Alexey Grekov. Second front against Russia

Second front against Russia
Alexey Grekov

Publication date: August 14, 2000

Reports from Russian publications in connection with the invasion of Uzbek militants into the territory of Uzbekistan, and now into the south of Kyrgyzstan, are so varied and contradictory that it is not clear what the nature and content of this armed clash is: whether it is an “Uzbek-Tajik” conflict, or Muslim extremists invaded, infiltrated into the territory of Uzbekistan, and now also Kyrgyzstan, either IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) militants, or unknown armed persons came in transit through Tajikistan, or even directly from Afghanistan across the Afghan-Uzbek border... Complete confusion! Apparently, also because neither Tashkent nor Bishkek allow journalists to go to the sites of hostilities... Let’s try to figure out what happened together with an employee of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a researcher of the problems of Afghanistan, Doctor of Sciences Viktor Kargun.

Alexey Grekov: Viktor Grigorievich, the Russian Federation is one of the main progenitors of the CST (Collective Security Treaty) of the CIS states. Thus, Russia assumed certain obligations to provide military-technical assistance in the event of a threat to the security of the member states of the Treaty. The leaders of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have repeatedly expressed confidence that the Russian Federation will not leave these countries alone with trouble. President Islam Karimov, during the last visit of Russian President V. Putin to Tashkent, was more than frank, saying that Russia is the only country that can help Uzbekistan in difficult times... And yet, why, in your opinion, the top leadership The Russian Federation, I would say, reacts rather sluggishly to events of such an extreme nature as the armed confrontation between IMU militants and the government forces of Uzbekistan, and now Kyrgyzstan? What is the reason?

Victor Kargun: First of all, I should note that, apparently, the leadership of the Russian Federation is monitoring the events in the south and northeast of Uzbekistan, and now in the south of Kyrgyzstan, but, most likely, it does not have complete, comprehensive, objective information , in order to conduct a thorough analysis of what is happening and then draw appropriate conclusions. These events are fresh, sudden, quite unexpected; only a few days have passed, and therefore, it was probably not possible to react to them with the same speed. However, I emphasize that as soon as Moscow receives reliable information about what is happening, first-hand information, its reaction will follow immediately. After all, these are precisely the issues of combating international terrorism and certainly the problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan through the countries of Central Asia and further to Russia and the West.

A.G.: How do you assess the current invasion in comparison with last year’s summer “campaign” of militants in Batkent in southern Kyrgyzstan? What changed?

V.K.: This time the government forces of both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were on alert. Clearer operational interaction has been established between the border troops, law enforcement agencies of Tajikistan and the relevant structures of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Although at the beginning of the events there were accusations from Tashkent against Dushanbe that supposedly “certain forces” in Tajikistan were almost involved in the invasion of gangs into the territory of Uzbekistan, and now into the south of Kyrgyzstan. All this noisy suspicion and unfounded accusations will not lead to anything good. It would be much more useful to coordinate actions and, perhaps, even conduct joint operations by the security forces of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan against armed groups of IMU militants. But this time the Uzbek militants prepared quite thoroughly. They are better equipped, armed with the latest weapons, including sniper rifles with silencers, night vision devices, mortars - in a word, everything necessary for waging guerrilla warfare and sabotage operations designed for a long time. But the tactics are the same, the same, Batkent, so to speak: the militants choose villages as a reliable shield, but this time without taking local residents hostage. Apparently they didn’t have time or it wasn’t part of their plans. Another characteristic is that the Uzbek fighters appear to have good knowledge of the terrain. This suggests that they devoted enough time to reconnaissance. This is also evidenced by the fact that they stayed in the blockade ring for four whole days and, as can be seen from the reports of the same official Uzbek sources, the militants were scattered into smaller groups and were not completely destroyed. If you believe official reports from Tashkent, a total of 15-16 people were killed. And this detail says a lot: the militants underwent special training. They prepared this operation for quite a long time and meticulously. We have developed all sorts of tactical options for conducting combat operations in high altitude conditions. The area was carefully studied. Problems of the local population and their state of mind, possible reactions. And one more important detail: it seems to me that the IMU militants did not leave anywhere from there, from the Surkhandarya region. Most likely, after last year’s defeat in Batkend, in the south of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbek militants in small groups, or even alone, began to concentrate in the south and northeast of Uzbekistan. So the roots of the conflict need to be looked for in Uzbekistan, it will be, in any case, more honest, and not blame everything on a sore head, blaming Tajikistan for your problems. And another thing: apparently, the lessons of Batkent for the Uzbek militants were not in vain. They know who they will fight with, how they will fight, what capabilities and forces their enemy has. That is, if the Batkent “campaign” was a kind of dress rehearsal for the Uzbek militants, then the current operations on the territory of Uzbekistan have become their benefit.

A.G.: And yet, will Russia, if necessary, provide military assistance to Uzbekistan, and now Kyrgyzstan?

V.K.: It seems that Moscow is waiting for the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to take certain steps that they themselves conceived, planned, and considered appropriate. On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the fact that Uzbekistan is presenting this armed conflict as its purely internal issue, and not at all international in nature and content, although the militants have just the opposite: here is Bin Laden’s capital, and support for the Taliban in Afghanistan, and support from certain circles in Pakistan. In a word, it creates a whole international bouquet. Therefore, obviously, the testing hour has come for the CIS countries’ CST. Moreover, the “homeland” of this Treaty is not Moscow, but Tashkent. That is, the first step, especially at the military level, should be taken not by Russia, but by Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. As for Kyrgyzstan, in the recently signed Russian-Kyrgyz Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Alliance, the issue of providing military assistance in the event of a threat to the security of one of the parties is clearly and clearly described. Of course, it can be assumed that Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan themselves will be able to eliminate hotbeds of armed conflict, as stated in recent reports. Well, if the actions of Bishkek and Tashkent do not give positive results, then... Then the Russian Federation, being one of the guarantors of the peace process in Tajikistan and bearing certain obligations within the framework of the CST of the CIS states and within the same Treaty, can take the necessary measures. Moreover, preventive measures against the Taliban in Afghanistan have not yet been exhausted.

A.G.: What can you say about the synchronicity of the invasion of Uzbek militants into the territory of Uzbekistan, and now Kyrgyzstan, with the advance of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan?

V.K.: Their plans are clear as day. The developers of such “scenarios” need to open the so-called second Chechen front against Russia at all costs. If you want, let's call it a pit to drive the “Russian bear” into. A sort of trap to draw all the forces and resources of the Russian Federation into it as much as possible. With the same result: for Russia to leave this region forever. For now, this looks like a red herring. Bye. This is apparently what was intended by the developers of the Taliban’s military “successes” in northern Afghanistan. This, if you like, is a joint response to Moscow’s inaction, and perhaps to the lack of joint actions between Moscow and Washington. Why are such diversionary maneuvers like an armed conflict on the territory of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan needed?

Firstly, to destabilize the situation there, in these countries, to cause panic, confusion, confusion... And all this against the backdrop of a terrible drought and crop failure in the south of Uzbekistan...

Secondly, to cause tension in the newly warmed relations between Dushanbe and Tashkent. To drive a wedge of hostility and suspicion between them, so that Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan do not trust each other, and in crisis situations they cannot act together in a coordinated manner and, therefore, would be defeated individually.

Thirdly, to create an atmosphere of fear and hopelessness in Kazakhstan. To stir up the Uyghur problem there. Play the card of Kazakh-Uzbek territorial and border mutual claims. After all, as we see, no matter how much the Central Asian states strengthen their borders, they turn out to be quite transparent for militants.

And finally, fourthly: the goal of the developers of the scenario for the current armed conflicts in the south and northeast of Uzbekistan and the south of Kyrgyzstan is to drag Russia into a “big war in Central Asia” with the ensuing consequences. The bitter experience of the former USSR in Afghanistan is well known. Therefore, perhaps it is for the best that Uzbekistan does not ask for military assistance from Russia, but is trying to cope with a local conflict on its territory on its own. And maybe Kyrgyzstan will also cope on its own... It is very important here not to put out the fire, but to eliminate the very basis for the conflict. If not for good, then at least make it controllable, predictable, expected. Today, we can clearly recommend that the Center for Combating International Terrorism in the CIS countries get down to business. If terrorism and drug trafficking are international phenomena, then we need to fight them together. It may make sense to draw on the capabilities available in the United States. After all, they, like no one else, have a wealth of experience in cooperation with those whom today they themselves call international terrorists under different numbers.