
The key issue of the current artificially caused crisis is the motivation of the authorities. The question is this: either the sovereign will amuse himself - and after that everything will be restored, or nothing will be restored, but quite the opposite. Perhaps both - the multifactorial process has begun. But let us still focus on two versions - human and political.
So, the human version. The life of a Soviet official consisted of three pleasant elements. The first is the opportunity to do nothing, not risk anything, write fake reports, and participate in a general social hoax. The second was to be allowed to enjoy the benefits, to enjoy life, which included, as a special joy, being abroad, even in ersatz Germany. Third, the opportunity and even the obligation to trample fellow citizens. An official in the housing office and a KGB officer differed from each other in different ways of obtaining all three pleasures. And by the way, it’s not at all obvious who was happier. But it is absolutely clear who was older - work in the housing office took place next to the ordinary life of ordinary people. And the indispensable quality of intelligence workers was and remains isolation from these people, which gave rise to infantilism - after all, in all countries, under all regimes, in all these breeding grounds for supermen, something playful, unreal, something make-believe remains. Therefore, anger towards real life, towards independent people and their success can be limitless, giving rise to teenage cruelty and sophistication in those who have deprived themselves of the joys of adult life, exchanging them for belonging to the KGB superethnos.
We have been observing all three methods of bureaucratic hedonism over the past four years, receiving reports about the activities of the president. He did not make a single strategic decision, but spoke and spoke a lot; sometimes on private topics, but creating the illusion of “a great leader supervising on the spot the development of a new variety of rice” (this is also from Kimirsen’s magazine “Korea”). And now he has solved a problem on a global scale - he has prevented the privatization of Mosfilm .
He also traveled a lot and with obvious pleasure on vacation and abroad. In general, it gave grounds for the conclusion that it has recently been performing presentation functions . True, sometimes something strange is presented. This was, in particular, the last trip to Asian countries, which outlined the eastern priorities of Russian foreign policy. Like, now this is no less important than relations with the West. But who and why decided that in Asia this is the only turn they are waiting for, that we are vital and very necessary to everyone there? But this is a separate, albeit very funny question.
And, of course, the main pleasure is trampling fellow citizens. Turn off the water to the residents, exterminate the dissident, imprison the richest man in the country. But the president does not want to admit that he is taking part in Khodorkovsky’s fate. He does not listen to Maxim Sokolov , who calls on the sovereign not to hide behind the broad back of the prosecutor general. Here's more! It may also officially recognize what is being said openly on the sidelines, and by Zhirinovsky even from the podium . Namely, that a process had begun, which in Germany was called the Aryanization of property. We will call it Slavicization, probably, or something else.
Vladimir Putin agreed to hand over shares of hitherto inaccessible Russian monsters - Gazprom and Sberbank - to foreigners in exchange for the handing over of Khodorkovsky. That is, he lobbied for two commercial structures. It’s a strange job for a president, but to each his own. Promising does not mean getting married - that's clear. The fact that it was necessary to simply quell the confusion caused by the expropriation of the largest company, punished for its transparency, is also not a big secret. So he beckoned into the bright future with Sberbank shares, creating a smokescreen of prosecutorial requisition. There is no other way to describe the actions of law enforcement officers, because the wording of the resolution to seize the YUKOS shares as “actually owned” by Khodorkovsky recalls the times of “revolutionary expediency,” “objective imputation,” and “the queen of evidence.” Moreover, what is significant is that there is almost no internal PR aimed at the Russian audience; the main thing is to reassure the West.
But here's what happens. Putin’s very first speech on YUKOS with a call to stop the hysteria contained two theses. The President then said that we have separation of powers (on the one hand), and on the other, that there will be no deprivatization. This was repeated in an interview with Italian media. Nobody argues: the head of the executive branch should not interfere in the affairs of the prosecutor's office and the court. But how can this chapter give guarantees that there will be no deprivatization, if this is precisely what the courts and the prosecutor’s office are doing? Here is Deputy Yudin again on horseback, this time attacking Sibneft, demanding that the prosecutor’s office deal with it too. And even quite moderate and careful journalists ask: who rules the country - Putin or Yudin? And Abramovich’s press secretary is perplexed : how does this happen - if a sprout is bought for five dollars, and the tree grown from it is sold for fifty, then why is this a scam?
But Yudin and Putin are calling us to court, to court. To the very court that the majority of the population does not trust. In order to correct the situation, so that the court is completely impartial, it needs to convey the sovereign’s impression that during privatization there was a conspiracy in order to “cheaply” buy up the “national treasure,” which then consisted of precisely these same five-dollar sprouts.
When meeting with journalists, the president conducts a cover operation, that is, he does not work in the main direction. It goes without saying that the secondary role in this special operation must be compensated for somehow. And, sad as it is to realize this, we are talking about the possibility of dealing with Khodorkovsky. This is the simple human version. But there is also a political one.
Both Gleb Pavlovsky , liberal conservatives , and free-spirited analysts based their comments on the consequences of Alexander Voloshin’s resignation around the upcoming elections. Like who will win them for the president.
Indeed, at first glance, some nonsense is expected, which, nevertheless, will be called statesmanship, a policy of checks and balances, or some other “Putin consensus.” That is, the security officers, who do not understand anything about modern management or electoral technologies, will redistribute property in a proletarian manner, and the bourgeois specialists in the administration will ensure both the victory of United Russia in December and the victory of Putin in March. Actually, such duality is now observed in the government, which, with its reformist rhetoric and bureaucratic imitation of vigorous activity, somewhat camouflages the real redistribution of property, just as four years before it camouflaged the complete inactivity of the highest authorities.
But now this is no longer necessary. In private conversations, AP employees, either sharing secrets or leaking information, speak out in the spirit that Khodorkovsky’s arrest is a new election technology. That the electorate will now unite in two ways: either a small victorious war, or the arrest of a rich Jew.
However, this is not the most unpleasant thing. Since with Voloshin’s departure and further resignations the authorities will lose channels not only of influence on social movements and parties, but simply of objective information about their activities, a direct refusal of elections may become quite realistic, as Korzhakov and Barsukov proposed in 1996. Or holding them in such conditions that it would be better if they did not exist at all. Let’s say, according to the new Constitution and new electoral laws, when a lifelong president of Russia will be elected on a non-alternative basis.
Then we can conclude that Khodorkovsky’s arrest is not only (and perhaps not at all) the sovereign’s whim. That this is part of a general and completely rational plan, according to which it is necessary to isolate the sponsor of almost all (including even United Russia, which is facing a purge ) parties in order to be guaranteed to obtain a constitutional majority and already in March next year solve the problem of an indefinite presidency. Or come up with something else.
Conclusion? Oddly enough, “everyone goes to the polls.” And even if United Russia wins. Because, once in parliament, these people, sometimes very specific people , will want to get what they spent a lot of time, money and effort for. Instead, they will be offered to become disposable deputies, participants in the congress of victors, the delegates of which, as we know, disappeared into the camp dust. After all, if they really dutifully vote for radical changes in the political system, then who will need them with all their claims, ambitions and desires? Not only does being a deputy not pay off, it’s also about saving your head and keeping your feet on the ground.
And there is no ideology in all this. No noise design. No state, national, public interests. Just take it away and don’t share it with anyone. Silent march of rats. Which nevertheless can be stopped. Here are three counter-PR topics off the top of my head:
Four years of complete inaction, and now - the promise of liberal reforms. Funny. Personal fortunes of St. Petersburg security forces and the origin of these fortunes. Dangerous. Shchekochikhin, it seems, came too close to this. And very specifically, the result of the attack on YUKOS was the transfer of the company to the management of American citizens. Ridiculous.
No, you can, of course, continue to sit, remain silent, do nothing, but Mr. Voloshin and other liberals have already sat for four years - they worked as bridges between democracy and authoritarianism, united the ranks of United Russia and taught something to fellow commissars from revolutionary Petrograd.
But they don’t know how to run a country and modern companies. And they are unlikely to learn.