M.K.: Having long been asking the question “is right-wing art possible?”, I came to a disappointing conclusion: no, there is no artistic creativity in right-wing art. In the same way, when I now tell the left that they are responsible for the Gulag and Hitler, I may be unfair: no one is demanding that the right be responsible for some regime of Admiral Horthy, etc. So we exchange ideological attacks: the left has the Gulag , and the right has no creativity. Can the right be creative? Should the left be responsible for the Gulag?
N.P.: Here we find ourselves at the intersection of aesthetics and politics. And from such a mixture an explosive is often obtained. threw in the face of radical students in 1968 In answer to the second question, let me remind you of one formula that Habermas - “left-wing fascism.” Being a 100% left-wing thinker, he nevertheless felt the line that separates social criticism from the Gulag. Beyond this line lies the desire to turn aesthetics into politics, that is, to consider society as a material for the embodiment of one’s ideal plan. And the higher the resistance of the material, the fiercer the desire to impose your own style on it. In principle, it does not matter here what kind of plan - class or racial - is waiting for its implementation. Another thing is important: right and left, freedom or social justice, do not at all contain any special mechanism for generating the Gulag. To do this, you need to cross the line - to declare the internal law of self-organizing life invalid in the name of the highest imperative of the artist. Beyond this line, both the fight against the establishment and its preservation at any cost become sources of terror, the principle of which is the implementation of the plan in the material.
If we wrap this thesis around, we will return to the first question: it turns out that the “right” is the one for whom the value of life itself is unshakable. Therefore, he is allegedly incapable of artistic creativity. But this is a purely avant-garde understanding of art - the principle of innovation. Although this understanding turned out to be dominant in the twentieth century, its dialectic of self-destruction was just as clearly manifested. Art cannot constantly impose itself on life. Its meaning is rather to allow life to articulate itself. It’s the same in politics, when it recognizes the limits of the possible.
M.K.: Well, the degree of respect of the right for unconditional value cannot be exaggerated either. Just say: “There is no special “right” respect for the value of life.” For the sake of returning to the organic foundations of life and the right, one often wants (and has to) shoot ten to twenty thousand communists who have disrupted the organic course of life and destroyed its free self-organization with their Gulags. How long ago have we said so much that it would have been better if Kornilov had shot thousands of Leninists in August 1917, so that those thousands would not then exterminate millions?
But for now I’m talking about something else: that innovation, it seems, is not the most important motive of leftism. It seems that the main thing is social justice... Although, I must admit, in a self-sufficient street rebellion I see little desire for justice.
N.P.: The fact of the matter is that a street riot generally has little in common with any ideas. That is why they look so identical - both pogroms and revolutionary outrages.
As for justice, Aristotle already distinguished between equalizing and proportional justice, that is, when everyone owns what belongs to him by right. Leftism is usually identified with equalizing justice, although there were also variants of socialism based on the second concept, for example, “Prussian socialism.” Another thing is that the principle of distribution is just uncreative, unvital. With its help, you can only change something in the direction of development, promote balance. But balance as a principle of life is simply entropy. Therefore, that aura of freshness and creativity in the left consciousness comes from innovation, and not from justice. Even the idea itself - to select and distribute among everyone - is effective due to its unconventionality. After all, at the next step of the argument it turns out that there still won’t be enough for everyone. But the first step - overcoming common sense - is captivating with its novelty.
M.K.: Well, “take away and divide” is hardly that original. And yet, the pathos of socialism is the pathos of justice. Or are you separating creative innovative leftism from gloomy socialism? In the end, the extreme rapprochement, so obvious during the 19th and early 20th centuries, to the point of almost identification, of socialism and liberalism, that is, the liberation of social and personal liberations, then organically connected - this kinship was nourished by the general pathos of freedom. And only later it turned out that few people actually cared about social freedom. What is the pathos of justice in modern leftism?
N.P.: I would argue about the unoriginality of the distribution thesis. The magic of simple solutions always impresses. Including in modern times. In addition, in the idea of “distribution” there is always the moment of “extinction of personal responsibility”, already noticed by long-time critics of socialism. It was not only Marx’s son-in-law Lafargue who understood by justice “the right to laziness,” but today’s European trade unions, which call, as in Germany, to “stop being shy” in demanding higher wages, are essentially practicing such economic irresponsibility.
In the idea of “justice,” however, there is another aspect that can be called “the psychology of a generation.” Every new generation comes, finding the form of life already established and functioning normally. And it does not provide room for new requests, new interests, new rights. It is then that a feeling of “injustice” arises, of lack of recognition as an integral part of life. From such a feeling, if it finds forms of expression, leftist protest is formed. After all, if you look at today’s radical left parties, they are mostly young people fighting for “social recognition.” Moreover, sometimes it turns out, as in Germany with the party of former communists, that it is sometimes easier for young people to find a common language with former functionaries of the GDR, who also talk about their deprivation. And they jointly oppose the establishment, which is entirely socialist.
It turns out that the social justice of protest is not equal to the social justice of power. Although the ideology is the same everywhere.
M.K.: So you want to say that in leftist protest the thirst for one’s own self-realization and the selfish task of demanding new socio-cultural vacancies and spaces is more important than all the populist or anti-globalist rhetoric about helping the weak and poor? So the new left has - even rhetorically - forgotten about the social side of leftism? After all, until 1917, this side was an absolute priority for them. It was she, and not Meyerhold’s creativity, that raised the communist revolution, resonating with the mass thirst for social equality.
N.P.: Yes, exactly. The scale of criticism is completely different when the eight-hour working day is introduced everywhere, when women have access to education and universal suffrage prevails. When the foundations of social peace (in the sense of non-war) have already been built, then only the generational energy of protest remains: disputes over tuition fees, permission for homosexual marriages, etc. There is one striking example of a paradigm shift - the interpretation of the Hegelian dialectic of “master” and “slave” from “Phenomenology of Spirit”. After all, it was the Marxists who extracted this theme of the “struggle for recognition” from Hegel, and in Lukács’s writings it was presented as an illustration of the class struggle for the emancipation of slaves. But then, somehow, a different version gradually took hold—Kojeve’s—where this dialectic is understood as an illustration of the “struggle for prestige.” All the arguments seemed to remain in place, but class tension disappeared. And now modern multiculturalists appeal to Hegel precisely for the purpose of theoretical justification of their regional truth. This is called the "policy of recognition."
However, I still do not agree that the mythology of innovation did not play a significant role in 1917. Yes, of course, the main force was the masses and the party. But the ideological support for the coup was clothed precisely in the myth of the “new world.” the same Shpet wrote in the preface to the furiously scientific treatise: “Phenomenon and Meaning”: “The world is collapsing, but it’s fun to live!” After all , even before the revolution,
M.K.: But it’s strange that leftist innovators, having lost the tension of social liberation, continue to appeal to Lenin, Trotsky, Mao. After all, hand on heart, neither the first nor the second or third have any particularly bright creative or social-demagogic rhetoric. Where do their modern admirers get this passion to clothe their spiritual quests in the rhetoric of practical communist cannibals? God be with them, with Marx-Hegel, but why are these Gulag practices dear?
N.P.: The word “practical” is important here. But it marks a completely different attitude: “Enough of the discussion, it’s time to get down to business in an organized manner.” And here other “authorities” who are not burdened by spiritual quests become important. Plekhanov is not interesting here, Trotsky is interesting. What’s scary is that those who appeal to him still think that they can avoid Gulag practices, that they can ride the wave of pure and fair protest, the embodiment of which is Trotsky, and not Stalin. But the line has already been crossed. This is very clearly seen in the example of European terrorism in the 1970s - individual people can still stop, but the dynamics of the organization are drawn towards terror.
In this case, again, we are faced with the problem of an attitude of consciousness, and not with an idea. The left of 1968 was inspired not only by Mao, but also by Carl Schmitt, that radical right-wing fighter against parliamentarism.
M.K.: It turns out that what is important for Trotsky-Mao is the impulse to practice, not practice (for their practice can hardly be positively mythologized), but a conservative critic of democracy is a criticism of the “inadequacy”, “bourgeoisness” of liberal institutions. But such critics and “anti-system” fringes are a dime a dozen. And Trotsky and Mao are specific precisely in that their impulse, in addition to the changes in social matter it causes, is measured by the masses of corpses. It turns out that what the left needs is Nekrasov’s “thing is strong when blood flows underneath it.” However, Nekrasov had in mind the blood of self-sacrifice, and not the victims of the revolution...
N.P.: Yes, those leftists who have already moved from “weapons of criticism” to “criticism with weapons” (if we recall Marx’s metaphor) act according to the logic “the worse, the better”: the harsher the repression of the authorities, the worse it will be response of the masses. Blood seems to be a natural justification for its historical mission. But the main contingent of the radical left is still interested in Trotsky, rather, as a total practical critic of the system. That is why he stood alongside, for example, Marcuse (as a theoretical total critic) among the students of 1968. We are talking about a kind of social myth, and in it Trotsky is a symbol of an unrealized practical impulse, like Rosa Luxemburg. I think very few people knew how many victims were on the conscience of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council. And Mao was perceived rather as an opponent of the Soviet system, and not as a bloody tyrant. Here, of course, a significant element of self-hypnosis must also be taken into account - after all, only a small part was ready to openly admit to themselves the inevitability of blood. It was then that most of the leaders of the 1968 generation took credit for the fact that they followed a peaceful path.
M.K.: Anti-globalists now have another concern - the welfare of the “third world”, and this means that the demand for social justice is returning. It’s easy for me to say that both Trotskyists and anti-globalists are unlikely to be able, roughly speaking, to “be responsible for the market” and actually build a system of social justice. After all, around them, in Europe, they already have experience of practical socialism and are unlikely to be able to offer anything other than a system of total bureaucratic redistribution. But I want to find some truth from them too. They cannot but have their own social, political and economic project. And although ordinary street idiots don’t give a damn about the projects, their intellectual provocateurs and guides cannot help but think about it.
NP: The “Third World” is a long-time favorite topic of the left. But here again, even a comparison with the mid-sixties, with its residual reactions of colonialism, demonstrates a dynamic that leaves no room for maneuver for the leftist project. If European governments are debating whether to allocate three or five percent of national budgets to the “economic development” of the Third World (and this is such an amount that it is even difficult to imagine!), then the statement about ignoring the interests of developing countries is hardly capable of drawing people to the barricades.
At the same time, I do not yet see any clear ideological projects of anti-globalism. Trotskyists in France or Germany so far feed only on the energy of protest, without any social project of their own. There is only a retrospective: the already integrated left is actively creating the myth that changes in Western societies in the last 30 years became possible only thanks to their oppositional pressure (which, however, is only partly true), and the non-integrated left is frightening about the onset of global capitalism, in which there is no longer a place utopias and the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.
You're completely missing the point about the establishment left. Apparently, in your questions concerning Russia, it is irrelevant. Meanwhile, if we are talking about the “costs” of leftism, then we should focus not on Trotskyists and anti-globalists, who are pure marginals, but on that creeping leftism that, through legislative practice, permeates modern liberal societies. After all, even after coming to power, right-wing governments are not able to abolish all the products of left-wing lawmaking. And thereby leftism penetrates into the very institutional flesh of legal states, truly depriving them of the legal opportunity for an adequate institutional response to the movement of reality. In connection with your criticism of socialism, I once formulated for myself one distinction that makes sense when assessing socialism: the distinction between politics and the institutional structure of society. All these socialisms of Clinton, Jospin, etc. (whether in relation to Kosovo or other problems of world politics) remain only a temporary phenomenon (until a change of cabinet), if they are not embedded in the institutional flesh of society. The fact that after September 11 this policy of worldwide championing of human rights was easily abandoned in the United States indicates that it was precisely a “political” and not an “institutional” phenomenon. The situation becomes more serious when such socialism is transformed from political rhetoric into legislative practice. Here you can't go around him anymore. Moreover, if two or three introduced taxes can still be cancelled, then, for example, the condition of “preference for women or some minorities” when hiring is no longer so easy to cancel.
I understand that this topic is not particularly relevant for Russia, due to the lack of an organized leftist movement fighting for power. But when assessing “leftism” as a phenomenon as a whole, this aspect must be taken into account first.
M.K.: Your words may somehow comment on the growing complexities of the left in Europe, but they do not at all explain its indispensable institutional and cultural role. Well, it all boils down to protest. Finally, what, in this case, could be the completely inevitable new role of the left in Russia?
N.P.: But the cultural-institutional role is to achieve the integration of those forms of life that, for some reason, have not yet received recognition and rights. Since the dynamics of life are such that it is impossible to satisfy the interests of everyone, this is where the pathos of injustice and social protest constantly arise. If this is not a naked gesture of denial, then it has every chance of being integrated into the systemic context.
In Russia, in my opinion, the case is different - here any form of coherent and organized social criticism will easily occupy a left-wing niche if it does not get involved in bargaining between corporations, called parties, and the state. Therefore, it is quite natural to expect that with the first signs of stabilization of life, a left movement will emerge from moderate reformism to Trotskyist radicals. That is, there is a normal resistance to what Habermas called “the colonization of the lifeworld by the system.” And resistance to the system as such and the desire to take a place in the system will induce forms of left opposition, apparently even without any connection with the current communists. The problem, rather, is for the authorities to find ways to compromise with them that do not allow the radicalization of protest. Here, by the way, a new reflection on the history of 1917 is possible, no longer in the perspective of fierce anti-communism (are you for the Reds or for the Whites?), but with an analysis of the paralysis of power and the helplessness of social liberal alternatives.
M.K.: If we approach the topic of reflection on 1917 statistically, we will have to admit that until now 90% of descriptions of the revolution in textbooks, general courses and monographs follow poorly specified formulas of Soviet historiography, and fierce anti-communism remains marginal. So the social-liberal correction you expect from the spiritual image of the Bolshevik revolutionaries will not be drawing a middle line between communist apologetics and anti-communist hysteria, but almost a lapidary return to the formulas of Stalin’s “Short Course of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)”, which also, by the way, especially emphasized “helplessness social liberal alternatives."
But I think more about something else: what is the field of compromise between the authorities and the new left? It is assumed that a compromise is possible, first of all, with those who are already integrated into the regime, and not with street leftists.
N.P.: Perhaps you are right. I really don’t read history textbooks, but that layer of philosophical and historical reflection that accumulated in the 1990s and simply varied the formula “the Bolsheviks ruined Russia” clearly requires social-liberal correction, and at least even in the spirit of those very self-critical theses, so that were expressed freshly by Russian philosophers in the collection “From the Depths”. There, by the way, it is the liberal Frank who writes about the “helplessness of Russian liberalism.”
The question of compromise makes sense either in the aspect of specific communication with representatives of the new left, which, in my opinion, is not yet the subject of discussion, due to the absence of any articulate subjects of the movement, or it means fundamental openness to the arguments of the opposite side.
In addition, the left is a whole continuum of degrees, from those integrated into the regime to street demonstrators breaking windows. The latter, by the way, define themselves even more in relation to the “revisionists” who have “sold out to the regime” than to the regime itself. Therefore, the wider the spectrum of power communication, the less significant the space of influence of street marginals will be. After all, there are limits to reasoned discussion. Aristotle also noted that “those who do not honor the gods and do not respect their parents should not be admonished, but reprimanded.”
M.K.: That’s all your right-wing liberalism, which takes left-wing truth into its heart. Last question: do you expect any ideological or cultural creativity from the Russian right-wing circle of Gaidar and Chubais? Why is the new left so important and necessary for you personally, as a public person, because the old left - the current members of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation - were never needed?
N.P.: Alas, alas, my heart is unable to accept all the pain of humanity. Only enough for her articulate expressions.
What is important to me is not the left in itself, but a critical reflection of reality that does not allow the system to close in on itself. Previously, it was always associated with the leftist idea, due to the eternal opposition of the latter. But now it turns out that criticism of the status quo is not a monopoly of the left. Rather, on the contrary, ideological conservatism today can perform a critical function with no less success. The most clear critical arguments - whether on the issue of European integration or genetic experiments with human material - come from the circles of Catholic theology, the right-wing press and conservative philosophy. And one cannot say that they are completely marginal. Already the discussion about the war in Yugoslavia has outlined such a trend. Another thing is that the discussion itself is driven into politically correct frameworks, but it is a matter of time before they are overcome.
The situation in Russia, it seems to me, is different in that the official rhetoric itself since the time of Yeltsin is right-wing, interspersed with the idea of social policy, while real politics is forced to be almost all left-wing, social democratic in the classical sense, which is what the communists are talking about, of course , were kept silent while fighting the anti-people regime. Putin’s ascent was accompanied by an attempt to change the rhetoric to “social liberal” and, judging by the election results, it really found a response, drawing the entire electorate to the dummy “Unity”, which had nothing behind its soul except this rhetoric of “social justice” or “rights” for a decent human existence."
Therefore, I don’t really understand the talk about the revival of the leftist idea. Perhaps in artistic and intellectual circles they make an impression under the influence of Zizek’s demagoguery. But this demagoguery is a typically European gesture, reacting to the established leftist discourse with even more leftist criticism, which agrees to some completely absurd things (like the glorification of Lenin’s terror). Another thing is responsible critical discourse. We really lack him terribly. Not least of all, simply due to the lack of outlets for criticism. Philosophy has never developed, and independent (that is, not tied to power) right-wing liberal thought is absent.
The creativity of the current Russian right could consist in a more responsible awareness of the independent interests of their potential electorate, and not in running around the offices of power. But I suspect that the “new right” will be more likely to do this here too.