To unclench the vice

Twenty years ago, it was difficult to believe that Russia would not fully provide itself with grain, but it would also become a major exporter. With the annual needs of 65-70 million tons, we produce about 90 million on average. Basically, it is wheat, followed by barley, followed by a forage grain. Of course, a year does not have a year, in 2010, the crop was record-low over the past 12 years-61 million tons, and the maximum happened in the previous one, 2009-108 million tons.

It is important to note that we collect about the same amount as in the late 1980s, but from the squares, almost 40 % of the smaller ones. The maximum in the Russian Federation under grain was occupied in 1978 - 78 million hectares (at the same time a record harvest was harvested - 128 million tons), and this year - 48 million hectares. That is, the reserve of the Earth is huge. All 30 million hectares for cereals, of course, can not be returned-a lot is lost due to urbanization, it is economically impractical to grow bread somewhere, but you can return 20 million hectares, and it is not too difficult.

The largest reserve is in the Altai Territory, there are almost 7 million hectares that are sown before, now a little more than 4 million is used, and, say, everything is occupied from and to the Kuban.

A lot of unused land in Central Russia. This region has oily minuses and oily pluses. The amount of temperatures here is low, but this deficiency compensates for the presence of black zoom. We have the most in the world, they even go into the Moscow region. But in order to level the disadvantages and maximize the advantages, technologies are needed, but with them we do not care. All technological operations must meet the features of the climate. Chernozems can be less fertilized, but you need to have varieties specially displayed for low temperatures, sowing and cleaning must be carried out as soon as possible, and there is not enough equipment for this. We have a load on one combine - more than three hundred hectares, and the Americans have 150, in Europe - 130. Relatively low -fruit lands can also be returned to the circulation and conduct a cost -effective grain economy on them - modern technologies allow this. For example, the transition to zero soil processing gives a four -time savings of diesel fuel. In addition, with this technology, moisture in the soil is preserved, plus a mulching layer that nourishes the plants and protects them from frosts is formed on it. Another example: the use of the Concordian seeder of accurate sowing allows you to do one instead of four aisles - all chemistry and top dressing are applied along with seeds. The savings, however, such an unit costs about $ 300,000, is more expensive than the combine, and this is just a hinged equipment, it is still needed for it, and powerful, that is, again imported. But with a competent approach, investments are more than paying off. The state’s help is needed here, however, it focuses on budgetary support for the development of animal husbandry. Like, the country sits in excesses according to grain, so why stimulate it from the budget. Not thanks to, but contrary to the state, the grains restored production and mastered the world market, became large exporters. This is a very instructive story, it clearly shows how much people can do, who at least do not interfere.

State care

Ninety -second year - empty counters, newspapers write about impending hunger. And the Gaidar government decides to import 26.5 million tons of grain from America according to the intergovernmental program of commodity lending. And the 1992 crop was one of the largest - 106.8 million tons. Empty shelves were not because of the lack of grain, but for completely different reasons that we will not discuss here. But the problem with the supply began to be solved through imports, that is, in fact through intervention in the domestic market. These deliveries gave rise to a black hole in agriculture, since it was imported twenty -six and a half million tons with a large harvest and sharply fallen consumption brought down the market. It became unprofitable to plow, sowing, investments in the ground sharply decreased, production fell. In 1995-1996, only 63 and 69 million tons were collected, respectively, and more than 80 million tons were required, since the livestock was still holding, plus bakery were used irrationally. In 1996, we were faced with grain deficiency. He was covered due to imports. They took Argentine wheat, and through commercial channels, without any government. Prices took off to a record 240 dollars per ton. Today, the dollar would be all 500. At this price, the peasants had an incentive, and next year they have already collected 88 million tons, at that time a very large crop. At least 10 million tons of excess (export was zero) fell into the market, and prices fell again. The reaction of the peasants is understandable - they sowed less, and then there is a drought. As a result, in 1998, we received 47.8 million tons-a minimum crop over the past decades. The government decided to purchase the so -called “humanitarian aid”, which the wholesalers received either at a relatively low fixed price if supplies were carried out through the distribution mechanism, or at the price set through the competition, but with a limited access to the participants, which almost always guaranteed its lower level in relation to the market. And again, the country turned out to be littered with imports, only now not just grain, but also with food: “Bush legs”, dry milk, etc. Here, the manufacturer has disappeared all sorts of incentives. Only in 2000 it was possible to convince the government that food humanitarian interventions are destroying our agriculture and they must be stopped. And immediately the rise went. In 2001, a good harvest was harvested-85 million tons, and in the next-86 million. When consuming in seventy and a small millions, tremendous surpluses arose, which naturally squeezed out onto the external market. In 2002, wheat exports almost from scratch grew up immediately to 17.6 million tons. We made our way to the market thanks to dumping. But the cost allowed to sell quite cheaply, maintaining internal incentives for production. Since then, Russia has become a system exporter, constantly raising crops. More recently, the average gross fee of 90 million tons seemed to be fantastic, and today it is a reality.

In the first half of the two thousandth, the state intervened in the grain market only episodically, conducting procurement interventions so that the price did not fall too much, which in the general effect gives a slight one. When the global food crisis began, the state decided to limit the growth of domestic prices and in 2008 introduced duties for export. Some surplus as a result remained on the domestic market. And here is a large (108 million tons) crop of 2009. The country was littered with bread, and domestic prices collapsed as much as 3 times! The peasants again lost their incentives and in the next 2010 they sowed little, moreover-the trouble did not come alone-the drought happened, the crop was collected low, and the state, frightened that the grains would not be enough, introduced the embargo for export. Without an embargo, the prices would increase, and this would partly compensate the peasants with losses due to low harvest, and the price was lower than the world for $ 100 per ton, and the losses of grains amounted to no less than 114 billion rubles. True, assistance in the amount of 45 billion was allocated from the budget, but of which the peasants actually got less than half. In general, practice shows that whenever the state intervened in the market, it went out sideways. But it should create incentives, and then we can realize our natural potential, which is huge. The peasant from the state needs three things: a normal sales economy, access to financial resources, that is, loans at an acceptable interest, and stability, and then he will do everything himself. The main thing, of course, is the sales economy. The market should not fall below the minimum profitability. There are enough tools to maintain it. These are interventions and regulation of intersectoral proportions. We have industrial inflation this year is planned at 16 %, and the total - below 8 %. This means that the costs in industry are compensated by the agricultural sector - the cost of agricultural products is increased, and the sale price is not, it is through commodity interventions, export restrictions, not to mention the constant pressure of regional administrations and the antimonopoly service, the state is in every possible way to protect the low -income segments of the population. But social issues should be resolved not at the expense of the peasants, but through social programs to help the poor. In addition, when you hold prices, you actually subside the rich.

Varieties and cars

The state has traditionally been engaged in the scientific support of the agricultural sector. Today, private science developments are conducted by private companies. Naturally, they act in their own commercial interests. The fundamental science on which the applied is based on is still financed by the state, and it is concentrated in the institutes of the Rosselchocademy. But if, for example, to take seed production, then scientists there are not engaged in the removal of new varieties, but by production on the basis of experimental farms and subordinate territories of the Academy of Commodity Parties of seeds, that is, a business. And all because copyrights are not respected in the country - in theory, business should receive new varieties from breeders, produce seeds as goods, sell them and pay royalties to breeders. But he does not. That is, selection is activity, today economically unprofitable. You can, of course, buy new varieties abroad. This is widely practiced with corn, since Western varieties are much better than ours. But with wheat, the main grain culture we have, the reverse picture. Our varieties are superior to Western. In addition, our country is huge, with very different conditions, and Western companies-seed producers will not occur to the head there to be zone there for Russia. So you don’t want to - you need to have your own selection. Now this work is very sluggish, and we mainly use the varieties bred back in the USSR.

Partly the same happens with technology. Even if the farm is able to buy Western, which is much more productive and reliable, it cannot always do it. In the West, combines are not produced for 10-15 centners per hectare. All these “John Dira” and “Claas” are indispensable if you collect from thirty centners and higher. Otherwise, using them is simply ineffective. That is, our developments are needed, and domestic manufacturers are gradually mastering this niche - they improve quality, create new samples. They are still inferior to the Western, but the progress is significant. It is understandable, today the peasant buys our technique only if he does not have money for imported or imported is not suitable for his conditions. After all, the combine that has broken in the field, and this happens constantly with ours, is, in addition to spare parts that are roads, also time, that is, non -compliance with the optimal cleaning time, and here the losses can be very large, significantly exceeding the purchase of cheaper domestic equipment. By the way, Western firms are now actively setting up the assembly of their agricultural vehicles in Russia (Klaas in the Kuban produces 1000 combines a year plus the tractor, attachment equipment, etc. Holland ”collects in the Naberezhnye Chelny;“ Amazon ”in Samara - sector sowing and equipment for soil -saving technologies;“ Kverneland ”in Lipetsk - sowing cars, cultivators in Golitsyno - tractors, plus in Bashkiria, 600 The combines and another 300 - with other partners) - the situation is exactly the same as with cars.

Big, medium, small

The grain is grown in our farms of a different scale. Large and medium -sized are, as a rule, former collective farms transformed into joint -stock companies in various forms. There are approximately 28 thousand of them (the average dumped 5-6 thousand hectares), and they produce approximately 80 % of grain. There are several large holdings of half a million hectares and more. Those who have about 300 thousand, dozens. The total large farms with over 100 thousand hectares of arable land are processed about seven million hectares. That is, their share in the total land resource is insignificant, less than 10 %. Moreover, of these 10 %, only part is sown with grain. Back in the country, 260 thousand farmers are registered, of which 120 thousand really work. They give the remaining 20 % of grain. These are mainly small manufacturers, however, there are those who have 15 thousand hectares, of course, not their own, but mainly rented land.

As for efficiency, at first glance, large farms should win in this regard. The consolidation of technology, resources in one hand allows you to build optimal logistics-both production and setting, save due to the effect of scale, but de facto does not happen. There is no such dependence: the larger the holding, the more effective it is. Perhaps the point here is that almost all the holdings of the Earth are scattered - their fields are interspersed with strangers. Moreover, these lands can be in different areas and even in different regions of the country - for example, in Siberia and in the Tambov region, and all this is one holding. Try to transfer the equipment in such conditions.

The cause of the pierce is the lack of a civilized land market in the country. And he did not form because we privatized the land through the subsidiary. They were introduced as a temporary measure, and next year their action ends, but so far the state does not lead any preparatory work (and its scale) to the transition from shares to specific land property. Today the situation is as follows: let's say, I have 10 hectares. In principle, I can sell it, but how to determine the price if this site is unknown where it is? The buyer knows no quality of the earth, no guarantees that when the site is specifically allocated, he will not, for example, in the center of the large field - how to drive the equipment to it through other people's sections? In other words, in such conditions, I will not receive a normal price for my share. It is no accident that now the main business on Earth as a resource is not done on its processing, effective use, but on capitalization. I bought rations cheaply, consolidated them, allocated in kind, put the documents in order. The price of such a legally pure large continuous plot increases sharply, especially if it can be removed from the category of agricultural land, and it can be sold with great benefit.

Infrastructure

It is not enough to produce grain, it must still be preserved and delivered to the consumer. We inherited from the Soviet Union not adequate storage system adequate to market conditions. Grain was produced in some regions, transported to the places of consumption and stored there. Now everything is stored in places of production (since there is no planned distribution, and when and to whom the grain will not be sold, the manufacturer cannot know in advance), and there, of course, there is a lack of storage capacities, and in places of consumption - excess (we note that the services of unloaded enterprises are much more expensive). Moreover, even those capacities that are in the regions do not belong to manufacturers, and they cannot influence the cost of services. In addition, it is no secret that elevators often deceive the peasants, underestimating weight and quality when taking grain. Without the help of the state, these problems cannot be quickly solved - it should more rigidly control the elevators and support agricultural producers through the budget who create their own storage facilities.

Do not solve without the help of the state and the problem of transportation. We have a huge territory, and transportation is very expensive. We cannot compete in the foreign market in conditions when it is necessary to deliver grain from Siberia to the port on the Black Sea in a complete tariff. Construction specifically in the calculation of Siberia, with its huge potential, the terminal in the Far East will also not solve all problems - as to the Black Sea, that the same 5000 kilometers to the Pacific Ocean. This year in Siberia, drought, excesses that must be sold abroad will not be, and the transport problem is not too acute. But if it does not solve it, if a good harvest happens, the surpluses will remain inside the country, since it will not work to compete in the foreign market at the current prices for transportation, and grain prices will fall. And this means a reduction in the sown area, that is, the natural resource base that the country has.

Before Russia entered the WTO, the transport problem was solved as follows: the Russian grain union sent an application to the Federal Service for Tariffs (FST) every year, and it set for Siberia and the Far East the so -called exceptional tariff with compensation for the income of Russian railways from the state budget or by increasing the volume of transportation. Now we do not have such an opportunity, since this is a direct subsidization of the agricultural producer. But you can go the other way-change the current tariff 10-01. Поскольку новый тариф будет действовать для всех, то ограничения ВТО снимаются. Мы предлагаем стоимость любых перевозок на короткие расстояния оставить на нынешнем уровне, а на длинные установить понижающий коэффициент. ФСТ сейчас обсчитывает два варианта: до 3000 км действует старый тариф 10-01, а свыше этого расстояния вводится понижающий коэффициент 0,17. Либо до 2500 км вводится повышающий коэффициент 1,04, а свыше — 0,12. На наш взгляд, целесообразно делать разбиение более мелким, скажем, до 1,5 тыс. — действующий тариф, свыше 1,5 тыс. до 2 тыс. — понижающий коэффициент 0,8, еще на 500 км — 0,6 и так далее... Снижение тарифа автоматически повысит объем перевозок, и доходы РЖД не упадут. Нам на это говорят: «Дайте объемы, тогда мы снизим тариф». Но как мы можем дать объемы при таких тарифах! Разговор по принципу: что сначала, курица или яйцо?

Жупел ВТО

На примере перевозок видно, что ВТО в каких-то вещах связывает руки, но зато заставляет решать проблему комплексно, а не путем затыкания дыр. Сейчас плач стоит — с ВТО мы потеряем наше сельское хозяйство. На самом деле ничего мы не потеряем. Трудности возникнут — скажем, в пределах квоты вводится нулевая пошлина на ввоз свинины, а на живых свиней ставка с 40 % снижается до 5 %, — но проблемы отнюдь не так серьезны, как их рисуют, а преимущества, которые может получить российский аграрный сектор, очень большие. Вопрос в том, чтобы их реализовать.

Противники ВТО твердят, что мы теперь вынуждены будем снизить уровень государственной поддержки сельского хозяйства. In fact, this is not so. Сегодняшнее ограничение в 9 млрд долларов в год вообще никакой роли не играет, поскольку мы сейчас тратим лишь 5 млрд с небольшим. Правда, к 2018 году разрешенный уровень поддержки снизится до 4,4 млрд, но не надо забывать, что это касается только прямых субсидий, к примеру, на удобрения. Никто не запрещает направлять государственные средства на то, что называется «поддержкой доходов сельхозпроизводителя» — здесь вообще никаких ограничений нет. Уже сейчас в государственной программе на 2013 год заложено 15 млрд рублей (и это только одно из направлений помощи) на погектарные субсидии с расширением этой программы к 2020 году до 37 млрд. Деньги, которые раньше крестьяне получали в виде субсидий на закупленные удобрения или экономили на поставках льготного топлива, теперь попадут к ним в виде погектарных выплат. Обработал пашню, провел необходимые мероприятия с землей, все условия выполнил — тебе государство выплатит за каждый гектар определенную сумму. То есть в отличие от субсидий такая система способствует улучшению земли.

Механизм ВТО может очень помочь нашим аграриям в глобальной конкуренции. Скажем, мы не получили право на экспортное субсидирование, то есть на государственное стимулирование экспорта. Не получили не из-за какой-то там дискриминации, а потому что никогда такого стимулирования не применяли. А Казахстан применял — там платили 40 долларов за тонну компенсации железнодорожных расходов при экспорте. Теперь же в рамках ВТО мы можем потребовать — и уже потребовали вместе с еще несколькими странами — выровнять условия конкуренции, то есть запретить экспортное субсидирование вообще.

Другой пример: сегодня мы поставляем сельхозпродукцию в Евросоюз в рамках общей для стран Причерноморской зоны бывшего Советского Союза квоты. Иными словами, мы вынуждены внутри этой квоты конкурировать с Украиной и Казахстаном. Теперь же Россия, как член ВТО, может добиваться отдельной страновой квоты.

Но самое главное — членство в ВТО поможет аграрному сектору избавиться от многих застарелых болезней. Например, от колоссальной закредитованности. Она возникла из-за тех самых экономических тисков: издержки растут, а цены на сельхозпродукцию сдерживаются. В результате хозяйства не имеют возможности не только погашать, но даже обслуживать кредиты. И государство их периодически пролонгирует. В 2010 году пролонгировали на три года, в тринадцатом году история скорее всего повторится.

У нас уже в менталитете закрепилось решать проблему либо списыванием долгов, либо реструктуризацией. Но по правилам ВТО это не что иное, как бюджетная накачка, которая строго лимитирована. У аграриев к настоящему времени накопилось 400 млрд руб. просроченной задолженности, что значительно больше 9 млрд долларов, которые разрешено направить из бюджета. То есть мы не можем с помощью старых инструментов эту проблему решить. Придется лечить не симптомы, а саму болезнь. И это самый жирный плюс, который дает вступление в ВТО.

Лекарств есть несколько: можно «похоронить» должников, то есть заставить работать закон о банкротстве, но на это никто не пойдет, поскольку у нас почти 50 % сельхозпредприятий ходят в должниках, и если даже треть из них провести через санацию, то множество селян останутся без работы. Можно «похоронить» банкиров, которые эти долги держат: Россельхозбанк, Сбербанк, Газпромбанк, ВЭБ, ВТБ. Но кто будет хоронить банкиров?

И есть еще вариант — разжать тиски. И даже не обязательно делать это с двух сторон, можно и с одной. Именно к этому нас принуждает ВТО. Либо отпустите цены — и мы уже видим, что после вступления в ВТО цены на зерно государство перестало «трамбовать», то есть разжимаются потихонечку тиски, — либо умерьте аппетиты естественных монополий. А дальше экономика сама сработает, и обслужить кредиты крестьяне смогут, и погасить, и в плюсе остаться.