Translated material
Oleg Khlevnyuk. About Davis
About Davis
Oleg Khlevnyuk
The state of correcting stereotypes as one becomes immersed in factual material is known to any historian. Even in cases where the general assessment of a process or phenomenon remains unchanged, knowledge of the details, as a rule, discourages the use of many established definitions and schemes. A detailed sequential examination of the entire chain of events allows us to see facts and phenomena that elude the eye with only one generalizing characteristic of the period. According to the famous English historian R.W. Davis 1 , despite the obvious strengthening of the repressive course and centralized control in 1931-1933, the main features of the emerging system cannot be described with the concepts of “administrative command”, “administrative repressive” (in modern Russian literature) or through Western interpretations: the totalitarian model or its opposites are technocratic interpretations.
According to Davis, the reality was different from any of the schemes mentioned. First, there was a significant influence of various Soviet leaders (both inside and outside the Politburo) and even directors of the largest enterprises on the development of economic policy. Secondly, in everyday practice, business managers and specialists were not just “cogs” of the system: to a certain extent, they had to become quasi-entrepreneurs, going beyond the established strict rules. Thirdly, the system of centralized control, the administrative and party machinery were in constant tension and their actions were subject to the destructive influence of various kinds of political campaigns. Ordinary citizens also limited the capabilities of the all-powerful state in their own way. Thus, the constant shortage of industrial personnel led to a certain independence of workers. Finally, the economic system was undergoing significant changes in both theory and practice. The acute crisis generated by the orientation toward a strictly centralized, cashless economy forced the authorities to show some flexibility and recognize the role of economic levers - in particular, material interest, commodity-money relations, and financial control. In the economy that had developed by the end of 1933, market and quasi-market elements, according to Davis, had already taken their place, albeit a subordinate one. An economic system of this type, the author believes, was preserved without much change. until the mid-80s .
Davis's new book continues his series of works on the economic history of the USSR . Having started in the 50s with the study of the Soviet budget system, Davis in 1969 published, in collaboration with E. Carr, a book dedicated to the development of the Soviet economy in 1926 - 1929. 2 Later, a priority for him, the author of numerous works, was a multi-volume study of the history of industrialization of Soviet Russia, which continued the research begun jointly with Carr. According to the author's plan, it is intended to cover the period from 1929 to 1937 (the first two five-year plans ). In the 1980s, his books about collectivization, Soviet collective farms and the industrial development of the country in 1929 - 1930 were published. 3
The main subject of study in the next, fourth volume of the series is the crisis that gripped the Stalinist system at the turn of the first and second five-year plans - more precisely, the industrial, urban component of this crisis.
Like other scientists of this level, Davis reconstructs the facts of events in the most detailed way, drawing on the widest possible range of sources. Within a three-year period, shorter stages are examined in detail, each of which marked a certain turn in economic policy. The subject of special attention of the author is the key “blocks” of the economic course of the early 30s, primarily the attempts at economic reforms (Davis calls them “mini-reforms”) in mid-1931 (changes in attitudes towards specialists, condemnation of equalization and wage differentiation, proclamation of self-financing one of the most important principles of management, etc.). The circumstances of the adoption of “reformist” decisions in the spring of 1932 were subjected to a detailed analysis: the proclamation of freedom of trade at prices prevailing on the market; attempts to intensify the production of consumer goods (including by lifting many restrictions on the activities of artisans); searching for ways to enhance economic incentives in large-scale industry (development of solutions that give enterprises the right to sell above-plan products on the market, discussions in the economic press about freeing prices in order to balance supply and demand, changing the order of investment in favor of self-sufficiency, etc.). Davis shows that such decisions were the authorities’ response to the critical situation in the country’s economy, but already in the second half of 1932, these inconsistent undertakings were overwhelmed by a wave of brutal repression, which became the main method of exiting the worsening crisis. Only from the middle of 1933, according to the author, the possibilities of a more balanced and relatively “moderate” course began to be seen. This new twist will be discussed in the next book...
Davis and his like-minded people share the opinion that ideological and political factors have a significant impact on the economy. 4 A new study confirms this idea, but demonstrates that there are actually several economic policy options that can lead to different results. In other words, recognition of the objective need for accelerated industrialization of the country does not mean at all that the methods by which this industrialization was carried out were objectively necessary and conditional.
While working on the fourth volume, “Industrialization of Soviet Russia,” the author first had the opportunity to write based on extensive archival materials. Davis was able to make real and fruitful use of the declassification of archives. However, he is a pragmatist when it comes to archives: he uses them as needed, without at all discarding published materials. “Working in archives for several years,” Davis notes on this occasion, “Western scientists were relieved to discover that archival materials, although they enrich the work, do not significantly influence our assessment of the economic institutions and social groups being studied . ” 5
This conclusion perhaps needs some clarification. Without fetishizing archival sources, it is worth recalling that many significant issues are insoluble without archival research. Davis himself has demonstrated the validity of this statement more than once. For example, only thanks to the archives was he able to find out how the aggravation of the foreign policy situation influenced the internal policy of the Stalinist leadership in 1931-1932. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, judging by the data discovered, was taken seriously in Moscow and led to a very significant increase in defense spending, which in turn further complicated the economic situation (pp. 164 - 176).
The importance of archival research is also evidenced by other publications by the author, which appeared in connection with the preparation of the fifth volume of the series, dedicated to the Soviet village of 1931 - 1933. A recent article (written by Davis in collaboration with S. Wheatcroft and M. Tauger) directly states that it was thanks to the archives that it was possible to clarify the fundamentally important question of the size of state grain funds during the famine of 1932 - 1933. 6 Emphasizing the responsibility of the Stalinist leadership for the destruction of agriculture during collectivization and the resulting famine, the authors provide data that is crucial in the debate about the immediate causes of this tragedy.
The widespread opinion about an artificial, deliberately organized famine comes from the fact that the government had funds at its disposal sufficient to prevent a catastrophe, and Stalin allegedly did not use these reserves for political reasons: he suppressed the resistance of the peasantry, especially the Ukrainian, with hunger. Now the doubts of opponents, who pointed out that the famine had gripped all the grain-producing regions of the country, regardless of the nationality of the population, that the terrible logic of the unfolding of this tragedy was understandable and without reference to Stalin’s special sinister plans, received new grounds. After carefully analyzing archival data, Davis and his co-authors showed that Stalin's leadership was never able to create significant grain reserves: on July 1, 1933, state reserves amounted to only 1.141 million tons. As the authors of the article believe, this was enough to save at least some of the starving people, but the Soviet leadership did nothing for them. However, it is also true that there were no significant reserves: a logical result of the destructive policy in the countryside.
The value of archives for exploring such questions is obvious. Publications by R. Davis and S. Wheatcroft on the problems of collectivization of the early 30s indicate that the fifth volume of “Industrialization of Soviet Russia” being prepared jointly by scientists is “Years of Famine. Soviet Agriculture. 1931-1933.” - will be no less noticeable than the published study on the crisis and progress in the Soviet economy.
Notes:
1 Davies RW Crisis and Progress in the Soviet Economy. 1931-1933 (The industrialization of Soviet Russia). London: Macmillan, 1996. - 612 pp. (R.W. Davis. Crisis and progress in the Soviet economy. 1931-1933 (Industrialization of Soviet Russia. Vol. 4). London: 1996. - 612 pp.)
2 Carr E. H., Davies R. W. Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926 - 1929. L., 1969. Vol. 1.
3 The Socialist Оffensive: The Collectivisation of Soviet Agriculture, 1929 - 1930. L. , 1980; The Soviet Collective Farm, 1929 - 1930. L., 1980; The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929 - 1930. L., 1989.
4 See the article by R. W. Davis on Western historiography of economic history in the book: Russia XIX - XX centuries. The view of foreign historians. M., 1996. S. 212 - 214.
5 Ibid., p. 216.
6 Slavic Review. Vol. 54, №3, Fall 1995, pp. 642 - 651.