In uniform

Singing the dregs

June 2, 2011 Vasily Zatsepin

The last week was marked by noticeable events in the Russian military-industrial policy. On Tuesday, May 10, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held a meeting on the development of the defense industry complex (OPC), on Friday of the 13th Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov-chairman of the military-industrial commission (VPK) under the government-made a government-closed report on the situation in the OPC as part of the government hour, after which on the Tuesday on May 17 on May 17 on May 17 on May 17 He reported to the president on the fulfillment of an order on the liability of officials of the defense industry and the Ministry of Defense.

The meeting in the hills was supposed to be the same analysis of “flights with the definition of those responsible both from industry and from government structures”, promised by D. Medvedev on March 18 at the expanded collegium of the Ministry of Defense. And despite the fact that the participants in the meeting were not immediately determined, it should be indicated at the following important points in the president’s speech: firstly, he stated that the state-owned assignment state’s state program adopted at the end of last year was scheduled four times more than the previous one, and, secondly, he recognized that we had “in many ways-complete dregs”.

It should be noted that in the first case, the president’s assessment diverges to a certain extent with the assessment of the government, with the light hand of the same Sergei Ivanov, who was established as official: according to the Prime-Tass agency, at a meeting of the military-industrial complex on December 8, 2010 it was declared that it was supposed to allocate about three times more funds compared to the previous one. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who was normently hesitated, repeated this assessment on March 21 in Votkinsk at a meeting on the implementation of the state weapons program for 2011-2010. And on April 20, speaking with the report of the Government of the Russian Federation on the results of its activities for 2010 in the State Duma. It is clear that the president’s assessment is much closer to the truth if the growth of allocations with 4.9 trillion rubles is declared. up to 21.5 trillion. Although it should be noted that in terms of the program of weapons of the Ministry of Defense, an increase of almost five times is planned - more precisely, 4.9 times: from 4 trillion rubles. up to 19.5 trillion.

Why the government needed to actually engage in misinformation for five months is difficult to say. It is possible that it is simply not customary to pay attention to such trifles in our government (Russia, as you know, “not to measure a common arshin”) and/or this is a simple arithmetic error. But it is very likely that the use of such “statistics” to a certain extent provided the successful, from the point of view of the Russian military-industrial complex, approval of the state program for the president: who knows how to react to the new weapons program and personally Vladimir Putin with his fear of large numbers, he knows about five-fold growth, and not three times ...

In this regard, the “complete turbidity” noticed by President Medvedev acquires special meaning and meaning. However, if you try to look for the answer to the question of the nature of this muti, it turns out that it is the direct result of the actions of the Russian state power, the same president and government.

In this sense, in this sense, the statement by Dmitry Medvedev’s weapons of the weapons for 2011-2020, it became known about this fact only at the end of February, when Deputy Minister of Defense Vladimir Popovkin announced at a meeting with reporters on the 24th that the program was approved by the president on December 31 last year, which became a perfect surprise for most of them, because Their reliable sources in the Ministry of Defense throughout January claimed that this did not happen.

What forced the Russian authorities to hide the fact of approving the weapons program worth more than 20 trillion rubles. For almost two months, it’s hard to say. The reference to the secret nature of the decree seems to be unabled, since there is an official practice of publishing extracts, presentations and simply reports about the fact of signing closed documents. It is possible that in fact, this program was signed in the early days of January retroactively, so as not to repeat errors with the signing of the two previous programs, when incomprehensible pauses reached 10-12 months before their approval, which prevented the weapons production contracts in time. This version is indirectly evidenced by the statement of the member of the State Duma Committee Mikhail Nenashev, who was made by him at the morning plenary meeting of the Russian parliament on January 14, 2011: “The other day, the President of Russia approved the State Arms Program until 2020 and the relevant decree of the Russian Government on the implementation of the state defense order” - if we agree with the fact that the other day, this is by no means. "Two weeks ago."

Unfortunately, due to the features of Russian parliamentary journalism, Necashev’s information did not cross the threshold of the meeting hall and did not fall into the seal, which ensured the preservation of the “obvious muti” in such a simple issue for almost two months. Nevertheless, it is clear that the actual source of this muti is in another place.

The experience of previous weapons programs showed that attempts by delaying the moment of signing them to improve the quality of their development do not lead to anything - feverishly “modified” programs are still not implemented. The reason for this is in the special nature of domestic software-targeted planning, very muddy, what is already hiding here. Any court, if, of course, it is not fable, justifies the developers of our weapons for their non -compliance, considering the guilt of the attempt with worthless means - Russian state weapons programs are basically impossible.

This fact somehow continues to elude understanding of the interested public, possibly due to a unique combination of ten-year depth (or horizon) of planning with a five-year period adopted from Soviet times for our programs. The fundamental inoperability of this mechanism is much more understandable when moving to a smaller temporary period, for example, to a two -year program reviewed annually - it is clear that by the time the first conditional program was planned two years ago, it will be replaced by another option, which, in turn, is also doomed to failure by the very logic of the process.

In the wide and professional press, unfortunately, the opinion often sounds that the new weapons program is adopted as a result of the failure of the old one, which is completely wrong - the new program is accepted because the time has come to accept it: in Russia it is necessary to accept the weapons program every five years. And since the development of a new program begins a few years before the end of the first half of the predecessor, the developers actually do not have the opportunity to take into account the results of its performance. As this affects the quality of Russian weapons programs, it seems that it is not necessary to explain - the results are visible to the naked eye, despite the traditional curtain of state secrets. Perhaps this is another reason why our authorities considered it appropriate not to attract attention to the fact of the approval of the new state program of weapons - under the current conditions, this may well damage the political rating.

In the aspect of expediency or goal -setting, a new weapons program, unfortunately, is also quite muddy. As you know, its main target indicator is the share of new equipment in the armed forces, which by 2016 should amount to 30%, and by 2020 - 70%. The validity of these indicators, not to mention the possibility of achieving them, looks very doubtful if you take into account the words of the then deputy Minister of Defense Vladimir Popovkin, who said in an interview with the “military-industrial courier” on March 2 and the Izvestia on March 11 , which in Russia “[d] Olya of modern weapons and military equipment in strategic nuclear forces is about 20%, and in terms of total forces purpose does not exceed 10%. For comparison: in the armies of the leading foreign states, this share is 30-50%. ”

If his data on the situation in the armies of the leading countries of the world is correct, then it turns out that by 2016 Russia will have to reach their level, and by 2020 - significantly surpass it. Apparently, none of the developers of the Russian weapons program for 2011–2020. And the state officials who pushed it or affirming it did not have a simple question: why, nevertheless, in the leading countries of the world, the share of new weapons and military equipment does not exceed 50%? And will Russia turn out in its semi -craft race for these 70% taken from the ceiling by 2020?

By the way, it is appropriate to remind you that the departmental body of the Ministry of Defense press last December went much further and argued that the Ministry of the Ministry of the Russian Federation “aimed at the implementation of the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation to bring the share of modern weapons to 2015 to 30%, and by 2020 - up to 70-100%”, which will allow armed forces to neutralize any military threats of the Russian Federation and become real A state instrument of active policy in the zones of its priority interests. ”

The disciplinary measures unprecedented in recent Russian history against a number of directors of the largest defense industry enterprises and military officials of the Ministry of Defense for disrupting the implementation of the 2010 state defense order - an urgent step in the right direction, but completely insufficient. The whole system needs to be changed - muddy to transparent.

Author - employee of the Institute of Economic Policy named after E. Gaidar

Photos of RIA Novosti