Another seminar was held at the Carnegie Moscow Center as part of the “Religion, Society and Security” program. The report “Legends and myths of Russian history: the historical policy of the Russian Orthodox Church at the beginning of the 21st century” was made by Oleg Morozov, a graduate student of the Faculty of History of the National Research University Higher School of Economics .
The leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, the speaker noted, in the situation of ideological uncertainty that has developed in the post-Soviet period, is doing a lot to create a version of the national past acceptable to the majority of citizens and, on its basis, to form values that strengthen the system of social relations and the authority of the ruling circles. By church leadership, in this case, the researcher understands a certain circle of people whose public position stands out from the rest of the clergy: first of all, these are Patriarchs Alexy II and Kirill, Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeev), Archpriests Vsevolod Chaplin and Dmitry Smirnov, Archimandrite Tikhon (Shevkunov) , with reservations - Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev and others.
The historical views of church leadership began to take shape into a single whole in the early 2000s. However, the rhetoric of officials disseminated through the media leaves in people’s memory rather than facts and events, but rather intonations and pale outlines. Historical memory is fragmentary. Ideas about the past are, essentially, ideas about its individual events, turning points in the history of a nation. In most cases, historical politics works for an agenda that is relevant to society and government. Such attempts, the researcher believes, on the one hand, transfer political problems to the historical level, but on the other hand, they equate history with politics, vulgarize and simplify historical knowledge, making it a servant of the pragmatic interests of those in power.
It is significant that options for popular unanimity acceptable to the church can be realized only in the presence of a general threat, the speaker noted. An enemy must appear on the scene, in the face of which it is necessary to demonstrate unity. Here the church directly follows the Russian government, which loves to exploit the concept of Russia as a “surrounded fortress.” The confrontation between Russia and the West as two civilizational projects forms the basis of the historical concept of the Orthodox Church. The establishment of National Unity Day in 2004 is one of the stages in the implementation of this concept, which had tangible consequences: there was an increase in anti-Western sentiment in society and the mobilization of nationalist groups. The Russian Orthodox Church represents the West as the center of ideas of liberalism and secularism hostile to Russian culture, forging from it a disastrous alternative to Russia’s “special path.”
The quasi-historical concept of “Holy Rus'”, widespread in the discourse of church leadership, is proclaimed as an ideal. "Holy Rus'" is not tied to a specific chronological and political context. Most often, it is a metaphor for a streamlined mythological past, incorporating both historical and religious content - which remains a mystery to everyone, Oleg Morozov emphasized. We see only some heroic images on the pedestal. One of these collective figures was Prince Alexander Nevsky. Moreover, holiness here acts not as a moral dignity that leads a person to salvation, but as a means of fixing historical images and forming the myth of “Holy Rus'”.
The church's attitude towards the Soviet past is quite contradictory. The Soviet government then appears in the image of an executioner and desecrator of Orthodox shrines (post-revolutionary and Khrushchev repressions), and then the church takes the position of a victim - very comfortable for the patriarchy, since it protects against attacks from public opinion and “blasphemers”. On the other hand, the church leadership does not miss the opportunity to talk about the need for historical “objectivity”, trying to find the bright pages of Soviet history right up to the actions of Stalin. Both discourses are mutually exclusive in meaning. Their combination easily explains why over the past twenty years the Russian Orthodox Church has not been able to dissociate itself from Soviet labels even at a formal level: the exploited image of the victim contrasts too much with the search for historical “objectivity”, in which the church, albeit partially, still identifies itself with the persecutors . Overcoming this contradiction and open participation in de-Sovietization would put the church in opposition to the state, which it cannot afford, the speaker concluded.
The discussion that followed the report concerned mainly the question of the independence of the church in creating its historical concept, the extent to which this is really the concept of the church, and not its individual representatives, and also the extent to which the concept corresponds to the collective unconscious - in fact, some speakers noted, church mythology in in many ways repeats the widespread mythologies of public consciousness, in which the Soviet past has by no means been overcome.