Sequestration of ambitions

Anti-Americanism is becoming an obligatory component of Russian foreign policy consciousness. There are many reasons for this - both objective and subjective.

The objective fact is that even the most devoted friend of the United States is unlikely to find arguments in favor of the outgoing White House administration today. George W. Bush rightfully claims to be the worst president in the history of the country, and the financial collapse that occurred at the end of his reign marked a symbolic end to political history. It is difficult to find a direction in which Bush would achieve a positive result.

Without diminishing the “merits” of the current president, it should be noted that the roots of the current crisis in American politics go back to the period before the accession of the neoconservatives. Victory in the Cold War was somewhat unexpected for Washington. In retrospect, the United States was not fully prepared intellectually for the burden of global leadership that fell upon it as a result of its rival's capitulation. And the preconditions for today’s impasse were laid precisely then, during the triumphant march of the Western idea around the world from the late 1980s to the late 1990s. The lack of an adequate policy towards Russia since the collapse of the USSR is only one element of the general palette.

At the same time, there is, of course, a very large emotional component in Russian rejection of America. The underlying desire to take revenge for defeat in a half-century of ideological confrontation and to avenge the arrogance shown by the winner after that is present in almost every domestic discussion about the United States.

Moscow is not capable of treating Washington the way, for example, Beijing does - without sympathy, with caution and an understanding of the real importance of balanced relations. Through the Russian analysis of the world situation, often quite sound, the desire to prove one’s historical rightness in a dispute with a geopolitical rival inevitably shines through. Remind him again and again of his responsibility for what is happening, including his own “insignificance” in the face of the menacingly growing world of “new centers of power.”

Among the most dangerous illusions is the following: the world is tired of American hegemony, and those who clearly and clearly declare their rejection of it are guaranteed the support of the majority of humanity.

There is no doubt that the dominance of the United States is not liked by the majority of the world's population and is a burden even to close allies. But this does not mean that all these countries and peoples are ready to stand under the anti-American banner and move together in the direction of a new world order. The most intensively developing countries on the planet - primarily in South, East and Southeast Asia - have taken advantage of the benefits that economic globalization has provided. And its potential for stimulating the growth of developing countries has not been exhausted. Moreover, they are threatened not by the continuation of “Western-style” globalization, but by a possible surge of protectionism in the developed world as a consequence of the outbreak of the financial crisis. At the same time, the United States is likely to remain committed to free trade, while Europe is much more inclined to protect its own markets.

A potential country that could at some point challenge American dominance is China. But now no one is more interested than Beijing in avoiding a “hard landing” of the US economy - the Asian “dragons” and “tigers” will lose too much without the American sales market.

Politically, the financial crisis is likely to stimulate the process of institutional restructuring of the world system. Russia has long insisted on this, rightly pointing out that the existing model of global governance has outlived its usefulness. The question, however, is what direction this restructuring will take.

The actual expansion of what is now called the G8 is inevitable. The upcoming G20 meeting in Washington in November is the first step in this direction. In the G8, Russia played a special role, giving the meeting additional legitimacy and acting as a conductor of the position of the non-Western world. But if this non-Western world, represented by China, India and a dozen other countries, is itself presented in a new format, the importance of Moscow will decrease. Moreover, in economic terms, Beijing weighs incomparably more. By the way, from the point of view of free trade, the importance of which will be emphasized by developing participants, Russia belongs to another camp - the continental European one, that is, the one that is most skeptical about the removal of barriers.

The financial crisis may have an unexpected consequence - the formation of an informal Washington-Beijing alliance, which will be based on the coincidence of certain interests.

First, there is a high degree of mutual dependence: the American market is important for Chinese manufacturers, and Chinese foreign exchange reserves are important for the stability of the US financial system.

Secondly, as a number of researchers in both America and China believe, a peaceful and smooth transformation of the existing system of global governance is possible precisely on the basis of American-Chinese rapprochement, and not on the basis, for example, of strengthening the transatlantic alliance (see League of Democracies according to John McCain) in defiance of the rest of the world.

In this entire new configuration, open anti-Americanism is capable of attracting Moscow the sympathy of those countries that are in deep conflict with the United States. However, the political weight of these states is clearly insufficient to create a serious bloc, moreover, the influence of many of them depends on the raw material situation (primarily Venezuela and Iran), accordingly, for the foreseeable period it will decrease, as will the capabilities of Russia itself.

Another factor is the departure of the Bush administration. Barack Obama's victory is very likely, and this will mean that the environment of American power will seriously change. At first, Obama is guaranteed political dividends only because he is not George Bush. Calls for updating foreign policy, restoring respectful relations with allies, attempting dialogue with opponents, and relying on multilateral approaches are popular around the world. You shouldn't expect miracles from Obama's presidency, but the atmosphere around America will somewhat defuse.

The global fashion for collective action (or at least discussion) seems to be returning, so the Russian desire for “free hands,” borrowed from the United States, may be at odds with the general trend.

There is hardly anything that will make the Russian establishment fall in love with the United States, and there is no such goal. However, the changing situation should be taken into account. Moscow needs a pragmatic course towards Washington, based on avoiding unnecessary confrontation, since it cannot count on anyone’s active support. The financial crisis will force all states to sequester ambitions and determine priorities. For Russia they are obvious - Eurasia and Europe. But plans to revive ties with all countries that were considered friends and clients of the USSR are unlikely to be realized in the new conditions.

Russia’s main task for the coming years is to take its rightful place in the world system that will inevitably replace the current one, which is in crisis. Relations with the United States will remain a key element of Moscow’s positioning on the world stage, where the configuration of forces will become more complex. Perhaps, as this complexity increases, some (certainly not all) of the current Russian-American contradictions, which seem existential, will find a mutually acceptable resolution.

The author is the editor-in-chief of the magazine “Russia in Global Affairs”