» и их арабские наставники, практически провалилась.
Особенность ситуации на Северном Кавказе заключалась в том, что в 1990-е годы исламские радикалы преодолевали рамки этнической обособленности и пытались выступать в качестве единой идейно-политической силы. Свидетельством тому стала общая борьба дагестанских и чеченских «ваххабитов» за создание единого государства от Каспийского до Черного моря, участие в «ваххабитских» терактах представителей самых разных кавказских этносов и т. д.
Если исламским радикалам в 1990-е годы удалось достичь взаимодействия, то в целом ислам на Северном Кавказе не стал фактором как внутри-, так и межэтнической консолидации. Использование его в качестве политического инструмента в конечном счете приводило и приводит к разобщенности в обществе. Наиболее характерным в этом отношении является противостояние традиционного для Северного Кавказа тарикатизма и «ваххабитов». Нападки исламских радикалов на традиционный ислам, стремление доказать свое моральное превосходство, «истинность» салафийи и ущербность тарикатизма резко обострили ситуацию в кавказском сообществе, особенно в дагестанском и чеченском, и привели к целому ряду столкновений, в том числе вооруженных и кровопролитных.
Духовные управления мусульман всех северокавказских республик предприняли максимум усилий для того, чтобы воспрепятствовать проникновению ваххабизма. Сплоченность антиваххабитских сил привела к небывалому росту влияния суфийских шейхов, в том числе на светских политиков. Как иллюстрацию приведем тот факт, что глава правительства Дагестана Хисри Шихсаидов для апробации некоторых решений ездил к наиболее авторитетному шейху Саиду Чиркейскому. Местные муфтии, а также тарикатские лидеры действовали в союзе со светской администрацией, добиваясь запрета деятельности «ваххабитских организаций». Итогом их общих усилий стало принятие в 1999 году в Дагестане закона «О запрете ваххабитской и иной экстремистской деятельности на территории Республики Дагестан». Схожие документы были приняты и в некоторых других республиках. Руководители Северного Кавказа лоббировали принятие аналогичного решения на федеральном уровне, но из этого ничего не вышло. (Несмотря на резкое неприятие исламского радикализма, в Москве все же сочли неуместным разбираться в том, кого можно, а кого невозможно считать мусульманином и отлучать от ислама.)
В 1999–2000 годах в борьбе между «ваххабитами» и коалицией, состоящей из институционного духовенства, тарикатистов и администрации, обозначился перелом. Большая часть «ваххабитских» джамаатов были разогнаны, подчинились требованиям властей; сократилась пропагандистская деятельность. Кроме того, после 11 сентября 2001 года российские власти резко ограничили, а то и попросту запретили деятельность на территории РФ большинства исламских организаций, которые, по мнению Кремля, способствовали активизации исламского радикализма.
Таким образом в начале наступившего века «ваххабизм» как политическая сила потерпел поражение, и на Северном Кавказе восторжествовал традиционный ислам. По мнению специалистов (в частности, одного из крупнейших знатоков ислама на Северном Кавказе Энвера Кисриева), уровень политизации религии в регионе снизился, и борьба между партиями, движениями, группами интересов ведется на сугубо «секулярном поле».
Вместе с тем нынешняя маргинализация «ваххабитов» и «ваххабизма» как исламского политического течения отнюдь не означает его полного исчезновения. Во-первых, сохраняется недовольство населения низким уровнем жизни, ростом имущественного неравенства, неспособностью властей изменить социальноэкономическую ситуацию, оголтелой коррупцией, и это недовольство вновь может принять религиозную форму. Во-вторых, несмотря на сильное давление, исламские радикалы сумели частично сохранить свои организационные структуры, которые законсервированы и пребывают в глубоком подполье. В-третьих, исламский радикализм подпитывается непрекращающимся конфликтом в Чечне. В-четвертых, потенциальному возрастанию религиозного радикализма способствует негативная реакция значительной части населения на войны в Афганистане и в Ираке, на непрекращающиеся попытки США и Европы, союзником которых выступает Россия, оказать давление на мусульманский мир.
Заметим, что мусульмане Центральной России, Поволжья, Сибири относятся к событиям в Ираке, Афганистане, на Ближнем Востоке менее болезненно, хотя их духовные лидеры и выступили с соответствующими осуждающими давление на ислам и мусульман заявлениями.
В связи с 11 сентября, войнами в Афганистане и Ираке многие предсказывали рост в России межконфессиональной и межэтнической напряженности. К тому же конец 2002-го — 2003 год был ознаменован активизацией деятельности террористов, феминизацией джихада. Несколько терактов с участием женщин состоялось в южных регионах России, а также в Москве. Некоторые аналитики сразу заявили, что «женские теракты» служат созданию государства ваххабитов. Звучит немного наивно. Тем не менее к подготовке самоубийц могли приложить руку «специалисты» из исламских экстремистских организаций, да и сам «почерк» террористов все более интернационализируется: некоторые теракты (на Ближнем Востоке и в России) как будто «сделаны» под копирку.
Следует отметить, что мусульмане России, в том числе на Северном Кавказе, испытывают дискомфорт от становящегося все более негативным отношения к исламу. Если вслушаться в выступления мусульманских политиков и имамов, то зачастую в них присутствует мотив самооправдания, стремление дистанцироваться от своих экстремистски настроенных единоверцев. Все это может привести к двум противоположным результатам — с одной стороны, к росту у мусульман комплекса неполноценности, зато с другой, напротив, к ощущению некоего гипертрофированного превосходства: боятся — значит уважают. Ходить в главных врагах Америки — почетно.
И все-таки даже чрезвычайные обстоятельства, в том числе рост «исламского терроризма», совместная борьба с которым некоторыми исламскими идеологами отождествляется с борьбой против ислама, реанимация идеи Сэмюэла Хантингтона о столкновении цивилизаций не вызвали среди российских мусульман роста радикальных настроений и не разрушили этноконфессионального консенсуса.
Россия подтверждает свой статус поликонфессионального государства, а ее руководство при всяком удобном случае подчеркивает, что наличие в России, находящейся на так называемом мусульмано-христианским пограничье, почти 20-миллионного мусульманского меньшинства, непосредственное соседство с мусульманскими странами и давние с ними связи позволяют говорить не просто о специфических российско-мусульманских отношениях, но также и о том, что Россия может быть признана своеобразной частью исламского мира. Свидетельством тому, например, стало сделанное в августе 2003 года российским президентом Владимиром Путиным во время его визита в Малайзию заявление о готовности РФ вступить в качестве наблюдателя в Организацию «Исламская конференция». Заявление это тотчас же было поддержано Советом муфтиев России, который рассчитывает, что членство РФ в ОИК будет иметь позитивное значение для российских мусульман. Все эти рассуждения покажутся кому-то слишком благодушными. Автору могут предъявить претензии в том, что, пользуясь выражением времен хрущевской «оттепели», он «лакирует» мусульманскую действительность. Suppose. Но, во-первых, прежние мои материалы отличались жесткостью, и речь в них в основном шла о конфликтной проблематике. Во-вторых, первые итоги исламского возрождения действительно в целом позитивны.
[1] Наследие. Специальный выпуск. Махачкала, 2003. С. 3.
[2] Газиева Г., Мельков С. Мусульманская умма в современном российском обществе: По материалам социологического исследования «Российские мусульмане. Кто они?», проведенного в 2001–2002 гг. на территории европейской части России. Москва, 2003. С. 21.
[3] Бабич И., Ярлыкапов А. Исламское возрождение в современной Кабардино-Балкарии. Москва, 2003. С. 113.